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Unhappy Consciousness: Recognition and Reification in Victorian Fiction 
Ben Parker 
 
 Unhappy Consciousness is a study of recognition scenes in the Victorian novel and 
their relation to Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism. Victorian recognition scenes 
often show a hero’s self- discovery as a retrospective identification with things. When, 
for example, in Henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady, Isabel Archer learns the truth 
about her marriage: “She saw, in the crude light of that revelation... the dry staring fact 
that she had been an applied handled hung-up tool, as senseless and convenient as mere 
shaped wood and iron.” The retrospective discovery of identity in Victorian novels is 
often figured as a catastrophic falling-apart of a stable self that is also an economic object 
or instrument: a bank check, a debt, a forgery, an inheritance, or an accumulated 
principal. 
 Recognition scenes cannot be considered in the light of a timeless “master plot” or 
the classical poetics of Aristotelian anagnorisis, but need to be interpreted in terms of 
historical forms of social misrecognition (such as Marx’s analysis of fetishism). Unhappy 
Consciousness contends that, if we are going to talk about nineteenth century things, we 
will have to take into account the novelistic misrecognition of the self, insofar as the 
heroes misrecognize themselves in forms of commodity fetishism. The thing is so often 
the subject herself insofar as “barred,” dispersed among retrospective or delayed object 
identifications. I respond to the historical contextualization in Victorian cultural studies 
of “commodity culture,” insisting that the economic structure of the commodity is not 
only a topic for realist notation, but makes up the inner logic of the novel form. Unhappy 
Consciousness urges a return to questions of novel theory which were perhaps set aside 
during New Historicism, arguing for a particularly novelistic mode of “objectification” 
(the form of the hero’s activity) seen in interaction with the historical mode of 
objectification found in the capitalist value-form. 
I advance this argument through studies of several canonical Victorian works. 
Chapter One looks at the tension in Charles Dickens’s Little Dorrit between the 
ideological closure attained in the “family romance” plot of buried wills and restored 
parents, and the dead-end of interpretation and retrospection found in the plot of financial 
crisis and stock swindles. Chapter Two argues that, in Anthony Trollope’s The Last 
Chronicle of Barset, the tautological nature of interest rate is not confined to the urban 
financial plot but is displaced and affectively diffused over the provincial mystery plot. 
Chapter Three is a study of the Sherlock Holmes stories by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, in 
which I read the detective as an exaggerated portrait of the subjective effects of capitalist 
alienation, a monad whose only intervention in the world is to link predictive results with 
opaque processes, to “produce” recognition scenes (the solutions to each case) as a 
salable commodity. He is a machine for retrospection who has no personal past. In 
Chapter Four, I read Henry James’s The Portrait of a Lady as a critique of the fetishizing 
of autonomous consciousness, using Marx’s definition of fetishism as the misrecognition 
of a social form as the content of a thing. Isabel’s mistake is to misconstrue the structure 
of the male gaze that constitutes her “freedom” as the inherent property of her 
individuality—until it is unmasked as a trap. As so often in the Victorian novel, fetishism 








Table of Contents 
Acknowledgments… ii 
Introduction... 1 
1. Recognition or Reification?: Capitalist Crisis and Subjectivity in Little Dorrit… 34 
2. Tautology and Displacement in The Last Chronicle of Barset… 66 
3. Locked Rooms: Empiricism and Form in Sherlock Holmes… 109 
4. Unhappy Consciousness… 147 
Conclusion… 196 















I owe the following people something better than attaching their names to the work 
now in front of you, but it is all I have, and without their support and criticism, writing it 
would simply not have been possible. 
Nicholas Dames treated these ideas with dignity when they were barely even thoughts. 
There is no greater spur to serious work than being taken seriously, and what is principled 
and ambitious here grew up in the space of that respect. Bruce Robbins and James Eli 
Adams always knew better than I what was vital and what was chimerical about this 
research. 
Edward Mendelson was an invaluable compass. David Miller!s questions and 
engagement at the very outset were Circe-like in pointing out where lay the cliffs and 
Sirens in my thinking. Amanda Claybaugh!s advice on a very early form of this material 
was prescient and I have tried to live up to it. 
My thanks to the Nineteenth Century Colloquium at Columbia University for the 
space to share these ideas in various shapes and sizes. Erik Gray, Sharon Marcus, and 
Anahid Nersessian all provided useful feedback on a version of Chapter Four. 
To my friends: you have been my courage to get through this. The tenor of Christine 
Smallwood!s own thinking has been ever before me. In this roll call, she deserves a 
somewhat more epic part, along the lines of Agamemnon in Homer!s catalog of ships. 
Jeanette Samyn and Anjuli Raza Kolb always understood what were my real concerns 
here. Yumi Lee, Anna Clark, Zachary Samalin, Andy Liu, and Spencer Bastedo all read 






The writing of this dissertation has also been a stretch of life, in which Golnar 
Nikpour, Meg McDermott, Anne Diebel, and Piper Marshall all were vital and human 
players. 
My father has, I believe, read every page of this dissertation. But not a word of this 





























“Like one who dreams he is being harmed, 
And even as he dreams, wishes it may be a dream, 
So that he longs for what is, as if it were not...” 







 The concept of reification originates in the writings of Karl Marx, but to see what it entails, I 
want to look not into the pages of Capital, but to the recognition scene in Charles Dickens’s 
Great Expectations.  
 Just prior to narrating the discovery of his benefactor’s identity—and the attendant dashing of 
his most cherished self-deceptions—Pip anticipates:  
I pass on, unhindered, to the event that had impended over me for longer yet... In the 
Eastern story, the heavy slab that was to fall on the bed of state in the flush of conquest 
was slowly wrought out of the quarry, the tunnel for the rope to hold it in its place was 
slowly carried through the leagues of rock, the slab was slowly raised and fitted in the 
roof, the rope was rove to it and slowly taken through the miles of hollow to the great 
iron ring. All being made ready with much labor, and the hour come, the sultan was 
aroused in the dead of the night, and the sharpened axe that was to sever the rope from 
the great iron ring was put into his hand, and he struck with it, and the rope parted and 
rushed away, and the ceiling fell. So in my case; all the work, near and afar, that tended 
to the end, had been accomplished; and in an instant the blow was struck, and the roof of 
my stronghold dropped upon me.1 
 
The recognition scene that follows discloses to Pip: an unlooked-for intimacy with another 
person—the convict Abel Magwitch, his benefactor and “second father”; the vanity of his 
aspirations in love; and his shameful, willful blindness to the meanings of the past. Hardly 
anything touching on Pip’s inner being is not overturned by Magwitch’s arrival: “All the truth of 
my position came flashing on me; and its disappointments, dangers, disgraces, consequences of 
all kinds, rushed in in such a multitude that I was borne down by them and had to struggle for 
every breath I drew.”2  
 And yet this knowledge, which penetrates to the core of Pip’s self, is described in terms of an 
impersonal, in fact a mechanical process: a matter of ropes and pulleys and stones. The “Eastern 
story” tells of enormous distances (“miles of hollow”) through which an inexorable, rigged 
                                                
1 Charles Dickens, Great Expectations (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 297. 




apparatus slams down the massive fact of the stone slab. The emotional and interpersonal 
knowledge to come is rendered as an external, objective inevitability, removed from any 
subjectivity, interpretation, or engagement with others. And where is Pip amidst so much hauling 
and quarrying? He is nowhere to be found in this picture, until finally the slab drops and 
obliterates him. But the recognition scene that is being described in this fable—Magwitch’s 
revelation—tells a different story, that Pip cannot be separated from the long ramifications of the 
past or taken out of the picture. He is, so to speak, dispersed or buried all along the way. When 
he sees, in the person of the weather-beaten and grimy sheep-farmer, the hitherto-concealed 
source of his own income and genteel position, he also sees himself as a thing, produced and 
bought behind his back. Magwitch, oblivious to Pip’s horrified reaction, exults in Pip as a 
particularly valuable commodity: “If I ain’t a gentleman, nor yet ain’t got no learning, I’m the 
owner of such. All on you owns stock and land; which on you owns a brought-up London 
gentleman?”3  Pip himself is shown to be, in the clerk Wemmick’s expression, only so much 
“portable property.”  
 This is a study of the dialectic between recognition scenes and reification in Victorian fiction. 
In the two scenes above, the recognition that Pip’s expectations are bound up in Magwitch, this 
figure of uninvited otherness, is figured in terms of an impersonal process of ropes and slabs 
taking place far from consciousness, and as an equally-removed and unconscious commodity-
production. In short, it is impossible to separate the aesthetic category “recognition scene” from 
the thingly abstractions of capitalism. Both recognition and reification are structures of 
concealment, whether it be the discovery of madwomen in attics, the unmasking of Red-headed 
Leagues, and the re-parenting of orphans, on one hand, or the mystifications of finance and the 
“hidden abode” of industrial labor, on the other. They interfere with one another, their logics 
                                                




override and interpenetrate. What is concealed or repressed by reification—the social relations 
obscured by the commodity form—return in recognition as formal, narrative distortions. 
 Reification has long been a topic of literary studies, especially of the Victorian novel—albeit 
often under the heading of “commodity fetishism”—in such diverse settings as material culture, 
affect studies, “thing theory,” New Historicism, and ideology critique.4 These studies have been 
characterized by a contextualist method where the economic is heterogenous to the literary, so 
much material to be worked upon by art—depicted, thematized, and domesticated by mimesis. A 
phenomenon like reification would then belong to the real, external order of imitated things. 
Alternately, as in the work of Mary Poovey, the economic is seen as not heterogenous, but rather 
continuous with the literary; realism participates, together with the “genre” of paper money, in 
the discursive framing and assembling of the economic as representable. In either case, the 
economic is recruited into textuality and linguistic representation. However, reification has not 
been studied as an aesthetic category in its own right, as having a temporal or narrative 
dimension. But the themes and consequences of recognition—identity, narrative and ideological 
closure, teleology, subjectivity—are also what is at stake in reification. 
 Reification is itself a misrecognition, a mode of “misrepresentation,”5 under which subjective 
and intersubjective social structures appear as an alien, opposing objectivity. Far from being a 
(more or less regrettable) occurrence available for novelistic representation, reification is rather 
the (historical, class-mediated) framework of that representation. But a representation that is at 
the same time a structure of repression—or a representation by repression.  
                                                
4 To name a few: Andrew Miller, Novels Behind Glass: Commodity Culture and Victorian Narrative; Elaine 
Freedgood, The Ideas in Things: Fugitive Meaning in the Victorian Novel; Mary Poovey, Genres of the Credit 
Economy: Mediating Value in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Britain; Catherine Gallagher, The Body 
Economic: Life, Death, and Sensation in Political Economy and the Victorian Novel; Ann Cvetkovich, Mixed 
Feelings: Feminism, Mass Culture, and Victorian Sensationalism (especially Chapter Seven, on “Marx!s Capital 
and the Mystery of the Commodity”). 




 The connection between recognition and reification is already implicit in the key Marxist 
analysis of reification, Georg Lukács’s essay “Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Proletariat.” At the center of Lukács’s deduction of the proletariat as the “subject of history”6 
from “the riddle of commodity-structure”7 is a remarkable moment of recognition, whereby “in 
the commodity the worker recognizes himself and his own relations with capital.”8 This 
recognition depends on both an objective and a subjective conception of reification. On one 
hand, reification is a mode of subjectivity, which “stamps its imprint upon the whole 
consciousness of man”9 and appears as “the necessary, immediate reality of every person living 
in capitalist society.”10 On the other hand, for the proletarian, in his consciousness and “in his 
social existence the worker is immediately placed wholly on the side of the object,”11 giving rise 
to “the split between subjectivity and objectivity induced in man by the compulsion to objectify 
himself as a commodity.”12 In other words, the worker must become self-conscious in that very 
location where he is an unconscious, produced thing: his economic position as a commodity. 
 Following this recognition scene, we might read Lukács’s analysis of reification to be itself a 
“theory of the novel,” as it provides an implicit theory of subjectivity, of repression, of ethics, 
and of immediacy and representation. If reification posits an objective world of material 
exchange, autonomous processes, and thingly values independent of and impenetrable by the 
subject, then recognition (exemplified by the proletarian class consciousness that is the “self-
consciousness of the commodity”13) is the collapse of this separation.  
                                                
6 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1972), 145. 
7 Ibid., 83.  
8 Ibid., 168. 
9 Ibid., 100. 
10 Ibid., 197. 
11 Ibid., 167. 
12 Ibid., 168. 




 By contrast, the classical theories of the novel are dependent upon (or are theorizations of) a 
reified subjectivity. In Ian Watt’s The Rise of the Novel, this separation of the self and the world, 
subject and object, is seen as innate to realism: “the basic terms of [novelistic] inquiry have been 
dictated by the narrative equivalent of dualism” along the lines of Cartesian ontology.14 In  
Lukács’s own The Theory of the Novel, the novelistic subject follows the dualist model: the 
historical disintegration of the unified epic vision resolves itself into the stark novelistic 
opposition between “soul” and “world.”15 Such a dualism, holding asunder the hero or narrator 
from an indifferent external world, is the starting point for what might be considered as the main 
line of the nineteenth-century European novel, which is continually taking up the questions, 
“What is my place in the world? How can I make my inner life into an external reality?” This is 
the situation of Dorothea Brooke in Middlemarch, Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment, Pierre 
Bezukhov in War and Peace, as well as of the heroes in the prototypical Bildungsromane of 
Goethe, Balzac, and Stendhal. The answer almost always involves the lowering or adjusting of 
one’s expectations; the difficulty is to wedge one’s life into its eventually limited niche, to “find 
one’s place.”  
 Against this, recognition scenes would seem to contend that one’s “place” in the world is not 
a substantial given, a question of the right fit within an external order, but a structural illusion 
that collapses under the weight of desire. This opens up some specifically “novelistic” ways of 
thinking about reification: about the immanence of meaning in realist representation, the telos of 
a life-story, and the alterity of the social world. Recognition thus becomes a fulcrum by which to 
motivate the question that Lukács identifies as “the dissonance special to the novel,” namely “the 
                                                
14 Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001), 295. 




refusal of the immanence of being to enter into empirical life.”16 
 In recognition scenes, “who I am” turns out to have preceded the self’s appearance in the 
object-world, as the disavowed or opaque organization of one’s desires. The meaning of this de-
centered subject is found within this framework of external reality as unrecognized appearance, 
what cannot be perceived “straight on.”  Where Pip... or Oedipus, or Jane Eyre, or Luke 
Skywalker, sees him or herself mirrored in the outside world—intended by Miss Havisham for 
Estella, savior of Thebes, mistress of Thornhill, revenger of his father’s death—are all untenable, 
impossible places. In such recognition scenes, one finds that one is that very blindspot. The 
traces or clues one previously ignored, come to speak the loudest. Identity resides in what 
seemed the most other: a convict’s graces, or an enemy’s outreached hand. The foreign city turns 
out to be your home. The attic turns out to hold the Mrs. Rochester you thought you were.  
 Reification and recognition together, read together as structures of subjectivity, contest the 
picture of the mind and world proposed by classical novel theory, the realist model of 
representation, historicist constructions of context and discourse, as well as the “formalist” 
isolation of narratological questions. But reification and recognition cannot be separated out into 
a hierarchy or into distinct spheres—the language of allegory, representation, homology, 
reflection. In the dialectic between them, we can only retroactively posit two positive, conflicting 
forces—not real conditions and their representation, but a relation of interference and 
contestation. Not mimesis, but a mutual contamination and blind groping, soliciting and counter-
soliciting. But perhaps this is all less clear than starting to define the two logics separately, as 
though they were not constantly crowding in on one another.  
* 
 Aristotle, in his Poetics, defines recognition (anagnorisis) as “a change from ignorance to 
                                                




knowledge,”17 and cites the Oedipus of Sophocles as the highest achievement in tragedy because 
the recognition there “arises from the internal structure of the plot”18 and is “coincident with a 
Reversal of the Situation.”19 Now, Aristotle’s definitions have a way of turning into 
prescriptions, or even hierarchies of categories, and the Poetics is especially valuable in 
indicating where recognition scenes might go awry or fall flat. So, we hear that recognition 
should not proceed from signs or tokens, or spontaneous declaration, but should spring from 
immanent causes, “by a turn of incident.”20 All these delineations remain in force for the present 
study. On one hand, recognition should emerge out of (only) that which we have already seen—a 
kind of aesthetic Ockham’s razor, enjoining the dramatist not to unnecessarily multiply entities. 
So, no deus ex machina, no late-introduced clues. On the other hand, recognition should 
illuminate what we have seen—something (the truth) should appear where we didn’t see it 
before. The knowledge to be gained is not just coming upon some new fact (this would be plain 
old cognition, gnosis), but in a sense must be an undoing: a reversal within knowledge, not mere 
additional information. Aristotle treats as a separate question the “irreparable deed (perpetrated) 
in ignorance,” under the heading of “the circumstances which strike us as terrible or pitiful.”21 
But this question of knowing and not-knowing will be essential to our sense of recognition. 
Ignorance (agnoia) is not a simple starting-place, neither the opposite of knowledge nor its lack. 
 Let us take another look at the Oedipus, if possible without Aristotelian glasses on. To begin: 
does Oedipus move “from knowledge to ignorance,” as the Poetics defines recognition? After 
all, he comes onstage marked out as one who knows. Having answered the sphinx’s riddle, 
Oedipus knows what man is, when so many others did not. At least, he knows intellectually, 
                                                
17 Aristotle, Poetics, trans. S.H. Butcher (Mineola, NY: Dover, 1997), Chapter XI. 
18 Ibid., Chapter X. 
19 Ibid., Chapter XI. 
20 Ibid., Chapter XVI. 




definitionally. In the same way, he is well-apprised of his horrific fate from oracles. His story is 
not one of benighted unawareness, but precisely of factual or oracular knowledge, knowledge 
that is useless to him because it remains either descriptive or prophetic. The course of the drama 
is to bring home to Oedipus how he has already lived this knowledge, unawares. Hegel describes 
the tragic hero thus: “The agent finds himself... in the opposition of knowing and not knowing... 
For the knowledge [of oracles] is, in its very principle, directly not knowledge, because 
consciousness in acting is inherently this opposition.”22  
 At the beginning of the play, Oedipus sets out to investigate the cause of the plague in Thebes, 
vowing to expel the murderer of Laius. He asserts that he can play detective here unbiased, “as 
one that is a stranger to the story as stranger to the deed.”23 But the question he approaches as 
one alien to himself, turns out to be his own story; moreover, his very being is enmeshed in what 
is most abhorrent to himself, and which he had sought to distance himself from by leaving 
Corinth. Everything at the beginning of the play that is repudiated as the utmost contamination 
and fled from—and everything that appears as having arisen externally, as a “case” to solve—all 
of this is precisely where Oedipus will find himself, outside of himself. In other words, where 
Oedipus is “unknowing”24 or “unconscious”25 [lelethenai, lelethas], there he is befouling 
himself, there is the truth he is looking for. Recognition is self-recognition in otherness. 
 The principle of recognition in the play is stated by Creon: “That which is sought is found; the 
unheeded thing escapes.”26 This means first of all that truth, however unrecognized, leads a 
life—is ongoing—even in its misprision. Recognition supersedes an existing interpretation, it 
                                                
22 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J.B. Baillie (New York: Harper & Row, 
1967), 739-40. 
23 Sophocles, Oedipus the King, in Works I, trans. David Grene (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991), lines 219-
20. 
24 Ibid., line 366. 
25 Ibid., line 415. 




does not step into a vacuum. The old meanings and identities are also a container for that which 
emerges and overturns them. That is, the “false” organization not only includes (as “unheeded”) 
the nodes of a latent truth, but itself was minimally coherent, operational. Oedipus’s ignorance is 
itself a structure, and one that goes, however limpingly. As Martin Heidegger remarks, the 
initial, fleeting appearance of Oedipus as “savior and lord of the state” is “not just Oedipus’s 
subjective view of himself, but that within which the appearing of his Dasein happens.”27 
Recognition takes place within the sway of “false” interpretations whose falsity lies not in their 
covering-up or excluding the arrangement of true identities, but rather in being the existence of 
these identities in their unconscious, unheeded state. Truth before its recognition is still pressing, 
as it were, from the other side—it is not an absolutely passive substrate. Nor is falsehood a mere 
smoke-screen or inaccurate assessment. 
 Recognition retroactively illuminates the past, not only substituting a new identity for an old, 
but also sifting the grains of truth in the existing account. A number of inert or floating details 
suddenly snap into place, as for instance the protagonist’s own name (in Greek, “swollen foot”). 
What was previously a mere biographical given, Oedipus’s lameness, is now integrated into an 
appalling explanation (his ankles were pierced by his parents before they exposed him on a 
hillside), which is in turn granted all the power of tragic repetition (his being thus cast out to die 
as a child is then echoed in his banishment from Thebes at the play’s conclusion). This aspect of 
retroactive significance, or illumination, compels a kind of virtual “re-reading,” summoning up a 
train of neglected or ambiguous statements that only subsequently can be heard correctly and 
placed in a new light, e.g., the more oracular statements by Tiresias.  
 “The unheeded thing escapes” also means that recognition arises from the overlooked, the 
                                                
27 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven, CT: Yale 




excessive, the fortuitous—in the case of the oracle, even from the ambiguous and slippery. One 
might call this the aleatory or non-teleological aspect of recognition. The truth inheres in what is 
marginal and unorganized, outside of the structured coherence of the initial situation. What gives 
so much power to the recognition springing from “the incidents themselves”28 is the apparent 
contingency of this immanence—how much depends, for instance, on the identity of the 
messenger from Corinth. Tragedies are often described as mousetraps, inexorable downfalls 
needing only to be set in motion. But if there is something like “iron necessity,” that of the 
Oedipus is more like gossamer. 
 Oedipus no sooner discerns the identity of his prophesied fate with his present life than that 
life collapses, like the disturbance of a reflection in the water. Recognition is not a reconciliation: 
he cannot linger in this new-found identity. What Oedipus recognizes is nothing but his own 
vanishing and dissolution. The chorus wails, “O generations of men, how I count you as equal 
with those who live not at all”:29 his very being is annulled in the moment of finding itself. What 
is recognized is not some essential identity, but rather his own dissolution, so that in Oedipus at 
Colonus, Oedipus can speak of no longer being.30 To know his past is to know how illusory and 
fleeting was his ideal image of himself. But this hubris is not a mere over-confidence or 
pridefulness, it is something actively mirrored in the fragility of the initial appearances. 
 To summarize the preceding: 
-Recognition is not a move from ignorance to knowledge; the reversal locates knowing 
within not-knowing, and vice versa.  
 
-Recognition is a self-recognition in otherness, an identity found in the object-world. 
 
-Truth is not a passive latency, but has a life in concealment. Falsehood equally is not an 
impotent, illusory non-being. 
                                                
28 Aristotle, Poetics, Chapter XVI. 
29 Sophocles, Oedipus Rex, lines 1186-8. 





-Recognition rewrites the past, illuminating a retroactive significance. 
 
-Recognition hinges on contingency. 
 
-The discovery of identity is equally the collapse of one’s “place” in the world. 
 
 This reading of Oedipus owes a great deal to psychoanalysis—though not to Freud’s own 
reading of Sophocles’s play in The Interpretation of Dreams. As Terence Cave points out in his 
study of recognition scenes, for all the importance of Oedipus to Freud, the Sophoclean 
recognition scene seems not to play much of a role in Freud’s poetics.31 Cave looks to fill in this 
oversight with analyses of Freud’s writings on Hoffman (“The Uncanny”) and Jensen (“Delusion 
and Dreams in Jensen’s Gradiva”). By contrast, “my” Freud is the case history on the “Wolf 
Man,” and Beyond the Pleasure Principle—see especially Chapter Four for an analysis of the 
“recognition scenes” in those clinical and theoretical texts. The way I will be talking about 
recognition also draws on the Lacanian ideas (though not always the Lacanian terminology) of a 
“barred subject,” of aphanisis, separation, and the “mirror stage.” 
 After Aristotle, the most important philosopher of recognition must be Hegel—however, not 
with reference to the influential “Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness: 
Lordship and Bondage” chapter in his Phenomenology of Spirit. This, however, is not the 
Hegelian recognition I want to draw upon. Although this “master-slave” dialectic is explicitly 
concerned with recognition [Anerkennen], it is of a particular sort. The life or death confrontation 
that yields self-consciousness in Hegel’s parable, has as its goal not illumination or the 
overturning of past interpretations, but rather mutual acknowledgement, the aim of being 
recognized as...32  The whole scene is more reminiscent of Oedipus confronting Laius on the 
                                                
31 Terence Cave, Recognitions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988),166. 




road and refusing to yield, than of the later discovery of what he has done.33 Neither will Hegel’s 
own theory of tragedy go very far in helping to define recognition. As Cave notes, “anagnorisis 
[does] not arise in the categories Hegel prefers,”34 most obviously in his preference for the 
Antigone over the Oedipus. 
 But Hegel does have an idea of recognition which we can use, in the Phenomenology of 
Spirit’s figure of the “unhappy consciousness.” The entire length of the Phenomenology is the 
story of subjectivity’s self-recognition in the external world (of sensory experience, of scientific 
fact, of religious and political institutions). Far from starting with some identical Subject-Object 
that variously incarnates itself throughout history, or rigging the game by a teleological sleight of 
hand, Hegel shows the repeated failure of consciousness to close the gap separating it from 
objectivity. Each section of the book takes up the attempt again at an expanded level: the actor 
(Consciousness, then Self-consciousness, then Reason, then Spirit) throws its arms around 
broader and broader swaths of experience and claims it as “mine!” before contradictions break 
apart this unity and recognition collapses. But this is not because objectivity remains 
unreachable, transcendental, absolute, noumenal, etc. etc., as in Kant’s idea of the “thing-in-
itself.” Spirit (consciousness, subjectivity), rather, is this non-identity of the absolute with itself. 
Spirit’s failures in this regard are not mere obstacles that might have been overcome with more 
gumption or a different approach, instead this continual splitting (without “reconciliation”) 
makes up the very life and history of consciousness. Further, consciousness is not to be taken in 
a psychological sense: consciousness’s efforts to clutch itself from phenomena take the form of 
law, ethical life, religion, the economy, sovereignty, art... (Another way to put this is that law, 
                                                
33 The emphasis on recognition as acknowledgement comes from Alexandre Kojève!s interpretation of the 
Phenomenology, and extends to the “look” in Sartre!s Being and Nothingness, and to Habermasian accounts of 
intersubjectivity, such as Axel Honneth!s The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflict.  




religion, and so on are themselves treated as cognitive scaffoldings.)  
  The Phenomenology demonstrates over and over how metaphysics sets up a “beyond” cut off 
from subjective experience—for instance Plato’s forms, or Kant’s noumena—thereby putting 
something back behind objectivity such that consciousness can never recognize itself there. 
Hegel’s argument (mostly in the Science of Logic) is that what is “beyond appearance” has to 
show up as beyond within appearance, and that this disturbance (reflected into appearance) is 
already the sought-for essence. In a famous image, Hegel dismisses the idea that there is 
anything going on in the “Holy of Holies,” that there is some great mystery in the locked room: 
“It is manifest that behind the so-called curtain, which is to hide the inner world, there is nothing 
to be seen unless we ourselves go behind there, as much in order that we may thereby see, as that 
there may be something behind there which can be seen.”35 Recognition does not come about by 
subjectivity staying on this side of things, gingerly eyeing appearances.  
 Now, the figure of consciousness most defeated by the illusion of the beyond in the 
Phenomenology is the “unhappy consciousness”: the Christian soul unable to leap into direct 
communion with the Godhead, but who bestows an unsurpassable permanence on the vale of 
tears confronting him or her.  
Instead of grasping the real nature consciousness merely feels, and has fallen back upon 
itself. Since, in thus attaining itself, consciousness cannot keep itself at a distance as this 
opposite, it has merely laid hold of what is unessential instead of having seized true 
reality. Thus, just as, on one side, when striving to find itself in the essentially real, it 
only lays hold of its own divided state of existence, so, too, on the other side, it cannot 
grasp that other [the essence] as particular or as concrete. That “other” cannot be found 
where it is sought; for it is meant to be just a “beyond,” that which can not be found.36 
 
What the unhappy consciousness does not understand is twofold, first that in its holding-
together-in-thought the empirical particularity (its own meager worldly existence) with the 
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“essential” (divine object of devotion and feeling), it has already found what it is looking for; 
second that its very “desiring and toiling,” the lived “process of canceling and enjoying the 
alien external reality,—existence in the form of independent things” is again this 
“unattainable” self-unity.37 In other words, the unhappy consciousness misperceives its own 
essence (as self-consciousness) as an unreachable transcendent God on one hand, and (as 
productive activity) as mere unsignifying materiality on the other.  
 Where is recognition here? Unhappy consciousness finds what it is looking for, but 
without realizing that this is so. In Hegel’s presentation, this “consciousness... can only come 
upon the grave of its life”38—and only for the philosophical observer, “for us or per se” has 
it “found itself.”39 This is, strictly speaking, a case of dramatic irony—the recognition scene 
in Hegel is pushed back into an infinite horizon. The important point here is that recognition 
is not necessarily the psychological awareness of a character; in Hegel’s sense, recognition is 
more like a structure, or a state of affairs. Hence, the final sequence of the Phenomenology, 
“Absolute Knowing,” is not to be construed as a giant light-bulb going off over the head of 
Substance, but rather as a set of conditions and practical relationships. This, too, is 
recognition. 
 To revisit the features drawn from my reading of the Oedipus, now as applied to Hegel’s 
“unhappy consciousness”: Recognition is not a move from ignorance to knowledge; the 
reversal locates knowing within not-knowing, and vice versa. The unhappy consciousness is 
frustrated and pitiful not because there is some positive knowledge “out there” which it 
cannot obtain—the unchangeable essence, the veiled presence of the absolute—but because 
the actual experience of the absolute which it has, through working and being part of a 
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world, it passes off as the truth of its thought-object.  
 Recognition is a self-recognition in otherness, an identity found in the object-world. The 
unhappy consciousness prefers its disunion and fretfulness to “that confirmation of its own 
existence which it would receive through work and enjoyment... in other words, it must 
consciously nullify this certification of its own being” in worldly things.40 
 Truth is not a passive latency, but has a life in concealment. Falsehood equally is not an 
impotent, illusory non-being. Hegel is the philosopher of reality: the idea will not be denied the 
right of actually existing, of dissolving reality as it stands. So, the same misperception does not 
merely break down over and over again—its “truth” has to become a force itself. In this case, the 
absolute wins out over consciousness, which “could ensure its self-renunciation and self-
abandonment solely by... real and vital sacrifice” of its freedom. The result and next starting 
point is then an asceticism that sees the self as the instrument of universal will.41 
 Recognition rewrites the past, illuminating a retroactive significance. The subsequent stage of 
asceticism, in which the sought-for identity is “recognized” structurally (in the institution of the 
priesthood) recasts the meaning of work and enjoyment, which originally it overlooked. After the 
conversion experience and renunciation, past satisfactions takes on the meaning of sin.  
 Recognition hinges on contingency. There is insufficient space (or justification) here to go 
into the role of Christ in Hegel’s philosophy, but this is where he first shows up in the 
Phenomenology: as the “unchangeable which has form and shape,”42 i.e. as the utterly contingent 
universal. The subsequent “recognition” of the self in the otherness of the collective Holy Spirit 
turns upon this contingency.  
 The discovery of identity is equally the collapse of one’s “place” in the world. In its search, 
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“consciousness has found out by experience that the grave of its actual unchangeable Being has 
no concrete actuality.”43 The ideal self-image projected out into things offers no solidity or 
shelter.  
 Recognition, as I have been sketching its outlines, is less a matter of scenes—for instance, the 
kind of concluding unmasking that runs from Anne Radcliffe to Scooby Doo—than of a temporal 
structure in which the “other side” of things (sheep-farming in Australia, long unsolved murders 
in Thebes, the worldly subsistence of unessential consciousness) turns out to have been one’s 
own history. My point is not that we should give up recognition scenes, but that recognition is, so 
to speak, at issue even where there is not the expected éclat of astonished discovery.  
I take this “expanded” idea of recognition to be what Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar are 
getting at in their famous reading of Jane Eyre. It is simply not the case that, in this recognition 
scene, Jane comes to the understanding of how her desires are implied in the repugnant ravings 
of the madwoman, although Bertha is “in a sense [Jane’s] own secret self,”44 “the !bad animal’ 
who was first locked up in the red-room [and] still lurking somewhere, behind a dark door.”45 
This is, in Hegel-speak, an in-itself that is only for-us, i.e. for the symbolic matrix. The Gothic 
illumination, the pulling back of the curtain to reveal the madwoman in the attic, requires a 
detour, through the Realist supplement of the St. John Rivers plot, in order for Jane to “process” 
Bertha’s appearance without recognizing herself therein. The recognition has to be read as 
unfolding, being “worked through,” not as being a succinct flash of knowledge. 
Victorian fiction is also bestrewn with recognition scenes that are “too much”: overly 
coincidental, far-fetched, unnaturalistic, even to the point of disrupting a realism that ought to 
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know better.46 It might appear that I am trying to define this well-known feature out of existence. 
It is true that not every Victorian recognition scene, taken in the broadest sense, will coincide 
with all the characteristics I have been outlining. (But the same could be said for Aristotle’s 
definition, which includes a ranking of what recognitions work best and what is contrived and 
tedious.) But recognition is still at issue even where it is not repeating the Oedipus model point-
by-point. 
 Indeed, recognition in Victorian fiction is always the site of an interference, as it were a 
“jamming” by reification. Reification shows up instead of recognition, discernible wherever 
recognition is incomplete, attenuated, disjointed. (But this “block” is also internal to recognition, 
which needs a minimal obstacle to work at all.) In the novel, this obstacle is the social form of 
value, carried over as a narrative and epistemological form. 
* 
 The term “reification” appears perhaps five times across the three volumes of Marx’s Capital, 
taking up considerably less space than the analysis of lesser-known topics such as the increasing 
organic composition of capital, differential rent, or the eighteenth-century distinction between 
fixed and circulating capital. Whereas associated words like “fetishism” and “alienation” are 
extensively discussed in Marx’s 1844 manuscripts, “reification” [Versachlichung or 
Verdinglichung] first comes into use only in the specifically economic writings of the late 1850s, 
the Grundrisse and The Critique of Political Economy. It is only in Georg Lukács’s 1922 essay, 
“Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat,” that the concept assumes a central place 
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in Marxist thinking, especially as subsequently thematized by the Frankfurt School.47 
 Perhaps reification can best be explicated through the series of dialectical paradoxes it 
engenders. To begin with, reification describes both an epistemological framework and an 
objective social process,48 the universalization of the commodity form in capitalism. Reification 
is therefore neither a perceptual error (misguided “false consciousness”) nor an empirical fact 
available for sociological description. Indeed, the subjective structure, the cognitive modality, is 
not in the head of the subject but is in the economic process, more specifically in the value-form 
of the commodity. At the same time, commodification does not only stand for the accumulation 
of material goods, but just as much for the reign of abstractions (like “value” and its attendant 
metaphysics). This reversal of subjective and objective, thought and thing, abstraction and 
materiality, recurs through all of the paradoxes of reification, which we will now take in their 
turn.  
“Personification of things, reification of persons” 
In Capital, “reification” only appears as part of a set formula: “personification of things 
and reification of persons.”49 50 The social domination of the bourgeoisie (in economic form, the 
                                                
47 The trajectory of the concept of reification is traced by Gillian Rose in The Melancholy Science (London: 
Macmillan Press, 1978), 27-51. Rose cautions against conflating reification with either commodity fetishism or 
alienation. This confusion of terminology, she argues, has prevented Marxism from extending the critique of 
reification to the value-form as a social form (27), or to the theory of surplus value, class formation, power, or the 
state (28). See also my Conclusion, for further consideration of Adorno. 
48 This definition goes along with two recent studies, Timothy Bewes, Reification, or the Anxiety of Late 
Capitalism (London: Verso, 2002), and Axel Honneth, Reification: A New Look at an Old Idea (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), up to a point. While these authors also see reification as a structure of consciousness, this is 
quickly reduced to cultural or hermeneutic questions divorced from the commodity structure, as “identity thinking” 
(Bewes 6) or “a false framework for interpretation, an ontological veil concealing the fact of an underlying genuine 
form of human existence” (Honneth 32). In these post-Marxist descriptions, undoing reification looks like a spirited 
jolt out of positivism or the lifting of a veil. In Lukács!s essay, undoing reification takes the form of self-recognition 
in the otherness of the commodity. Reification remains a problem of class consciousness, i.e. of consciousness as the 
self-mediation of objectivity, i.e. the goal of abolishing reification is therefore not to restore non-identity thinking or 
a primordial reciprocity—it is to abolish a form of social domination that takes the phenomenal form of equivalent 
exchange. 
49 “Personifizierung der Sachen und Versachlichung der Personen.” Karl Marx, Capital volume I, trans. Ben 
Fowkes (New York: Vintage, 1977), 209. Marx uses the two German words interchangeably within the iterations of 




expropriation of surplus value from workers) takes place in the medium of the equivalent 
exchange of commodities: the sale of the worker’s sole commodity, labor-power, as wage labor. 
Thus, the antagonism between classes is mystified by its appearance under the form of a 
relationship between things (the sale of labor to capital). In contrast to the direct, even violent 
domination of feudal or colonial exploitation, capitalist accumulation is mediated by the 
commodity form, i.e. by the sociality of objects.51  
 This domination is founded on the commodity-form itself and the definition of value as a 
objectified quantity of abstract labor. The formal, quantitative equality of the value-form is the 
mask of the social antagonisms which constitute it: the “impersonal and abstract social forms” 
commodity and capital “do not simply veil what traditionally has been deemed the !real" social 
relations of capitalism, that is, class relations; they are the real relations of capitalist society.”52 
Class domination is the commodity-form, is capital. 
 Reification is therefore the concealment, the obscuring, of one set of determinations—the 
reproduction of the working class as exploited labor power, as a “peculiar race of commodity 
owners”; hence the ever-renewed separation of worker from means of production—by the 
                                                                                                                                                       
labor’ or the productive forces of social labor” [als Personifikation und Repräsentant, verdinglichte Gestalt der 
„gesellschaftlichen Produktivkräfte der Arbeit“] (I, 1056); “personification of things and reification of the relations 
of production” [Personifizierung der Sachen und Versachlichung der Produktionsverhältnisse] in Marx, Capital, 
volume III, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin, 1991), 969; “the reification of social relations” [die 
Verdinglichung der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse] conjures up “the bewitched, distorted and upside-down world 
haunted by Monsieur le Capital and Madame la Terre, who are at the same time social characters and mere things” 
[als soziale Charaktere und zugleich unmittelbar als bloße Dinge]  (III, 969). 
50 On the other side of the paradox, there is the “personification of things”—most famously the table who “stands 
with its feet on the ground, but, in relation to all other commodities... stands on its head, and evolves out of its 
wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin dancing of its own free will.” (Marx, 
Capital I, 164-5). And in capitalist production, personification occurs when “past labor in its objectified and lifeless 
form” (raw material) is transformed into new means of production, thus “an animated monster which begins to 
‘work,’ ‘as if its body were by love possessed.’” (Marx, Capital I, 302.) But capital’s apparent spontaneous self-
reproduction, too, appears as its own self-contained, innate activity: capital is thus personified, “at the same time [a] 
social character and [a] mere thing.” (Marx, Capital III, 969.) In wage labor, the structural exploitation of the worker 
is as mystified as any scholastic doctrine of the Holy Trinity; the accumulation of capital appears as a social  
relationship between the capitalist’s investments on one hand and the purchased commodity labor-power on the 
other. 
51 Marx, Capital I, 170.  




abstract determinations of value that make up the commodity form. All of the existential 
moments of labor disappear into the undifferentiated medium of price. Class domination is 
concealed by the objective form (the commodity) of the value abstraction. But at the same time, 
the concept reification means that capitalist domination is this form—it does not lie concealed by 
the mists of religion or politics, but is hidden in its very material appearance.  
 In reification, the process of capital and the social rifts of class are condensed into object 
form. We see this paradox again in Marx’s famous definition of “commodity fetishism,”53 where 
the constitutive sociality of value is essentially obliterated by its mode of appearance: “Value is a 
relation between persons... concealed beneath a material shell.”54 Fetishism of commodities is 
not—it can hardly be said enough—to be equated with the untoward consumer preference for 
commodities evinced in modern society, as Pushkin is said to have had a “foot fetish.” Rather, 
Marx stresses that commodity fetishism is “inseparable from the production of commodities.”55 
For commodity production is production and surplus-production only secondarily of textbooks, 
pharmaceuticals, long-range missiles—the capitalist’s “aim is to produce not only a use-value, 
but a commodity; not only use-value, but value; and not just value, but also surplus-value.”56 
That is, the particular commodity itself is meaningless, and is at once hypostatization and 
mystification of the socially-constituted category surplus-labor.  
                                                
53 “The equality of the kinds of human labor takes on a physical form in the equal objectivity of the products of 
labor as values; the measure of the expenditure of human labor-power by its duration takes on the form of the 
magnitude of the value of the products of labor; and finally the relationships between the producers, within which 
the social characteristics of their labors are manifested, take on the form of a social relation between the products of 
labor. 
 The mysterious character of the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that the commodity 
reflects the social characteristics of men!s own labor as objective characteristics of the products of labor themselves, 
as the socio-natural properties of these things.” Marx, Capital I, 164-5. 
54 Ibid., 167n. 
55 Ibid., 165. My emphasis. 
56 Ibid., 293. A more vulgar version of this thought: The “worker cares as much about the crappy shit he has to 
make as does the capitalist who employs him, and who also couldn!t give a damn about the junk.” Karl Marx, 




 But reification does not overlap entirely with the commodity fetish—the “objectification”57 of 
abstract labor in the value-form of the commodity.58 Reification can also and especially be found 
in more advanced forms of capital, e.g. interest, “fictional capital,” or rent. The mystification of 
surplus-value by reification runs all the way through Capital; it does not lose its force when we 
leave behind the purchase of individual use-values like coats and bibles.59 The entire process of 
capitalist production (the realization of workers’ surplus labor as surplus-value) therefore 
appears as an impersonal interaction between raw materials, machines, the arrangement of the 
factory, and production costs (wages, overhead, regulatory fines, various faux frais). That is to 
say, the capitalist production of surplus-value looks like it results entirely from the fact of capital 
itself, how it is laid out and itself set in motion—or even to the inner profundities of financial 
capital to itself, e.g. the vicissitudes of interest. What is thereby concealed, subtracted, mystified 
is the origin of surplus value in the exploitation of labor: the capitalist’s purchase of the 
commodity “labor power” and its employment in the valorization process—all this appears to be 
the relationship of capital to itself.  
 Here is where one paradox turns into another, for the material connotations of “reification” we 
had been dealing with pertained to graspable, material things and the practical, concrete 
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58   Lukács in his 1967 preface to History and Class Consciousness renounces a “fundamental and crude error” 
committed in the book!s vocabulary, namely that it “equates alienation with objectification” (xxiv). Evidently 
embarrassed by the popularity of “alienation,” he distances his argument from any “unmasking of alienation by 
philosophy [then] in the air” and alienation’s close proximity to “an eternal ‘condition humaine’” (xxiv).These self-
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vocabulary, to be altogether clear to me. However, it is my understanding that Lukács makes no such confusion in 
the original text, understanding perfectly well that alienation is an abstraction (in value-form) opposed to the 
particular objectification of labor in use-value. 
59 “[I]n connection with the most simple categories of the capitalist mode production and commodity production in 
general, in connection with commodities and money, [there already appears] the mystifying character that 
transforms the social relations for which the material elements of wealth serve as bearers in the course of production 
into properties of these things themselves (commodities), still more explicitly transforming the relation of 
production itself into a thing (money). All forms of society are subject to this distortion, in so far as they involve 
commodity production and monetary circulation. In the capitalist mode of production, however, where capital is the 
dominant category and forms the specific relation of production, this bewitched and distorted world develops much 




production and purchase of those things. But Marx’s point also turns into its opposite: the more 
abstract and immaterial capital becomes (as in finance), the more mystified the appropriation of 
surplus value, the more reification. 
Reification as Abstraction 
 Marx calls reification “this religion of everyday life,”60 and it is precisely its metaphysical 
dimensions that I want to look at, i.e. how it reconfigures the experiences of consciousness and 
belonging to a world. The key point here is that abstraction does not mean “subjectivity” (as in 
“abstract thought”); in capitalism abstraction is a property of material (social) reality. 
“Abstraction [is] not the exclusive property of the mind, but arises in commodity exchange... The 
form of commodity is abstract and abstractness governs its whole orbit.”61 That is, abstractness is 
not only the abrupt reduction of social relations to the physical object, money or commodity—
capitalist social relations already consist in a “real abstraction,” “which is purely social in 
character, arising in the spatio-temporal sphere of human interactions.”62  
Reification, far from describing the world of capitalism as an enormous heap of mass-
produced stuff, instead confronts consciousness with “a reality cocooned by... concepts,”63  
The metabolism of capitalist society in every aspect proceeds as if quantified, abstract, socially 
necessary labor were the “substance” of value. We see this most clearly in the commodity fetish, 
which is as if exchange-value inhered in things themselves as a natural property. (Think of the 
listing of calories next to the prices of popcorn and soda at the movie theater; 300 calories and 
$5.99 are presented as two reflections or measures of the same substance.) 
Lukács traces this abstraction to the very core of commodity production: 
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Thus the universality of the commodity form is responsible both objectively and 
subjectively for the abstraction of the human labor incorporated in commodities… [I]n so 
far as the commodity form facilitates the equal exchange of qualitatively different 
objects, it can only exist if that formal equality is in fact recognized… [T]his formal 
equality of human labor in the abstract is not only the common factor to which the 
various commodities are reduced; it also becomes the real principle governing the actual 
production of commodities.64 
 
The apparently autonomous self-reproduction of capital appears as a number of laws and 
determinations, e.g. the causality of supply and demand, turning “a rigid and immobile face 
towards the individual.”65 The resulting organization of cognition is what Lukács calls “the 
contemplative nature of man under capitalism.”66 “Contemplative,” J.M. Bernstein notes, does 
not “signify in Lukács’s theory a psychological property of individuals. The contemplative 
stance is a categorial appearance for of (individual) social existence in capitalist social 
formations... Contemplation, then, denotes a form of external relatedness... categorial 
contemplation is a historically produced and derived mode of relatedness to the world.”67  
Objective Misrecognition 
 We have met such a figure of removed “contemplation” before: Hegel’s Unhappy 
Consciousness. I mentioned above that the acknowledgment of the “Master-Slave” dialectic 
could not serve as the basis for an analysis of recognition. In the same way, most Marxist 
attention to Hegel has focused on that same “Master-Slave” moment, as key to the concept of 
alienation. However, I also want to locate reification (as distinct from alienation68) in the 
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Unhappy Consciousness; i.e. in the next chapter over.69 As Judith Butler has pointed out, the 
Unhappy Consciousness, far from being alienated, “clings or attaches to itself,” stubbornly 
persisting (however negatively) in its selfhood and embodiment. 70 In Kojève’s description of the 
Unhappy Consciousness, we can see reification as fundamentally a structural (in this case: 
theological) misrecognition of the subject within an indifferent, absolute substance: “The 
religious man lives, since he acts; but he does not take his action into account, and he thinks only 
of his nullity and his death. He does not know that the world he lives in is his world, that it is the 
result of his action; he believes that it is the work of God and [his present existence] remains sin 
and woe.”71  
 Both in reification and the Unhappy Consciousness, the work of reality is at an insuperable 
remove from the contemplative and divided consciousness. The organization of objectivity 
nowhere reflects back the real determination of consciousness by and within this organization. 
The “work of God” is identical here with the work of capital, where value appears as the actor, 
the “hero with a thousand faces,” rather than as a structural misrecognition of abstractly-
dominated labor: 
The independent form, i.e. the monetary form, which the value of commodities 
assumes in simple circulation, does nothing but mediate the exchange of commodities, 
and it vanishes in the final result of the movement. On the other hand, in the circulation 
M-C-M both the money and the commodity function only as different modes of existence 
of value itself, the money as the general mode of existence, the commodity as its 
particular or, so to speak, disguised mode. It is constantly changing from one form into 
the other, without becoming lost in the movement; it thus becomes transformed into an 
automatic subject. If we pin down the specific forms of appearance assumed in turn by 
self-valorizing value in the course of its life, we reach the following elucidation: capital is 
money, capital is commodities. In truth, however, value is here the subject of a process in 
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69   Here I disagree with Fredric Jameson and T.W. Adorno, who see the chapter on Understanding as already 
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Philosophy” in Hegel: Three Studies, MIT Press 1993.  
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which, while constantly assuming the form in turn of money and commodities, it changes 
its own magnitude, throws off surplus-value from itself considered as original value, and 
thus valorizes itself independently. For the movement in the course of which it adds 
surplus-value is its own movement, its valorization is therefore self-valorization. By 
virtue of being value, it has acquired the occult ability to add value to itself. It brings 
forth living offspring, or at least lays golden eggs. 
As the dominant subject of this process, in which it alternately assumes and loses 
the form of money and the form of commodities, but preserves and expands itself through 
all these changes, value requires above all an independent form by means of which its 
identity with itself may be asserted. Only in the shape of money does it possess this 
form.72 
 
We can see how, as Gillian Rose writes, “in the historically-specific case of commodity 
producing society…substance is ((mis)-represented as) subject, how necessary illusion arises out 
of productive activity.”73 
Consciousness is “in” the thing 
For this reason, recognition is possible starting from reification. This is Lukács’s 
revolutionary wager in History and Class Consciousness: that “the worker can only become 
conscious of his existence in society when he becomes aware of himself as a commodity.” This 
revolutionary recognition depends on seeing the proletarian “consciousness [as] the self-
consciousness of the commodity,” in other words, the consciousness of the unthinking, produced 
commodity-thing. But the dialectical reverse is also true: the commodity abstraction functions in 
place of consciousness and independent of it. The formal, quantitative abstract equivalence of 
values is not a mental operation, but a social one: “It is not people who originate these 
abstractions but their actions”74 (20). In other words, reification is not a subjective perception of 
the commodity structure, but as cognitive modalities, representation, abstraction, the concept of 
immutable value-substance, are immanent in the value-form itself. We can hold all of these 
thoughts in our hand, as a coin. I can carry all of this thoughts behind my posterior, in my wallet. 
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Reification is not our external perspective on commodity-exchange, nor an illusion intervening 
between our consciousness and commodities, but rather is in the commodity, in its very 
movement. Reification is “an antithesis, immanent in the commodity.”75 
Reification is most advanced where it is least material    
It is important not to over-“localize” reification as the fetishism pertaining to the 
consumer good. As a cognitive modality, reification does not attach to only certain acts like 
buying and selling, and then retreat or cease applying. In capitalist social formations, the 
consumption needs of a community, the division of labor and labor’s modes of cooperation and 
productivity, the class means of appropriating necessary and surplus labor, the minimal 
exigencies for reproducing itself as a society—are all routed through commodity exchange and 
the (demand for) expansion of capitalist production and increased consumption.76 Thus, the 
complex metabolism of an entire society with all its immense ramifications are arrived at 
through things, i.e. “goes on behind the backs of the producers,” not in the minds of social agents 
but in their practical, unconscious activity.77 This unconsciousness is most pronounced when it 
becomes automatic, as for instance in calculations of interest, exchange rate, inflation, tax 
schedules, etc.—all the regulating mechanisms of the extraction and distribution of surplus value 
which appear as mere procedural algorithms.  
Along these lines, perhaps the most concrete examples of reification I can give are the 
several ways I use it in the succeeding chapters of this study. In Chapter One, I look at the two 
recognition scenes in Dickens’s Little Dorrit, one pertaining to the Gothic family romance plot, 
and the other to the collapse of a financial empire. Reification here is the non-appearance of 
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crisis as such, the way that a chain of hidden causes which Dickens so elaborately paints in the 
Gothic recognition plot, is unavailable to him in explaining a financial crash. Crisis is a kind of 
noumenal thing-in-itself, devoid of content and incapable of appearance. In contrast to the moral 
closure of the other recognition plot, crisis is both outside of the circuit of moral explanations, 
and yet empty and abstract compared to the rich ramifications of that recognition.  
In Chapter Two, on Trollope’s Last Chronicle of Barset, I analyze the fetishistic form of 
interest announced in phrases like “Money’s about seven now,” where capital simply sheds 
interest out of its own greenhouse fecundity. This fetishism and its fundamental mystification, 
however, do not stay in its place (the financial market of London’s City), but are displaced onto 
the provinces of Barsetshire and into the enormously attenuated mystery plot concerning 
Reverend Crawley and a mislaid check (presumed stolen).  
Chapter Three, on the Sherlock Holmes stories, looks at the contrast between the 
empiricist posturing of the detective as the relation of a reasoning, contemplative subject towards 
an objectivity that is figured as inessential, atemporal, and void of concept. This contrast plays 
out in a narrative logic vitiated by external flashbacks, arbitrariness, and indifference to 
temporality.  
Chapter Four, on James’s The Portrait of a Lady, locates reification in the unconscious 
framing and determinations of consciousness, especially the autonomous and transcendental 
subject of Jamesian self-consciousness. James’s understanding of consciousness is not as 
determining but as determined. Isabel’s ensnarement is just in overlooking her intensely framed 
and situated consciousness (her interpellation by the inheritance that Ralph Touchett engineers 
for her, to observe her) as an unbounded, idealist ego. Her “fall” is not a mistaken judgment, but 




self-consciousness are already articulated and “at work” outside of that interiority.  
* 
To make explicit the political analogy I am relying upon here: The proletariat is nowhere 
given to appearance; there is only a disparate, heterogeneous, split “working class”—no longer 
recognizable by a belonging to the industrial site, and obscured under discourses (and existential 
threats) of immigration, urban ghettoization, a predatory financial industry, debt, and new modes 
of surplus-value extraction. This “inexistent” proletariat must unmake the determinations of its 
being, which are at the same time the causes of its obscuring and dispersal. Recognition is a self-
recognition in otherness that is also a negation—the proletariat annuls its own placement in class 
society. Reification constitutes this “otherness”—the repression of the value-extraction that 
reproduces the working class (but does not “make” a proletariat). 
 I said above that recognition scenes are not allegories for de-reification. What I meant was 
that recognition scenes in these works of high realism are not a figural abolition (i.e. in effigy) of 
capitalist-owned commodity production. If recognition and reification are intertwined as I have 
been arguing here, this connection was unknown to these authors. This does not mean, however, 
that they were unconcerned with grasping and representing reification as it appeared to them. In 
a sense, this is all that realism does. One can hardly read a novel by Trollope, Eliot, Dickens, 
Hardy, the Brontës, James, without feeling that, in Marx’s words, “no other nexus [remains] 
between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous ‘cash payment.’ [The bourgeoisie] 
has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of 
philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation” (“Manifesto” 70). This is 
the world that Wuthering Heights, The Mill on the Floss, Bleak House draw in such detail; this is 




these charges verbatim in a Dickens novel. This is the ideological appearance of reification, open 
as much to condemnation from Christian morality as from proletarian class-consciousness. And 
it might be that recognition scenes are an allegory for de-reification in this sense.  
 However, the thematization of reification available to these authors (as “commercialization,” 
alienation, a Kierkegaardian critique of the “public,” as bureaucracy, self-interest or its opposite 
utilitarianism, or “instrumentality”) is not to be confused with reification as the unconscious 
penetration of the commodity-structure into rationality and the very modes of subjectivity. For 
reification has been been applied and extended to sociological phenomena and ideological 
characterizations, for example: “consumer society,” “instrumental reason,” “treating persons like 
objects”—even some of the terms Lukács incorporates from Weber, like “rationalization.” 
Lukács also describes a memorable litany of examples of reification: the fragmentation and 
dehumanization of the industrial worker, the conscientious dedication of the bureaucrat, the 
partial, technical refinement of the artistic virtuoso, the journalist’s lack of convictions, the 
methodologism of modern science, and the “realism” of revisionist or gradualist social 
democracy. It is easy to think that reification is just the sum of things like this. (And in that case 
reification would seemingly have been exhausted as a topic by the nineteenth-century novel.)  
On the contrary, reification is itself the condition of appearance for such sociological 
notations as “consumer society” or “instrumental reason.” Reified consciousness is the 
scaffolding within which such observations can show up at all. Reification in the latter sense is 
not a content for realist representation—indeed, realism itself is founded on the reified cognitive 
modality of the representational “world picture,” in Heidegger’s phrase. There seems to be a 
continual blurring and re-drawing of the line between critique and containment, since recognition 




 In Franco Moretti’s “sociology of forms”—a project more continuous than otherwise with 
Moretti’s subsequent “quantitative turn”— the aesthetic sphere is a “system of consent,”78 whose 
“function” is to “make individuals feel ‘at ease’ in the world they happen to live in, to reconcile 
them in a pleasant and imperceptible way to its prevailing cultural norms.”79 Aesthetics, but 
particularly literature as a rhetorical form, responds to the antinomies of capitalist society with a 
message and an image of “compromise.”80 “Literature is the ‘middle’ term par excellence, and its 
‘educational,’ ‘realistic’ function consists precisely in training us without our being aware of it 
for an unending task of mediation and conciliation.”81 In a memorable image, Moretti allegorizes 
aesthetics as what pacifies a soul (the passive and desensitized consumer of culture) who is being 
borne away in the clutches of a harpy (representing a barbarous and deadening capitalist 
hegemony). Here we can recognize in vivid outline the “culture industry” argument propounded 
by the Frankfurt School. 
 From the title and constant reference of this work, it could be assumed that for Unhappy 
Consciousness, too, “compromise” is the order of the day. After all, does the Unhappy 
Consciousness not conclude with the moment of explicit mediation and conciliation in Hegel, 
namely the priestly intercession between the soul and the eternal? In that case, recognition would 
serve for Moretti as another “incessant attempt to annul that separation [of capitalist society and 
moral freedom] and remedy it.”82 Recognition scenes would defuse certain energies by fitting 
them into a safe “cultural” harness. 
 Fredric Jameson!s The Political Unconscious offers an interpretation of cultural production 
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that is at once “functionalist" and “Utopian." In the first approach, culture is seen to offer 
"substantial incentives... for ideological adherence," while in the second approach, Jameson 
produces the textual matrixes wherein one can discern “the anticipation of the logic of a 
collectivity which has not yet come into being," i.e. the projection of a classless society.  
 If I can project this distinction onto the problem of recognition and reification, the 
“functionalist" result of recognition scenes would be to secure a distracted compliance via the 
imaginary reconciliations and redemptions of narrative closure. The final scene of Return of the 
Jedi is a wonderful example, where the Oedipal antagonism between Luke Skywalker and Darth 
Vader is transformed into a ghostly party vibe, where even the spectral image of a now-redeemed 
Anakin Skywalker can chuckle at the follies of the gentle Ewoks. And the Utopian perspective is 
built in here, too, as the family romance and duel-to-the-death implied by recognition give way 
to the teamwork of the Rebel Alliance as they detonate the Death Star, as well as the 
aforementioned primitive communism of the Ewok village.  
 But here is the crucial difference between “recognition” and “recognition scenes,” in 
ideological terms (in a moment, I will address the consequences for novel theory). To briefly 
recur to Hegel: the Unhappy Consciousness presents two figures of “recognition”—1) the 
impossible religious union with the Absolute, with its compensatory satisfactions of devotional, 
ritual feeling,83 which can be taken as elaborating a “fantasy” and ideology of transcendent 
identity; and 2) the mis-recognized, actual “desire, work, and enjoyment” of temporal, laboring 
existence, which comprises the “substance” perpetually disavowed by the Hegelian subject. The 
recognition in 1) is a displaced enjoyment that is never consummated, while escaping from the 
social “real”; meanwhile, the recognition in 2) would renounce the satisfactions of the “beyond,” 
in effect paying for self-consciousness by the subtraction of religious jouissance. 
                                                




 But Jameson does not seem to have accounted for this distinction. The Utopian 
“incentives” of ideological production are always a fantasy of collective reconciliation; but this 
is what recognition 2) gives up on and does without. As Jameson says elsewhere, “jouissance... 
involves that demand for recognition by the Other, which in the very nature of things (in the very 
nature of language?) can never be fulfilled.”84 So the ideological function of jouissance in 
aesthetics can no longer be appealed to in recognition 2), where the Other is no longer the 
sought-for interlocutor. Recognition 2) is a loss, the abandonment of whatever had been 
projected as “behind the curtain,” indeed a destitution. It is hard to see the ideological incentive 
or functionalist version of this figure. In renouncing its “substance” of enjoyment that 
psychoanalysis locates in fantasy, i.e. in recognition 1), recognition 2) also annuls itself as a 
subject. 
Another possibility is Mary Poovey’s argument, that realist literature has a pedagogical 
task of naturalizing new financial instruments and economic arrangements for a wary public; 
anxieties about capitalist forms are taken up in order to be imaginatively worked through and 
domesticated. (Poovey has written about The Last Chronicle of Barset and Little Dorrit 
specifically along these lines.)  
The above models have an advantage over familiar, naive characterizations of 
literature—as escapism, as “pure” aesthetics, as engines of catharsis, as propaganda, as 
ideological deception, or as a mirror reflection—in acknowledging that novels have to pay for 
the illusions they deliver, so to speak. Satisfaction, identification, or a displaced wish-fulfillment 
at one level is purchased by harsh truths and a reality-principle elsewhere. There are no clear-cut 
victories. Only in utter trash like the works of Ayn Rand, or in works of fantasy, does an abstract 
principle win out in the world. The novel is the scene of the perpetual, crushing defeat of the 
                                                




ideal. (Pending the analyses of the succeeding chapters, I am thinking of something like Madame 
Bovary, Jude the Obscure, Lost Illusions, The Golden Bowl, Wuthering Heights, or Anna 
Karenina.) No one has captured this better than Lukács, in dictum, “Irony is the objectivity of 
the novel.” 
Recognition scenes have a capacity for harmony, for restoring a lost balance. The 
concluding recognition scene of Tom Jones, for instance, puts everything back in order, socially 
and sexually. But does recognition “save” reification? Is recognition even the capsule that makes 
reification go down smooth? As we will see, the most reified of recognition scenes are for that 
reason especially ragged, incoherent—not smooth. I am loath to endorse any idea of an organic, 
harmonious synthesis, and I do not see in the Victorian novels any recognition to which 
reification is not still clinging. Even in our locus classicus, the blind abyss of exile that swallows 
Oedipus warns against equating recognition with reconciliation. 
 Finally, Victorian recognition scenes are neither “utopian” (future-oriented) nor “safe” 
(compromised, anxiety-assuaging), because recognition reveals the utter lack of a safety net—the 
risk already run and lost, the (oblivious) destitution of long standing. Reification itself, by 
populating objectivity with categories, rule-governed processes, and social atoms, can seem 
warm by comparison to the emotional nudity of a Wotan, a Jane Eyre, a Michael Henchard, at 
the moment of recognition. This would argue the inversion, I think, of the usual “ideological” 
role of literature. Before the abyss of recognition, reification begins to look like the glossy 
covering, the little bit of satisfaction proffered by literary form. To go behind the veil, to enter 







Recognition or Reification?: Capitalist Crisis and Subjectivity in Little Dorrit 
“These things were here and but the beholder wanting”—G.M. Hopkins 
Dickens’s novels are unthinkable without their elaborate revelations and overturning of 
identities. The recognitions that crowd the endings of his novels do not concern merely external, 
objective enigmas; they reveal the deepest truths of subjectivity. What is recognized by the 
protagonist is the way that “who I am” has preceded him or her all along. Behind the mystery of 
Nemo and Tulkinghorne’s deaths in Bleak House lie hidden the social void in which Esther is 
born and the various submerged ways she is implicated within an entire pre-existing urban 
labyrinth. In Great Expectations, it is as though every coincidence, every improbable connection 
that comes to light, is addressed to divesting Pip of his autonomy and the place he has imagined 
as being prepared for him. Instead of stepping into the expectations he has built into certainties, 
what Pip arrives at through the disclosure of his benefactor’s identity is only the sum of his 
disillusions—the revealed concatenation of false hopes and disappointments, of ties dissolved 
and betrayed. So, in Great Expectations’ recognition scene, we find the retroactive re-writing of 
events in light of their repressed, newly illuminated meaning: 
 For an hour or more, I remained too stunned to think; and it was not until I began to 
think, that I began fully to know how wrecked I was, and how the ship in which I had 
sailed was gone to pieces. 
 Miss Havisham’s intentions towards me, all a mere dream; Estella not designed for me; 
I only suffered in Satis House as a convenience, a sting for the greedy relations, a model 
with a mechanical heart to practice on when no other practice was at hand; those were the 
first smarts I had. But, sharpest and deepest pain of all,—it was for the convict, guilty of I 
knew not what crimes, and liable to be taken out of those rooms where I sat thinking, and 
hanged at the Old Bailey door, that I had deserted Joe.85 
 
Everything falls into place, as it were, not only in the present of recognition but also 
retrospectively—what had been latent or free-floating suddenly snaps into a new connection. The 
                                                




observer finds his or her own meaning within the framework of external reality as what cannot 
be perceived “straight on” and has gone unrecognized (or even been ignored, disavowed) in 
appearance. In other words, the “locked room” of Dickensian mystery contains only the truth of 
the protagonist who shows up at first as an investigator from the outside.  
 For Dickens, the logic of recognition presumes an ultimate knowability: the truth of 
subjectivity requires a detour through otherness. The wager of the recognition plot is this final 
identity of the subjective “inside” of the hero’s interiority with the seething realist “outside” of 
metropolitan London. But, as we shall see, the epistemological abyss of capitalist crisis refuses 
and obstructs this recognition, remaining intractably other, and holding subjectivity apart from a 
realist totality.  
 Especially in the late, sprawling urban novels (starting with his virtual invention of English 
detective fiction in Bleak House), recognition is closely bound up with Dickens’s use of mystery. 
It is well known that Dickens’s mystery novels are at the same time novels of social criticism. 
But how and why does Dickens use mystery to totalize the historical “outside” under realist 
representation? In Viktor Shklovsky’s study of Little Dorrit, the extra-literary social world is 
devoured by the mystery novel as only so much fresh meat: “The mystery novel allows 
[Dickens] to interpolate into the work large chunks of everyday life, which, while serving the 
purpose of impeding the action, feel the pressure of the plot and are therefore perceived as a part 
of the artistic whole. Thus are the descriptions of the debtors’ prison, the Circumlocution Office, 
and Bleeding Heart Yard incorporated into Little Dorrit. That is why the mystery novel was used 
as a ‘social novel.’”86 In another classic essay, George Orwell takes the opposite approach to this 
problem, dissolving Dickensian form, the “awful Victorian ‘plot’” into a number of characteristic 
moral-political positions—essentially producing an abstract Weltanschauung that stands outside 
                                                




and above its (regrettable) formal instantiations.87 “As soon as [Dickens] tries to bring his 
characters into action, the melodrama begins. He cannot make the action revolve round their 
ordinary occupations; hence the crossword puzzle of coincidences, intrigues, murders, disguises, 
buried wills, long-lost brothers, etc. etc.”88 
 If Shklovsky has the outside world devoured by the novel’s formal operations, and Orwell 
sees plot subsumed under morality, the more recent Foucauldian reading of D.A. Miller argues 
that Dickensian mystery is itself an ideological operation intent on disallowing any “outside” of 
its workings. Miller contends that the mystery plot of Bleak House is simultaneously played-off 
against and caught up within the novel’s system of ideological and subjectivizing effects.89 The 
Dickensian plot of mystery and detection is called forth by the text’s criticism of Chancery, as by 
a desire for a localizable form of power and interpretive closure.90 It is easy to draw parallels 
here with Little Dorrit, where the Circumlocution Office would play Chancery’s role as an 
unlocalizable yet ubiquitous disciplinary grid whose logic is internalized by its subjects, while 
being opposed by the topic of a carceral space (the Marshalsea) whose initially-confined 
operations somehow also fail to “stay put.” But in Bleak House, the only candidate for an 
“outside” of the Chancery-Police binary (and of the complementary hermeneutic projects they 
set to work) is bourgeois domesticity—strictly speaking, just another “inside”: the confines of a 
comfortable home and one’s own readerly interiority, enclosures equally constituted by power’s 
network of effects.91 
 In short, Dickens’s social criticism takes the form of mystery because it is a criticism of 
mystery, of institutions and organizations that produce mystery, i.e. that have the specific kind of 
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distorting effect upon consciousness I will call a “not-wanting-to-know.”92 For, if capitalist crisis 
will present a problem for realism, one knows very well what a mystery in a Dickens novel can 
represent: illegitimate children, suppressed wills, murder, disguises, blackmail, and deceit. In a 
word: secrecy—keeping in mind that what is secret is always known... by someone. And these 
conditions for mystery, abstracted into moral terms and extended through thematic ramification, 
are the foremost objects of Dickens’s social criticism in Little Dorrit. This novel’s criticism of 
everything that obstructs or conceals knowledge receives its best elaboration in Amanda 
Anderson’s Habermasian reading93 of the topic of omniscience in Little Dorrit, which becomes 
an extended plea for intersubjective transparency and meditation on subjective detachment, and 
just as much a sustained assault on secrecy, mistrust, obstruction and barriers of all kinds—
especially the cynicism of those characters who try to leverage partial knowledge (through 
blackmail in Rigaud’s case, spying in Miss Wade’s, and the lazily-sustained lies of le beau 
monde in Gowan’s) for personal advantage. However, as with Miller’s criticism, which was 
limited to power’s techniques of constituting and penetrating the bourgeois subject, Anderson’s 
account of Little Dorrit is likewise confined to subjective questions of transparency, rationality, 
self-cultivation, and comprehension—in short, of an observing and detached consciousness.94 
 However, Little Dorrit presents us with an “outside” that does not fall within bourgeois 
interiority, rational communication, nor the power grid of the hermeneutics of the subject. This 
external space is the irrationality of capitalist crisis, embodied in the novel by the ruin of Mr. 
Merdle. Drawing on Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness, I argue that crises of capitalism 
represent, for bourgeois consciousness, a structural blindspot, an economic analogue to Kant’s 
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“thing-in-itself”—separated from the plane and structure of the bourgeois subject by an 
unbridgeable epistemological remove, and thus incapable of being “internalized” or made a topic 
of recognition. This is not to say that Little Dorrit’s representation of Merdle succeeds in 
representing crisis where bourgeois political economy fails; it is rather that crisis is found in the 
text only as having bypassed the (ideological, experiential) framework that excludes its 
appearance per se (i.e. the financial crash in the novel is not shown as systemic to the market, but 
as a freak “criminal” glitch therein). But this economic logic shows up only insofar as it is 
unthematized, where Dickens’s presentation is truncated: precisely in the vicissitudes of the 
recognition plot.  
Dickens’s social criticism, when faced with material that cannot be rendered transparent 
by a concluding recognition scene where all is brought to light, banishes this opaque material 
(capitalist crisis) to a discrete narrative space where recognition occurs only as abbreviated or 
inert. That is, the reified logic of the economic is kept separate from the full unfolding of 
Dickensian recognition. On one hand, then, recognition: the demolitions of the boundaries of the 
subject, the indictment of forms of consciousness which are closed to themselves and to others, 
the ultimate rationality of discordant social reality. On the other hand, escaping this closed loop 
and unable to be articulated by a coherent recognition (i.e. there is no subjectivity to find itself 
there): capitalist crisis—the immanent contradictions of the capitalist mode of production, which 
exceed the rational production and conscious intentions of the bourgeois subject—as discerned 
by the cognitive boundaries of the Merdle plot. 
* 
From his first appearance, Little Dorrit’s daydreaming protagonist already seems to have 




Clennam encounters the harsh world of his upbringing with weary eyes, and finds that he has “no 
will” to face it.95 How does this world look? 
It always affected his imagination as wrathful, mysterious, and sad; and his imagination 
was sufficiently impressible to see the whole neighborhood under some dark tinge of its 
sad shadow. As he went along, upon a dreary night, the dim streets by which he went, 
seemed all depositories of oppressive secrets. The deserted counting-houses, with their 
secrets of books and papers locked up in chests and safes; the banking-houses, with their 
secrets of strong rooms and wells, the keys of which were in a very few secret pockets 
and a very few secret breasts; the secrets of all the dispersed grinders in the vast mill, 
among whom there were doubtless plunderers, forgers, and trust-betrayers of many sorts, 
whom the light of any day that dawned might reveal; he could have fancied that these 
things, in hiding, imparted a heaviness to the air. The shadow thickening and thickening 
as church-vaults, where the people who had hoarded and secreted in iron coffers were in 
turn similarly hoarded, not yet at rest from doing harm; and then of the secrets of the 
river, as it rolled its turbid tide between two frowning wildernesses of secrets... (542) 
 
The drama of the entire novel might be thought of as Arthur Clennam’s struggle to keep his head 
above these shadowy depths of secrets and enclosure, while the plot drags him through a “turbid 
tide” of concealment. Upon his return, Arthur begins to suspect that William Dorrit’s 
imprisonment for debt might somehow be traceable to the firm of Clennam & Co, but the current 
of suspicion ends up encompassing “plunderers, forgers, and trust-betrayers”—nor is it lacking 
in “iron coffers” and “papers locked up in chests.” Along the way, all manner of petty fictions, 
shameful pretenses, and outright deceit enjoin Arthur to turn a blind eye to this proliferation of 
secrets and cover-ups.  
In his reverie, Arthur imagines all of these images as locking him out, as secrets kept 
from him—a projection of the exclusion he has already felt from his own mother upon returning 
home. But the course of the novel works to lock him in, to bring him to the heart of all these 
secrets by imprisoning him in the Marshalsea, where the “shadow of the wall” falls “dark upon 
him” (735). In short, the novel takes this early vision of a terrifying night-world, which confronts 
Arthur as a padlocked door marked “Do Not Enter,” and places him on the other side of that 
                                                




opaque front—where his fortune, the true story of his birth, and his life’s love unfold. The 
“truth” of Arthur Clennam in fact lies out there, behind all of these imposing doors and closed 
shutters—behind objectivity—as the empty place with respect to which he is always displaced. 
 For Arthur Clennam, then, this locking-away of the truth has a temporal and objective aspect: 
the truth about his mother, the background of Mr. Dorrit’s debts, the nature of Merdle’s 
speculations, Rigaud’s identity and game, and even Little Dorrit’s love for himself—all of these 
secrets are hidden from him early on, and (with the exception of the last) their revelation falls 
upon him like the stone block in Great Expectations’s “Eastern story.” (It should be noted that 
Arthur is to learn about his birth mother only “in time to come”; after Mrs. Clennam has died, he 
is “to know all that was of import to himself” from Little Dorrit, “but he should never know what 
concerned her, only” (812); i.e. Arthur is never to know the story of Gilbert Clennam’s repressed 
will, which Amy asks him to burn unread. I will return to this point later on.) 
 But what if the truth could be locked away from oneself?—not in a closed vault, but within 
one’s own consciousness? But what if the truth could be locked away from oneself?—not in a 
closed vault, but within one’s own consciousness? If Arthur’s story posits a knowledge cut off 
from subjectivity and masked by external obstacles, then Mr. Dorrit’s story is that of the collapse 
of a subjective partition set up within himself, dividing his gentility from knowledge of the 
reality of the debtors’ prison. “While he spoke, he was opening and shutting his hands like 
valves; so conscious all the time of that touch of shame, that he shrunk before his own 
knowledge of his meaning” (226). Knowledge here is not a mystery kept by others, but rather 
something kept at a distance by oneself, and skirted around or obscured by pretense and “prison 
mendicity.” It is as though we were always looking into the other side of what he is not saying, 




undercurrents, side by side, pervading all his discourse and all his manner” (642).  
 Mr. Dorrit’s suppression and avoidance, even within himself, of the Marshalsea past and of 
Amy’s sacrifices and devotion, can be expressed in a phrase from Freud’s Studies on Hysteria: 
“the strange state of mind in which one knows and does not know a thing at the same time.”96 
This mental process is ubiquitous in Little Dorrit, and forms the basis and motivation of 
Dickens’s criticism of society. In contrast to this not-wanting-to-know, Arthur Clennam’s earnest 
petitioning of the Circumlocution Office, and his recurrent suspicions about Clennam & Co.’s 
responsibility for Mr. Dorrit’s debt—in short, his determination to get to the bottom of the 
injustices and mysteries that confront him—can be summarized in one phrase: the insistent “I 
want to know” with which he dogs the Barnacle bureaucracy (113). The novel’s other moral 
paragons are Mr. Pancks, for his “fortune telling” (freeing Mr. Dorrit and his family from the 
Marshalsea by tracking down an inheritance); John Chivery, for magnanimously passing along to 
his rival, Arthur, the painful revelation that Little Dorrit loves him; and of course, Little Dorrit 
herself, who is incapable of dissimulation, who deplores the deceptions of pride, and who never 
confuses her filial duty with the denying of her past—as her siblings do and as her father urges 
her to, instructing her to “obliterate” all recollection or suggestion of the Marshalsea.97 
 But then not wanting to know is bound up with the most hateful symbol in the novel, the 
Prison. As seen above, the “Father of the Marshalsea,” thoroughly tainted by the prison 
atmosphere, is also the character most obviously avoiding knowledge of what is the case: Mr. 
Dorrit is “an illustration of the axiom that there are no such stone-blind men as those who will 
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not see” (280). And when Mrs. Clennam is at her worst, she also invokes imprisonment as her 
justification for refusing to make amends for past wrongs, but also for refusing to hear about it or 
be reminded (as her dying husband intended her to be): “[L]ook at me, in prison, and in bonds 
here. I endure without murmuring, because it is appointed that I shall so make reparation for my 
sins. Reparation! Is there none in this room? Has there been none here this fifteen years?” (50, 
my emphasis). Mrs. Clennam herself also confirms Freud’s hypothesis that ignorance is to some 
degree volitional: “[If] I am also shut up from the knowledge of some things that I may prefer to 
avoid knowing, why should you… grudge me that relief?” (184). One of the novel’s great 
insights is that the “imprisoned” person, by refusing to acknowledge the past, by willfully not-
knowing, does far more damage in this state than in the original fault for which they are 
condemned. In Dickens’s moral world, wrongs are ultimately and importantly reparable. Mr. 
Dorrit’s debt, therefore, and Mrs. Clennam’s suppression of Arthur’s mother—these errors are 
not, in the last analysis, as damning as the consequences of their repression, as the repugnant 
false pride which refuses to engage the past honestly. The “prison” motif, as virtually every critic 
of the novel has noticed, is both a social and a psychological critique98—but one must see in this 
motif or symbol not only “imprisoning states of mind” (Wilson) in their various forms, but the 
important way that the prison (even as a symbol) shapes knowledge. After all, the essential 
knowledge pertaining to being-imprisoned—one’s guilt—is one thing that cannot be kept out by 
prison walls. In the symbolic continuation of the metaphor, e.g., Mrs. Clennam’s self-
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confinement to her room, the prison is not just a limitation or narrowing, a “mind-forged 
manacle” (Leavis), but a form of willed ignorance, an internal prohibition on knowledge that 
carries on (in mental life) the function of isolation carried out in prison by the physical barriers 
against outside stimuli and escape. However, both in the real prison and in the imaginative one, 
these barriers are insufficient to keep unhappy knowledge safe in its desired place. Just as the 
quintessential prison-escape films, John Sturges’ The Great Escape and Jean Renoir’s La 
Grande illusion, take as their heroes men whose spirits are so strong that “no prison can hold 
them in,” the lesson of the prison motif in Little Dorrit is, there is no prison wall strong enough 
to keep knowledge of the past out.  
 What the standard interpretation of the motif therefore misses is precisely the retreat from 
knowledge embodied in the prison symbol—a retreat which in the novel is necessarily destined 
to fail, since the utmost internal distancing (repression, “not wanting to know”) still involves a 
dynamic interplay of returns (the mystery plot and its revelations) and the immanent expression 
of that knowledge that one would be “shut up” from. The Prison is also the transitive motif by 
which Dickens extends his criticism of consciousness and reality-denying. Whenever in the 
novel we hear that some place is “like the Marshalsea,” we are prepared to hear next of some 
odious collective deception and consoling fraud. Thus, Venice (seen here as an existential trap on 
par with Great Expectations’s Satis House) is described as “a superior sort of Marshalsea,” 
dominated by “feigning” and persons who “rarely knew their own minds” (511).  
 Knowing and not-wanting-to-know are not only psychological and narrative organizations—
recognition and its possibility is even subjected to a kind of historical necessity. Indeed, what are 
the physical locations of this mystery, as it is introduced to the reader through Arthur’s 




souls are locked away forever. Both these edifices, the Marshalsea Prison and the Clennam 
home, physically cease to exist. We are in the Gothic. Now, it is a common enough motif in 
Hollywood versions of the Gothic that some structure collapse in flames while the credits roll: 
this can be found in both Frankenstein (1931) and Bride of Frankenstein (1935), Rebecca 
(1940), and The Fall of the House of Usher (1960).  
 In Little Dorrit, it is the Clennam house which is given such a climactic and rubble-filled 
scene of collapse:  
 In one swift instant, the old house was before them, with the man lying smoking in the 
window; another thundering sound, and it heaved, surged outward, opened asunder in 
fifty places, collapsed, and fell. Deafened by the noise, stifled, choked, and blinded by the 
dust, they hid their faces and stood rooted to the spot. The dust storm, driving between 
them and the placid sky, parted for a moment and showed them the stars. As they looked 
up, wildly crying for help, the great pile of chimneys which was then alone left standing, 
like a tower in a whirlwind, rocked, broke, and hailed itself down upon the heap of ruin, 
as if every tumbling fragment were intent on burying the crushed wretch deeper. (794) 
 
The point here is that the house falls for obvious generic reasons which are also “historical”—
just as realism both supersedes and incorporates the Gothic, the high capitalist period which 
Little Dorrit depicts in the person of Merdle coexists (for a time!) with the smaller, earlier mode 
represented by Clennam & Co. However, as with all social structures which outlive their 
usefulness under capitalism, it may be said of Clennam & Co.: “It has to be annihilated; it is 
annihilated.”99  
It is true that Dickens does not physically destroy the Marshalsea in the same manner—
leaving this, you could say, to the hand of time. In any case, between the historical setting of the 
novel and its writing, the Marshalsea was abolished (1842) and subsequently dismantled. The 
classic account of Dickens’ obsession with prisons, starting from Sketches by Boz and running 
through the novels, is of course Edmund Wilson’s essay, “Dickens: The Two Scrooges.” Wilson 
                                                




regards the treatment of the Marshalsea in Little Dorrit as Dickens trying “once for all to get the 
prison out of his system.”100 Although in this novel we don’t have the pleasure of seeing a 
prison destroyed, one does not need to look far to find Dickens destroying prisons with the same 
literal bluntness as the House of Clennam is subjected to above: Wilson notes “the satisfaction 
[Dickens] obviously feels in demolishing the sinister old prison” in Barnaby Rudge, 101 and one 
of the most famous scenes in all of Dickens must be the storming of the Bastille in A Tale of Two 
Cities. The first time Dickens introduces the Marshalsea, he writes: “It had stood there many 
years before, and it remained there some years afterwards; but it is gone now, and the world is 
none the worse without it” (56). In the Preface, the peaceful destruction of the prison is gone into 
in more detail, in a passage far too good not to give entire: 
Some of my readers may have an interest in being informed whether or no any 
portions of the Marshalsea Prison are yet standing. I myself did not know, until I was 
approaching the end of this story, when I went to look. I found the outer front courtyard, 
often mentioned here, metamorphosed into a butter shop; and I then almost gave up every 
brick of the jail for lost. Wandering, however, down a certain adjacent ‘Angel Court, 
leading to Bermondsey,’ I came to ‘Marshalsea Place’: the houses in which I recognized, 
not only as the great block of the former prison, but as preserving the rooms that arose in 
my mind’s-eye when I became Little Dorrit’s biographer. The smallest boy I ever 
conversed with, carrying the largest baby I ever saw, offered a supernaturally intelligent 
explanation of the locality in its old uses, and was very nearly correct. How this young 
Newton (for such I judge him to be) came by his information, I don’t know; he was a 
quarter of a century too young to know anything about it of himself. I pointed to the 
window of the room where Little Dorrit was born, and where her father lived so long, and 
asked him what was the name of the lodger who tenanted that apartment at present? He 
said, ‘Tom Pythick.’ I asked him who was Tom Pythick? and he said, ‘Joe Pythick’s 
uncle.’ 
A little further on, I found the older and smaller wall, which used to enclose the 
pent-up inner prison where nobody was put, except for ceremony. Whosoever goes into 
Marshalsea Place, turning out of Angel Court, leading to Bermondsey, will find his feet 
on the very paving-stones of the extinct Marshalsea jail; will see its narrow yard to the 
right and to the left, very little altered if at all, except that the walls were lowered when 
the place got free; will look upon rooms in which the debtors lived; will stand among the 
crowding ghosts of many miserable years. (xvii-xviii) 
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Psychologically—knowing that Dickens’ father was imprisoned here for debt—this obviously 
feels like Dickens “mastering” the trauma, what Wilson calls “getting it out of his system.” It 
can’t hurt you anymore… it is only a butter shop now. On the other hand, “ghosts” are not as 
easily dispelled as brick walls are taken down, and the knowledge of the Marshalsea persists 
“supernaturally” while the palimpsest of the city still retains “the very paving-stones” of the jail.  
 The outdatedness and antiquity of these two milieus determines the sort of mystery (i.e. 
knowledge) which is possible there. The Gothic atmosphere attaching to these places, and 
Dickens’ pleasure in their physical demolition, are strictly compatible with a plot which 
illuminates individual wrongs, false claims of maternity, blackmail, and long-buried secrets 
which find a way to the surface.  
 But in expanding this criticism of the prison mentality, echoing it across the vast chamber of 
the novel, Dickens imperceptibly relocates the social criticism of mystery—embodied in the bad 
institutions of the Circumlocution Office and the Marshalsea—onto the plane of a subjective 
moral epistemology: criticism of a thinking that denies reality, with the moral evaluation that this 
necessarily distorts “the good.” The novel’s most subtle and corrosive practitioner of this 
distortion, of a consciousness that holds together a knowledge irreconcilable with its utterances, 
is Henry Gowan, who cynically trashes everyone in his acquaintance before concluding that, 
“notwithstanding,” so and so was the “best fellow who ever lived,” with the effect that, “while he 
seemed to be scrupulously finding good in most men, he did in reality lower it where it was, and 
set it up where it was not; but that was its only disagreeable or dangerous feature” (204-5). The 
key word here is “notwithstanding.” Nearly every character and every milieu has referred their 
truth over to the keeping of some notwithstanding. This unreality—the acceptance everywhere of 




likeable characters in the novel: Flora Casby in her “mermaid condition,” where she lapses into 
giddy romantic blabbering “as if she really believed it” (286) and Pet Meagles, who “conceals all 
of [Gowan’s] faults… even from herself” after she marries him (552). Reality has a very slight 
hold on the minds of Little Dorrit’s population. But at this point, Dickens’s criticism is no longer 
assailing objective social mysteries (debts whose origins are buried in red tape, concealed wills, 
the erasure of class origins) but instead attacking divided consciousness, metaphorically 
extended from the Prison symbolism to represent a widespread subjective distortion.   
 We can see now how mystery in Dickens always leads back to the self-disciplined bourgeois 
subject (Miller), the detached-insightful cosmopolitan consciousness (Anderson), and the 
banalities of moralizing judgment (Orwell). As social criticism, Dickensian mystery is only 
conducted, so to speak, along channels of recognition—of full-knowledge, of consciousness and 
repression, of transparency and coming-to-light. Counterintuitively, perhaps, “repression” is an 
indication of full knowledge—what is repressed is at the same time fully preserved.102 To be very 
schematic: what is repressed leads to mystery, what is mysterious can be fully known, what is 
fully-known is given in advance (teleologically) to be illuminated in the concluding 
recognition—namely, the truth of the subject-protagonist, i.e. the full knowledge of the 
consciousness that we began with on the “outside” of all this pre-existing secrecy. To quote the 
film The Red Shoes: “Not even the best magician in the world can produce a rabbit out of a hat if 
there is not already a rabbit in the hat.” What is produced out of the Dickensian mystery plot is 
always this same subjective truth (identity) which was initially put there, in order to then present 
it as the antidote to what has been criticized all through the mystery’s windings. At the same 
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time, however, this full knowledge is also knowledge of that subject’s symbolic impossibility, of 
his or her “emptiness”—Esther Summerson’s effacement by disease especially, but also Pip’s 
being “wrecked... gone to pieces” when he touches the truth; in this case, the reduction of 
Arthur’s personal history. It is a mark of Dickens’s moral courage that his subject of ethical 
knowledge, in pursuing the truth of his world’s organization, recovers not an ideological 
plenitude or substantiality but his own historical dissolution.  
In recognition, a character finds his or her identity at the point—mute a moment before—
where it was not. When, in the conclusion of Little Dorrit, Rigaud, Affery, and Mrs. Clennam 
reassemble the true history of Arthur’s birth and Gilbert Clennam’s will, this concealed truth 
once recognized can be seen in retrospect to have been present all along, not as a passive trace 
but as pushing from the other side of the text. Affery’s dreams, the cause of the noises heard in 
the Clennam house, the meaning of the cryptic “Do Not Forget,” Rigaud’s apparent recognition 
of Flintwich while meeting him for the first time—all of these questions, which are left hanging 
for hundreds of pages, also reveal the contour of the full knowledge of which they are aspects. I 
proceed then to a closer look at the temporal structure of Little Dorrit’s (fairly contorted) 
recognition scene.  
* 
 Dickens keeps his mysteries before the reader rather like the performance of a chess prodigy 
who is playing a dozen games at once—making only one move at a time, but with the endgame 
of each already clearly envisioned. Flashes of mystery appear from the beginning, only to be left 
in suspension for hundreds of pages. So, the main doubt overhanging Arthur Clennam’s return is 
whether Clennam & Co. "had unhappily wronged any one, and made no reparation" (48). From 




Arthur begins to connect her, and subsequently her family, with these initial doubts about his 
mother: 
 Influenced by his predominant idea, he even fell into a habit of discussing with himself 
the possibility of her being in some way associated with it. At last he resolved to watch 
Little Dorrit and know more of her story. (56) 
 
 What if his mother had an old reason she well knew for softening to this poor girl! What 
if the prisoner now sleeping quietly—Heaven grant it!—by the light of the great Day of 
judgment should trace back his fall to her. What if any act of hers and of his father’s, 
should have even remotely brought the grey heads of those two brothers so low! 
 A swift thought shot into his mind. In that long imprisonment here, and in her own long 
confinement to her room, did his mother find a balance to be struck? I admit that I was 
accessory to that man’s captivity. I have suffered for it in kind. He has decayed in his 
prison; I in mine. I have paid the penalty. (89) 
 
 Alone again, Clennam became a prey to his old doubts in reference to his mother and 
Little Dorrit, and revolved the old thoughts and suspicions. (274) 
 
As with the characteristic tics, epithets, or catchphrases which accompany Dickens’s minor 
characters in their every appearance, these doubts recur periodically but, after their first full 
statement, do not develop. Thus, once Clennam has seen the Dorrit family in the Marshalsea, he 
wonders if William Dorrit’s debt could be traced back to his own parents; the very next time the 
thought recurs, it is already an “old doubt.” The mystery has thus been set in motion... but a 
particularly Dickensian sort of recurrent motion—more a leitmotiv than a suspenseful 
development. (True, the mystery eventually takes on a more complete shape, with false solutions 
and exculpations, even detectives of a sort in Rigaud and Pancks, but the repeated picking-up of 
this thread is also a repeated dropping of it.) 
 Several of the novel’s mysteries are continually resurfacing in this way—e.g., the noises in 
the Clennam house, and the "D.N.F." inscription on Mr. Clennam’s watch. Others are left 
strikingly unelaborated: the appearance of Mr. Flintwich’s doppelganger (with an iron box!) in 




before us but are then left untouched until the conclusion takes up all of these strands once again 
for a final ordering. 
 The recognition scene—the series of revelations that illuminates all of these questions, 
retroactively aligning all the pertinent information and producing a coherent image of the past—
will be found in the chapter “Closing In” (volume II, chapter 30). It is crucial to note that the 
cumulative facts now exposed were not previously the knowledge of any one person. In other 
words, there is not some Über-Subject whose knowledge preexists recognition as the inverse of 
the objective totality—rather, the secret is assembled by the very investigation. Rigaud has only 
the partial knowledge of the lost will which he obtained from Flintwinch’s twin brother in 
Belgium; Affery has only the fragmentary and delirious data of her “dreams" (what she calls her 
observations so as to keep them unreal); Flintwinch and Mrs. Clennam do not know the afterlife 
of the incriminating information, as it passes from Flintwinch to his brother to Rigaud to Miss 
Wade; Arthur has only his suspicions and confused observations upon his return; etc. Hence the 
need for the (somewhat implausible) piecing-together of the whole story by Rigaud, Flintwinch, 
Affery, and Mrs. Clennam in her room, with interruptions and corrections divided between all 
the characters. 
 This four-way retrospection takes up a dozen pages of the novel and cannot be conveniently 
reproduced here. The main outline of the revelations are as follows: Mrs. Clennam, after she 
married Arthur’s father, discovers that he has a lovechild with another woman, a singer. This 
affair was to have been quashed by his marriage, which is mandated by a domineering uncle, 
Gilbert Clennam. When Mrs. Clennam finds out, she adopts Arthur as her own, and secrets his 
mother away under the protection of Flintwich’s brother Ephraim. However, upon his deathbed, 




“a thousand guineas to the youngest daughter her patron might have at fifty, or (if he had none) 
brother’s youngest daughter, on her coming of age” (779). This patron is Frederick Dorrit, the 
brother is William Dorrit, and the would-be recipient of this benefaction is of course Little 
Dorrit. But Mrs. Clennam suppresses this will, and refuses to make any reparations except the 
smallest approach of hiring out Little Dorrit for needlework. 
 Rigaud is blackmailing Mrs. Clennam with this information, which he has acquired in 
acquiring the iron box (containing the suppressed will) from Flintwich’s twin brother Ephraim in 
Antwerp, Flintwich having removed the box from the house in order to have something to hold 
over Mrs. Clennam’s head, in about the same way. But the fate of this iron box is more curious 
still. Rigaud has left it in safe-keeping with Miss Wade, by whom he has been employed to spy 
on Mr. and Mrs. Gowan in Italy—Henry Gowan being Miss Wade’s former love. The endpoint 
of all this is that when Tattycoram breaks from Miss Wade and returns to the Meagleses, she 
brings back this iron box with her (810). 
 So what are the specific mechanisms of recognition? 1) The new revelations act like a sifting 
mechanism. Some details leap into connection with each other, while others are shown to be 
meaningless or even red herrings. Arthur’s suspicion that Clennam & Co. is responsible for 
William Dorrit’s debt is shown to be mistaken—the will that Mrs. Clennam suppresses crazily 
zig-zags from Frederick Dorrit (Arthur’s mother’s musical patron) to Little Dorrit without 
actually touching her father. On the other hand, the "neutral" aspects of Mrs. Clennam’s relation 
to Little Dorrit now make an ominous chain of significance. When, early in the novel, Arthur 
hears that Little Dorrit has been employed to do needlework for Mrs. Clennam, he traces this link 
and finds it to be a fortuitous connection that came about through several intermediaries—Mr. 




being passed along that found her work (86, 140). But this scene brings to light that Mrs. 
Clennam wished to make small reparation (for her conscience at least) by hiring this specific girl 
whom she has injured (without Amy knowing it) by blocking her from an inheritance. The longer 
circuit (with its three “buffers”) and the element of chance in connecting these characters are 
now shown to be false, as Mrs. Clennam dissembling her motives and covering her tracks. In 
other words, some earlier material falls outside the explanation, and other material is 
reconfigured and cemented in being recognized. 
 2) What is illuminated was there all along, but as a silent determinant; its effects precede its 
appearance. When Miss Wade takes Tattycoram away from the Meagleses, encouraging her in 
her rebelliousness, this at first appears as motivated by... what? The young girl’s headstrong 
nature, the magnetic bitterness of Miss Wade, the deep condescension inherent to Tattycoram’s 
position as Pet Meagles’ maid. All of this is true—in a way—but what cannot be suspected at the 
moment of Tattycoram’s running away is that Miss Wade has any personal hostility towards the 
Meagleses (whom she has just met on their travels, as much by coincidence as their meeting 
Arthur Clennam). This, nonetheless, is the case: Miss Wade is burning with hatred of Pet 
Meagles, the wife of Henry Gowan, whom we learn in her "History of a Self-Tormentor" to be 
Miss Wade’s former lover. She is not in Marseilles at all by chance, but because she is 
following—tracking—her rival. And it is for this same motive of revenge that she exercises her 
influence over Tattycoram. But we see all of this before we understand its causes; what is to-be-
known is not inert or dormant but instead active and determining prior to its being pronounced 
and incorporated in the recognition. 
 3) Recognition points beyond itself. Recall the scene where Mrs. Clennam chastises Flintwich 




here would be less useful than a digression on some recent criticism. For it seems to me that 
Dickens’s procedure of recognition is identical with what has been criticized as the philosophical 
or critical "hermeneutics of suspicion" in essays by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick103 (who 
psychologizes it as "paranoid reading") and by Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus104 (as 
"symptomatic reading"). It should be apparent from my discussion (in detail below) of crisis as a 
blind-spot in the phenomenal and ideological texture of bourgeois experience, that (with Freud, 
against Foucault) I am very much interested in reconstituting what the text cannot pronounce. It 
is just that this itself is not much; it is certainly not Little Dorrit’s hidden "meaning." The point 
here is to see literary form (in this case, the mystery plot) not as something to historicize, to 
reduce to some other content, but rather as the key to the shape of historical consciousness: in 
other words, form as the key to another form. This principle is amply rendered in Dickens’s 
mysteries, in the non-identity of the present moment with its own meanings, in the ubiquity of 
what is "needlessly significant." 
 4) Lastly, these explanations are explanations. What is recognized and revealed refers to what 
is before us, what is already there. I think we have all had the experience of “asking what 
something is”—in a foreign country, at a restaurant, buying a computer—and having the answer 
come back as some equally unhelpful foreign or technical term. Novels can be like this 
sometimes. The unmasking of the Gothic elements in Charlotte Brontë’s Villette, or the real 
identity of Tom Jones’ mother in Fielding’s novel, both bring in a great deal of additional, 
confusing backstory so as to clear that up. Many of the Sherlock Holmes stories work this way, 
not least A Study in Scarlet—at the end of the investigation, the detective merely produces before 
us a stranger we have never seen before and clasps handcuffs on him. The case is solved... but 
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only insofar as there is a new and equally unknown name and face to put to a crime. In this sense 
an “arrest” also arrests the temporality of interpretation. But in Little Dorrit, the explanations do 
not just brand a new identity on the forehead of textual objects—everything about Mrs. Clennam 
“snaps into place” when we learn what she has done, as when we read Miss Wade’s history. The 
explanation does more than put a label to the past; it invests the free-floating positivity of the 
past with a signifying order “tied to” an element immanent within it but never given.  
 Recognition requires that there be something already there all along to be recognized. I have 
been insisting that this something-to-be-illuminated in Little Dorrit is the truth of the 
consciousness confronting these mysteries, i.e. the very vantage point from which we encounter 
the novel’s gloomy secrets is finally the point on which our gaze is fixed in the conclusion. If this 
sounds circular, it is. As Lionel Trilling puts it, the concluding revelation, “the secret of [Arthur 
Clennam’s] birth, of his being really a child of love and art” is itself the starting point for his 
“ethical will” to unconceal these very facts.105 This unconcealment, however, bears a bitter cost. 
If Arthur’s being always-already “out of place” leads him to this illumination, the full knowledge 
arrived at is paradoxically a kind of subjective destitution—the erosion of his (toxic familial) 
foundations. The beauty of the novel lies, of course, in conceiving this destitution as liberating: 
what was alienating for the subject was just this initial perspective that generated its consistency. 
Now, this same circularity also holds for Dickens’s social criticism: the (moral) teleology of the 
mystery procedure means that there is no “outside” to this observing bourgeois consciousness—
exposure is built into its initial coordinates such that its itinerary aims (indirectly) only at itself. 
That there is a mystery plot and illumination at all is a guarantee that what is being criticized is 
ultimately knowable—and so belongs to the domain of the moral subject. In Dickens’s 
mysteries, in illumination, in his criticism and moral perspective—the entire matrix of his 
                                                




treatment of consciousness and knowledge—we never leave this domain of the subject’s return-
to-self and the internal opposition of knowledge/repression.  
* 
 Everything changes when we turn away from the Gothic sites of Clennam & Co. and the 
Marshalsea, to the modern spheres of bureaucracy (the Circumlocution Office) and high 
capitalist finance (Mr. Merdle). Here, one searches in vain for an immanent or teleological 
recognition.  
 Recall that the major event in the novel, the freeing of William Dorrit from debt, which 
divides Little Dorrit in two parts, “Poverty” and “Riches,” is a false solution, a red herring, 
which appears to exculpate Mrs. Clennam from Arthur’s suspicions. The initial explanation of 
how Dorrit ended up in the Marshalsea in the first place is a masterpiece of confusion: 
The affairs of this debtor were perplexed by a partnership, of which he knew no more 
than that he had invested money in it; by legal matters of assignment and settlement, 
conveyance here and conveyance there, suspicion of unlawful preference of creditors in 
this direction, and of mysterious spiriting away in that; and as nobody upon the face of 
the earth could be more incapable of explaining any single item in this heap of confusion 
than the debtor himself, nothing comprehensible could be made of his case. To question 
him in detail… was only to put the case out at compound interest of incomprehensibility. 
(59). 
 
To summarize, there is a known result, Dorrit’s debt; and a known cause, a failed and legally 
dubious business partnership. Of the connections between cause and effect, though, an 
affirmation of quantity—a “heap” of confusion—is deemed to be so mystifying as to ward off 
any investigation, clarification, or specification. As things stand here, though, Dorrit’s being-in-
debt is an ontological given, unknowable in detail other than the present outcome. As to details, 
remedies, lines of causality, actors, motives, etc., these are all so abstractly swept over that the 
debt appears as an inert fact of life, not indeed as a consequence of any thing at all. The debt is 




this is really all we learn about it. As a reader of Bleak House will already have been led to 
suspect, even if this hopelessly complicated legal-financial mess is capable of being terminated, 
it is incapable of being resolved. That is, if in said novel the suit Jarndyce & Jarndyce concludes, 
it is not because any light has been shed on the matter of rightful inheritance. The funds and 
property have merely been spent on litigation costs and thereby exhausted. In the same way, 
even though Dorrit is eventually freed from debtors’ prison, and this due to Pancks’ 
investigation, there is never any clarification of this initial situation, of the components and 
particulars of the debt. Dorrit’s original debt is of a convoluted unknowable nature, while his 
later freedom is due to an inheritance of the more “knowable” wealth in landed property. The 
critical “solution” is obvious—the mysterious inheritance is the only way to cut the Gordian knot 
of incomprehensible bureaucratic debt; a pure fairy tale of economic regression.  
 Dorrit’s debt is caught up in the Circumlocution Office in much the same way as Jarndyce & 
Jarndyce is caught up in Chancery. As Ferdinand Barnacle narrates Dorrit’s paying off of the 
debt, “When the fairy had appeared and he wanted to pay us off, Egad we had got into such an 
exemplary state of checking and counter-checking, signing and counter-signing, that it was six 
months before we knew how to take the money” (565).  
 Not only the flourishing of this artificial bureaucratic superstructure, but also the 
unknowability of the constitution and specifics of Dorrit’s debt is a product of the unholy 
junction of bureaucracy with finance capital—the Circumlocution Office and its representatives 
the Barnacle family are also deeply caught up in Merdle’s speculations and projects. 
 The mystery begun in Volume I, Chapter 21, “Mr. Merdle’s Complaint,” consists only in the 
following: that the great financier has a “deep-seated recondite complaint” that is not apparently 




mysterious illness, it turns out, is that Mr. Merdle’s speculations are more or less fraudulent 
shells, strung along by forgery and the ruination of new and ever-larger investments. After 
having drawn in the principals of Mr. Dorrit, Arthur Clennam, and Mr. Pancks, and “numbers of 
men in every profession and trade [who] would be blighted by his insolvency” (710), Mr. 
Merdle’s schemes finally catch up to him. Before he can be found out as a bankrupt, he commits 
a gory suicide.  
 Compared to the elaborate and prolonged, even theatrical, recognition Dickens builds to in the 
mysteries around Mrs. Clennam—which in some editions is supplemented with a clarifying 
appendix—the truth about Mr. Merdle that surfaces after his suicide is described in a dialogical 
manner as though “overheard,” or narrated by fama itself, starkly denuded of any journalistic 
detail or realistic specificity.  
As the whispers became louder, which they did from that time every minute, they became 
more threatening. He had sprung from nothing, by no natural growth or process that any 
one could account for; ... he had been taken up by all sorts of people, in quite an 
unaccountable manner; he had never had any money of his own, his ventures had been 
utterly reckless, and his expenditure had been most enormous... [T]he late Mr. Merdle’s 
complaint had been, simply, Forgery and Robbery... [He] was simply the greatest Forger 
and the greatest Thief that ever cheated the gallows. (709-10). 
 
But what exactly is explained by any of this—that the criminal has “sprung from nothing,” and 
by “no… process that anyone could account for;” that still further matters are “unaccountable,” 
and that his crime had been “simply, Forgery and Robbery,” that Merdle is—again “simply”—
the “greatest Forger and the greatest Thief,” etc.? This debriefing, completely drained of 
specifics as it is, raises more questions than it answers. What exactly did Merdle forge? Was he 
engaged in illegal activities all along, or only belatedly, in order to cover some unforeseen loss in 
a reactive chain? How were the massive projects he has supposedly been undertaking kept from 




deep-seated recondite complaint”) for its explanation (“Forgery and Robbery”) and not advance 
one inch in clarifying any of the Merdle story. Nor did we ever in the first place know much 
about Merdle’s investments, which are from first to last equally vague: “[N]obody knew with the 
least precision what Mr. Merdle’s business was, except that it was to coin money” (394)—which 
is almost “Forgery” already!106 The mystery’s “solution,” we find, only ever refers back to the 
single, reiterated question that indicated there being a mystery at all. The whole revelation is 
pinned to this affective mirroring of the unaccountability of capitalist profit, but without 
overturning or amplifying any interpretation of the original question. 
 Instead of illuminating “Mr. Merdle’s complaint,” Dickens merely puts a name to it. Instead 
of recognition, a nominal swap. (No explanatory appendix here!) If one takes this passage and 
flips back through the earlier sections of the book, applying the explanation retroactively to the 
points where Mr. Merdle’s unease and illness appear... nothing happens for interpretation, except 
this one-to-one substitution. Whereas every line of dialogue between Mrs. Clennam and Arthur 
can be reinterpreted in the new light of his not being her son, or every chance appearance of Miss 
Wade reinterpreted in the light of her obsession with Henry Gowan and hatred of Pet Meagles—
all the passages dealing with Mr. Merdle read the same backwards as forwards.  
 Furthermore, there is no full knowledge in the plot of finance capitalism, nor in the plot of 
debt and the bureaucracy of the Circumlocution Office, as there was in the recognition of the 
family romance. Rather than knowledge or explanation of anything that transpired, we only have 
the two words “Forgery and Robbery,” which are as inert and external to what came before as a 
deus ex machina. Not only is there no full knowledge here, but as a result there is no light shed 
on the subject who confronts this process. That is, the objective “secret” of Merdle’s financial 
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crime remains objective. Another way to say this: its temporal effects only run forward. Arthur 
Clennam ends up in debtor’s prison because of Merdle’s ruin, to be sure, but the thematic 
circularity that this avails the novel belongs to an entirely other dimension. Just as Little Dorrit is 
the “vanishing-point” (733) of Arthur’s story,107 he has to return to the Marshalsea as the 
existential symbol of the defeat of his will, a will that Arthur learns was always bound up in her: 
“When I first gathered myself together... and set something like purpose before my jaded eyes, 
whom had I before me[?]” (720). And this has nothing to do with the revelation of Merdle’s 
crime except in the way of a device that removes the financial disparity between the lovers. 
Arthur’s imprisonment for debt lacks any inner connection with Merdle’s fraud, while by 
contrast there is such a connection in the case of the suppressed will, which seems to confirm 
Arthur’s love choice—approving Little Dorrit, as it were, from beyond the grave.  
 The objectivity and externality of this financial crimes plot (how it touches on Arthur 
Clennam’s plot only mechanistically and tangentially, at a sole point), and how bare is the 
knowledge held back by the “secret” of Merdle’s complaint indicate that we have left behind the 
series of terms centering on the knowing subject seen in the recognition scene, especially the 
reversals of consciousness in Dickens’s mystery-procedure. But this departure from recognition 
and mystery already points beyond Merdle’s “forgery” as the object of any social criticism. As 
Mary Poovey points out, forgery plays an ambiguous role in the novel, “figur[ing] only briefly,” 
while “the details of the financier’s crimes remain vague, and the effects of the speculation he 
inspires are registered in a moral vocabulary that obscures his actual crimes.”108 In fact, forgery 
shows up only on this one page (after Merdle has committed suicide and he is found to be 
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bankrupt); most of the discourse around Merdle is instead about speculation and capital 
investments.109 
 Speculation is thereby placed in a dialectic with forgery—legitimate finance can apparently 
slide into gross illegality and fraud; what is criticized under the heading of “speculation” 
includes in advance a moral and practical judgment borne out by the revelation of spectacular 
(though vague) financial crimes. The point here is not to decide whether Dickens’s “real” target 
was speculation per se (apparently-fictional capital and its very real volatility) or instead only the 
criminal financier type represented by his contemporary model for Mr. Merdle, the Irish banker 
John Sadleir, and the other “originals” Dickens suggests in his preface.110 It is rather that this 
apparent undecidability, the way that “forgery” overlaps with “speculation” in Dickens’s rhetoric 
and in the outcome of the plot, is not just a conflation of the two terms. What we are dealing with 
here is a blind-spot within Victorian (and not only Victorian) ideology, an inability to perceive 
crises in capitalism, or to represent crisis as something given for social experience. To put this 
blind-spot in dialectical terms, the analytical problem of such a gap or rupture in economic 
appearance—the shuttling between “forgery” and “speculation,” the way that we can’t pin down 
the object of Dickens’s criticism here—is itself the phenomenal structure of a third term: 
crisis.111 In other words, capitalist crisis can only show up as something other-than-itself, e.g., as 
                                                
109 “[Merdle] was in everything good, from banking to building... He was in the City, necessarily. He was Chairman 
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against speculating” (673). 
110 “If I might make so bold as to defend that extravagant conception, Mr. Merdle, I would hint that it originated 
after the Railroad-share epoch, in the times of a certain Irish bank, and of one or two other equally laudable 
enterprises. If I were to plead anything in mitigation of the preposterous fancy that a bad design will sometimes 
claim to be a good and an expressly religious design, it would be the curious coincidence that it has been brought to 
its climax in these pages, in the days of the public examination of late Directors of a Royal British Bank” (xvii). 
111 “The world trade crises must be regarded as the real concentration and forcible adjustment of all the 
contradictions of bourgeois economy... [The] more abstract forms [of these contradictions] are recurring and are 





forgery or a localized panic. Karl Marx describes the way that illegality, profit, and the 
responsibility for a commercial fall-out are thus linked together in a desperate chain: “In every 
stock-jobbing swindle everyone knows that some time or other the crash must come, but 
everyone hopes that it may fall on the head of his neighbor, after he himself has caught the 
shower of gold and placed it in secure hands. Après moi le déluge! is the watchword of every 
capitalist and every capitalist nation.”112 A “crash” (capitalist crisis) always appears as mere 
contingency, a kind of high-stakes game of musical chairs. But this element of chance and the 
undecidability of the immediate cause of a crisis are themselves the essential determinations of 
crisis. The naivete of positivism in bourgeois economics is to expect crisis in capitalism to show 
up “as itself,” whereas it is in the untimely and inconvenient nature of crises to arrive uninvited 
and under a false name. A useful analogue here might be made to Edgar Allan Poe’s “Masque of 
the Red Death.”  
 Crisis is in this sense both included and excluded from Little Dorrit. Included, because the 
historical material that Dickens is appropriating (the crisis of 1857 and the numerous 
contemporary fallouts that he cites in the preface) certainly bears within it the structure of 
appearance of crisis, i.e. its “extravagant” manifestations in forgery, public scapegoating, and the 
vilification of finance qua “fictional capital.” Excluded, because crisis per se falls outside of the 
moral topology of the novelistic subject and outside of the circuit of recognition. The series of 
crises which slammed the economy of Victorian England113—and Marx notes that, “It will be 
remembered that the year 1857 [year of publication of Little Dorrit] brought one of the great 
crises with which the industrial cycle periodically ends”114—appears to Dickens only as a 
number of extraordinary fallouts (i.e. exceptions to the rule) from white-collar crimes such as 
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embezzlement, fraud, and forgery. 
 Whereas Little Dorrit’s dialectic of self-consciousness here consists of the drama of Arthur 
Clennam unmasking his familial and social constitution—the de-founding of the subject—but 
along a series that leads back only to a concluding ethical freedom. Nothing “escapes” this 
circuit of switching perspectives. In recognition, the repressed or secret contents of 
consciousness (the mystery) eventually line up for the knowing subject as his own ontological 
presuppositions; what is illuminated is Arthur’s truth from within what confronts him as an 
objective unknown. The absence of any such recognition or subject in the Merdle plot points to 
the divorce of crisis from this sphere of the subject’s (self) knowledge, its exclusion from the 
horizon of knowable experiences of bourgeois rationality. If the bourgeois subject views 
“rational knowledge as the product of mind,”115 then crisis—the irrationality of the total 
economic process in capitalism—cannot be sighted, so to speak, in the categories of ideological 
experience. Hence Marx’s repeated appropriation, in his economic writings, of Hegel’s 
phenomenological distinction that dialectics is what occurs “behind the back of 
consciousness.”116  
The reason for this is that, on one hand, under capitalism, “The life of industry becomes a 
series of periods of moderate activity, prosperity, over-production, crisis and stagnation,”117 and 
on the other hand, that this inevitable cycle of boom and bust appears as external to the constant 
and “eternal” laws of bourgeois political economy: “Under free competition, the immanent laws 
of capitalist production confront the individual capitalist as a coercive force external to him.”118  
In Dickens’s plots of recognition, the contradictions in objectivity (the gaps in what Peter 
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Brooks calls the “official narrative”119) transcend their mute givenness to reveal a fragile 
conceptual identity with the hero’s own subjectivity, bridging the space between the self and the 
world, essentially annexing objective reality to rational cognizance. In capitalist crisis, no such 
unifying immanent meaning is forthcoming or recognized. Where crisis would be in the novel, 
one finds only mute incoherence, an economic disaster that is somehow simultaneously a non-
occurrence: it is not a “possible object of experience” for bourgeois consciousness. Crisis is the 
eruptive and irrational return, within the objective framework of political economy, of the reified 
“laws” of capitalist production and accumulation. Crisis is not “reified.” It is, so to speak, the 
return of the repressed of reification. 
The impenetrability, the absence of any objective content in the Merdle mystery—no 
precipitating cause, no internal connection between the outcome and the lead-up, no specifics of 
any document forged, no accomplices, and altogether a cryptic and distracted character upon 
whom no light is shed by the revelation—is the direct translation into plot of the kind of 
knowledge which bourgeois society is capable of attaining about economic crisis, or of “coining 
money” through finance. This knowledge which is limited by the partial, specializing rationality 
which comes to dominate in the capitalist mode of production. Georg Lukács is the poet of this 
phenomenon: 
[I]t is the very success with which the economy is totally rationalized and 
transformed into an abstract and mathematically orientated system of formal “laws” that 
creates the methodological barrier to understanding the phenomenon of crisis. In 
moments of crisis the qualitative existence of the “things” that lead their lives beyond the 
purview of economics as misunderstood and neglected things-in-themselves, as use-
values, suddenly becomes the decisive factor. (Suddenly, that is, for reified, rational 
thought.) Or rather: these “laws” fail to function and the reified mind is unable to 
perceive a pattern in this “chaos.”120 
 
Crisis is in this analysis the irrational, uncognizable analogue of Immanuel Kant’s thing-in-itself, 
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to which pure reason cannot penetrate—the transcendental object lacking any verifiable content, 
existing independently of the knowing subject, hence outside of a possible self-recognition. 
 In other words, the raw historical material of the 1857 crisis is inaccessible to the 
representational practices of Dickensian form—it being understood that the “blind spot” in the 
latter is here detectable only against the background of the former. If recognition “invests the 
free-floating positivity of the past with a signifying order tied to an element immanent within it 
but never given,” such a conceptual anchor or knot is precisely what is lacking in political 
economy when it comes to crises in capitalism. Because the concept of use-value (to say nothing 
of class-struggle or overproduction) is foreclosed, as it were, from notional appearance, the 
empirical is deprived of the term that would make it cohere even at the level of description. 
Thus, instead of crisis being a result of identifiable tendencies, traceable backward in time, i.e., a 
topic of recognition—it is instead for political economy a non-existent, more a tear in the fabric 
of economic reality than an occurrence in itself.   
 Reification and recognition, though shown here to be mutually exclusive, are intertwined. 
Reification overdetermines recognition, outside of representation. Not only Aristotle’s 
anagnorisis, not only the genre of mystery and the threading of plots in the multi-plot novel, but 
the very space of novelistic subjectivity—all are articulated outside the literary, in historical 
processes. Subjectivity is not limited to the epistemological space of character or narrator, but is 
decentered, for as basic a mode of subjectivity as self-recognition takes place only in terms 
already bound up in the concrete.   
These forms are already operated within—preceded by—the processes of the capitalist mode 
of production, i.e. they are not matters of mimesis (see above, crisis as “bypassing” 




container for outside historical incident, nor as a grammar or apparatus that translates history into 
literature, preserving it through a kind of reversible no-loss process called “form.” Rather, as I 
have been trying to suggest, what we can read in a novel like Little Dorrit is the way that form is 




















Chapter Two  
Tautology and Displacement in The Last Chronicle of Barset 
“Thou comest in such a questionable shape  
That I will speak to thee” 
—Hamlet 
 
 Why are there plots at all in Trollope’s novels? In his Autobiography, Trollope himself could 
only offer a kind of apology for his plots: “A novel should give a picture of common life 
enlivened by humour, and sweetened by pathos. To make that picture worthy of attention the 
canvas should be crowded with real portraits,—not of individuals known to the world or to the 
author,—but of created personages impregnated with traits of character which are known. To my 
thinking plot is but the vehicle for all this, and when you have the vehicle without the 
passengers, a story of mystery in which the agents never come to life, you have but a wooden 
show. There must however be a story. You must provide a vehicle of some sort.”121 (He goes on 
to say that the plot of the novel under discussion, The Bertrams, was “more than ordinarily 
bad.”) Trollope’s own interest in his “stories” does not rest upon their plots but rather upon their 
imagined milieu, delineation of character, moral pedagogy, allusions to Othello, classical 
aphorisms, etc.  
 Trollope’s objection to plot is grounded in what he saw as the purpose of his fiction. Although 
subsequent readers have drawn the conclusion from Trollope’s prodigious literary output that he 
was a “novel machine,”122 Trollope demurs: “I have ever thought of myself as a preacher of 
sermons.”123 (He is inordinately fond of quoting Much Ado About Nothing to the effect that “they 
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that touch pitch will be defiled.”124) The “picture of common life” necessary to this purpose is 
premised above all upon transparency and legibility—equally in the moral and the stylistic 
senses.125 Thus he cites with approval Nathaniel Hawthorne’s description of Trollope’s fictional 
world as “just as real as if some giant had hewn a great lump out of the earth and put it under a 
glass case, with all its inhabitants going about their daily business.”126 The intention is to do 
entirely without artifice, with nothing interposed between us and this basically amiable swarm of 
characters. As Walter Kendrick notes, “realism” for Trollope means: unmediated by any formal 
intervention or apparatus.127 Trollope’s great aesthetic accomplishment is to show us his world 
through a pane of glass—not darkly. 
 Trollope’s name for such artifice, however, is plot. Plot carries us away from the immediate, 
from the self-evidence of experience and habit, and into the alarming, sensational, and unreal. In 
his Autobiography, Trollope objects to Wilkie Collins’s plots on the grounds that, in reading 
them, he “can never lose the taste of the construction.”128 Plot, then, is essentially an additive—
complete with aftertaste. Once Trollope has equated morality with the plainly legible, 
transparent, and “realistic,” plot can only be a more or less superfluous scaffolding, as much 
obstruction as support.  
 Given these reflections, The Last Chronicle of Barset (henceforth LCB) can only stand out 
among Trollope’s major works in almost qualifying as a mystery novel: the moral verdict on the 
Reverend Crawley, his guilt or innocence, is an open question for nearly 800 pages.129 Contrast 
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this with the next closest contender in his oeuvre, Orley Farm, in which Trollope gives the 
suspense away so early that he has to apologize for it in his Autobiography.130 But mystery is 
really too strong a word for what might be better described as LCB’s pervasive confusion. After 
all, the novel is only belatedly and momentarily a “whodunnit,” and it is difficult to characterize 
a book as a mystery novel when its solution is arrived at by the asking of a polite, direct question 
to a friendly party. 
 In what follows, I argue that this dominant affect in LCB, confusion, originates in the 
fetishistic form of interest in Victorian capitalism, whereby capital appears to simply shed a 
dividend out of its own greenhouse fecundity. The question mark hanging over the novel can be 
traced back to this displaced affect, which has spread from a minor plot set in the London 
financial market out into Trollope’s benign English ecclesiastical world and the enormously 
attenuated mystery plot. Here I differ from recent historicist criticism, which has seen the limits 
of Trollope’s moral immediacy and transparency as affectively bound up with the cognitive 
demands of capitalism and modernity. No matter how much historicism has problematized and 
interrogated the realist project, in looking for a discursive content to match a novelistic affect, 
historicism has relied upon the realist procedure of mimetic reference. Against this, I will be 
arguing that realist immediacy itself has as its conditions a reification which can never appear for 
that representation. There being no such thing as an unmediated appropriation of raw, pre-
ideological, “natural” experience, Trollope’s incredibly broad mimesis is only possible on the 
basis of a cognitive modality—reification—which has structured that experience in advance. It is 
not possible for Trollope to hack a “great lump out of the earth” without also taking over the 
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logic of that immediacy itself. But this means giving up the search for an historical objective 
correlative—the affect, so to speak, belongs to the perceptual frame, rather than to the picture 
itself. And Trollope has already given us his name for that frame or “vehicle”: plot.  
* 
 In recent historicist criticism, the Victorian novel’s objective as moral pedagogy has been 
reframed as the task of naturalizing for the reader new and anxiety-producing social categories. 
So, for Audrey Jaffe, the Trollopian novel is “that vehicle par excellence... for teaching the 
nineteenth century how to look upon things.”131 When confronted with a diffuse social 
“discomfort” about value in the stock market, “an uneasiness about the unpredictability of 
investing in shares,”132 the novel mediates and tames this pervasive nervousness by “rely[ing] on 
narratives of romantic love to adjudicate the relationship between feeling and value, the love 
relationship absorbing and disseminating the codes of ideological discourse.”133 Under this 
interpretation, morality and its romantic-narrative trappings are the smooth coating, as it were, 
that makes social norms and ideology go down easier for a panicky and uneasy population of 
readers. These threatening social categories and the anxieties they produce are the same “things” 
inside the novel (where they are defused) as outside, in contemporary Victorian reality, where 
readers have been taught “how to look upon” them.  
 Amanda Anderson’s account of Trollope’s liberal critique of modernity is also steeped in 
anxious affect: the vertigo and emasculation of a critique that can never fully transcend its 
necessarily “embedded” ethos.134 “The dwarfing of moral virtue by psychological excess... is 
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formally repeated in the vulnerability of the Tory ethos to the vertiginous conditions of modern 
life and the characters who embody it.”135 This “restless” and “energetically ambivalent”136 
anxiety has a clear awareness of its origins, namely, “a particularly fraught and idiosyncratic 
ambivalence toward... new and otherwise threateningly impersonal practices” of modernity and 
the threats posed to sincerity, communicative transparency, and liberal or cosmopolitan 
disinterest.137 That is to say, Anderson equates the affective (the anxious) with the “embedded,” 
which for her is a kind of psycho-social cabinet from which one may (or sullenly may not) sally 
forth to wage rational critique. By contrast, confusion in LCB cannot be fixed so easily to 
definite social forms, nor to the fraught self-awareness Anderson describes. On my reading, 
affect is displaced, not directly responsive, and stems from an a priori condition of 
consciousness, not from a morally-challenging encounter.  
 In her recent study, Genres of the Credit Economy, Mary Poovey proposes a different 
affective nexus between LCB’s complicated economic material and its recognition plot, i.e. 
between a historical understanding of the movements of Victorian credit and the novel’s 
retrospective construction of the movements of Mr. Soames’ check. Whereas I see confusion in 
LCB as displaced from the truncated form of interest, i.e. as taken over from an “unconscious” 
economic category, Poovey sees anxiety as coming from an outside discourse. The concernful 
dealings and misunderstandings over a check, which make up the plot of LCB, reflect the 
contemporary discourse about financial instruments in Victorian political economy. Victorian 
credit is taken to be the same historical discourse-object whether it appears in a novel or in a 
work of political economy.138  
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 Owing to this identification, Poovey reads the novel’s recognition narrative as a pedagogical 
exercise in “pattern recognition”139 and “narrative dislocation,”140 the pedagogical aim of the 
novel being to “neutralize the problematic of representation inherent in the credit economy.”141 
In Poovey’s reading, the narrative dynamic of recognizing “the detachment of signification from 
a referent and its subsequent endowment with meaning” is, “of course... also the dynamic of 
credit.”142 As I will show in discussing the fetishism of interest rates below, “the problematic of 
representation inherent in the credit economy” is not either “neutralized” or “supported” by 
anything so psychological (“subjective” in the Keynesian sense) as “collective belief.”143 But 
meanwhile, Poovey’s narratological argument relies on an untenable premise, that recognition is 
the reconstruction of an original unity that has been “broke[n] up”144 and scattered to the 
winds—so many fragments hidden throughout the novel. In recognizing the pattern, the 
dislocation is meant to be undone, and the delayed narration revealed as only apparent. But in 
LCB, this would require that the pattern’s visibility precede its “dislocated” confirmation. This is 
a kind of positivism; Poovey assumes that the framework can pre-exist its elements. By contrast, 
as I will argue below, the narrative order is not composed of self-identical units (atomic story-
events) which could ever be assembled in the first place to be then “dislocated.” Indeed, in LCB, 
the solution to the mystery here is given in the first chapter: no dislocation here. From the first, 
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Mr. Crawley says that he got the check from Mr. Arabin’s hands along with the gift of the bills. 
And this is the truth. That this truth is then balked and not recognized by characters is an entirely 
other matter than the critical-readerly project of "reconstructing" this truth anywhere else than 
where it is directly presented.  
* 
 For those who have not read The Last Chronicle of Barset, any summary of the plot is bound 
to have an air of the mock-epic: yes, this is the 900-page Victorian novel whose interminable 
main action centers upon the origin of—a bank check for twenty pounds. Since the novel is also 
the last chronicle of Barset, there are also extensive sub-plots and intersecting threads bringing 
together all our old friends, from Mr. Harding and Archdeacon Grantly to Lily Dale and Mrs. 
Thorne (née Dunstable). Just as, while reading Tolstoy, it is necessary to scribble out the 
diminutive forms of Russian names on a back page, so in LCB the web of cousins and 
Barsetshire’s fictional geography will have the reader taking pencil in hand to make little maps 
and family trees for private reference. However, in this initial summary, all of that can be safely 
left out: the exposition of the mystery of the check is confusing enough. As the order of 
presentation of the mystery is crucial to this study, I give each detail of exposition in the order in 
which it appears in the text.145 The summary is given as much as possible in quotations from the 
novel so as to preserve the nuance innate to literary “clues,” since these ambiguities will be 
precisely what I want to return to in what follows. 
 The novel’s protagonist is Reverend Josiah Crawley—known to readers of Framley 
Parsonage as the obstinate, moody, and impoverished curate of the Barsetshire parish of 
Hogglestock. “The crime laid to his charge was the theft of a cheque for twenty pounds, which 
he was said to have stolen out of a pocket-book left or dropped in his house, and to have passed 
                                                




as money into the hands of one Fletcher, a butcher of Silverbridge, to whom he was indebted” 
(4). “A day before the date” that bills were to be posted for Crawley’s debt, “Mrs. Crawley had 
come to Silverbridge, and had paid the butcher twenty pounds in four five-pound notes... Some 
six weeks after this, inquiry began to be made as to a certain cheque for twenty pounds drawn by 
Lord Lufton on his bankers in London, which cheque had been lost early in the spring, by Mr. 
Soames, Lord Lufton’s man of business in Barsetshire, together with a pocket-book in which it 
had been folded. This pocket-book Soames had believed himself to have left at Mr. Crawley’s 
house” on the occasion of remitting “a rentcharge to Mr. Crawley on behalf of Lord Lufton, 
amounting to twenty pound four shillings” (9). Mr. Soames “had paid the money personally to 
Mr. Crawley. Of so much there was no doubt. But he had paid it by a cheque drawn by himself 
on his own bankers at Barchester, and that cheque had been cashed in the ordinary way on the 
next morning. On returning to his own house in Barchester he had missed his pocket-book, and 
had written to Mr. Crawley to make inquiry... [N]o pocket-book had been found... All this had 
happened in March” (9). 
 “In October,” the butcher was paid, and “in November Lord Lufton’s cheque was traced back 
through the Barchester bank to Mr. Crawley’s hands. A brickmaker of Hoggle End [sent by Mr. 
Crawley] had asked for change over the counter of this Barchester bank,—not, as will be 
understood, the bank on which the cheque was drawn” (9). This brickmaker has to come back the 
next day, however, with the check “bearing Mr. Crawley’s name on the back of it, together with 
a note from Mr. Crawley himself,” when he receives “the identical notes [that] had been given to 
Fletcher, the butcher” (10), which you will remember as the four five-pound notes mentioned 
above. 




Crawley has cashed a check that was lost by Mr. Soames on a trip to Hogglestock. Already in 
chapter one, the explanations and conjectures start. First: “When inquiry was made, Mr. Crawley 
stated that the cheque had been paid to him by Mr. Soames, on behalf of the rentcharge due to 
him by Lord Lufton. But the error of this statement was at once made manifest. There was the 
cheque, signed by Mr. Soames himself, for the exact amount,—twenty pounds four shillings” 
(10), as distinct from the lost check for only twenty pounds. The second explanation is from Mrs. 
Crawley: “[S]he believed the cheque for twenty pounds to be a part of a present given by Dean 
Arabin to her husband in April last... Mrs. Arabin had told her [Mrs. Crawley] that money had 
been given,—and at last taken. Indeed, so much had been very apparent, as bills had been paid to 
the amount of at least fifty pounds... [Mrs. Crawley] had felt no doubt that the money [for the 
butcher’s bill] had been given by the dean” (10-11). But this account is contradicted by Dean 
Arabin himself. The Dean, who is abroad with his wife, writes upon inquiry that “on the 17th of 
March he had given to Mr. Crawley a sum of fifty pounds, and that the payment had been made 
with five Bank of England notes of ten pounds each, which had been handed by him to his friend 
in the library at the deanery” (12). These ten-pound notes, then, are distinct both from the check 
in question and from the five-pound notes that paid the butcher. 
 A kind of third explanation, which will become more prominent as the novel goes on, is that 
Mr. Crawley is so mentally agitated that he cannot be held responsible for his actions or his 
memory. Mrs. Crawley, trying to justify her husband’s erroneous first explanation, tells the 
lawyer Mr. Walker, “‘The truth is, sir, that my husband often knows not what he says... There are 
times when in his misery he knows not what he says,—when he forgets everything’” (11). I call 





It must be understood that by this time the opinion had become very general that Mr. 
Crawley had been guilty,—that he had found the cheque in his house, and that he had, 
after holding it for many months, succumbed to temptation, and applied it to his own 
purposes. But various excuses were made for him by those who so believed. In the first 
place it was felt by all who really knew anything of the man’s character, that the very fact 
of his committing such a crime proved him to be hardly responsible for his actions. He 
must have known, had not all judgment in such matters been taken from him, that the 
cheque would certainly be traced back to his hands... [T]he guilt of the theft seemed to be 
almost annihilated by the folly of the theft. And then his poverty, and his struggles, and 
the sufferings of his wife, were remembered; and stories were told from mouth to mouth 
of his industry in his profession... And then there were serious debates whether he might 
not have stolen the money without much sin, being mad or half-mad,—touched with 
madness when he took it...” (478-9). 
 
 All three of these explanations, therefore, are in place within the first dozen pages, in which 
space the first two are in turn refuted and only the third pseudo-explanation left to ferment and 
perpetuate itself (as above). No other self-sufficient account of the check is given, and the case 
makes no progress towards resolution for several hundreds of pages, until Mrs. Arabin drops the 
following bombshell to John Eames (Mr. Crawley’s nephew who has sought her out in 
Florence): “‘I gave him the cheque, you know’” (757). 
 The history of the gift of the cheque was very simple. It has been told how Mr. Crawley 
in his distress had called upon his old friend at the deanery asking for pecuniary 
assistance... Previously to Mr. Crawley’s arrival at the deanery this matter had been 
discussed between the dean and his wife, and it had been agreed between them that a sum 
of fifty pounds should be given. It should be given by Mrs. Arabin, but it was thought 
that the gift would come with more comfort to the recipient from the hands of his old 
friend... At last it was agreed that the notes should be put into an envelope, which 
envelope the dean should have ready with him. But when the moment came the dean did 
not have the envelope ready... And then Mrs. Arabin explained to John Eames that even 
she had not had it ready, and had been forced to go to her own desk to fetch it. Then, at 
the last moment, with the desire of increasing the good to be done to people who were so 
terribly in want, she put the cheque for twenty-pounds, which was in her possession as 
money of her own, along with the notes, and in this way the cheque had been given by 
the dean to Mr. Crawley. (759) 
 
But where did Mrs. Arabin get the check? “[S]he had taken the cheque as part of the rent due to 
her from the landlord of ’The Dragon of Wantly,’ which inn was her property, having been the 




part of another cousin, Mr. Toogood, that one Mr. Scuttle stole this check from Mr. Soames 
while driving him to the above-named inn, this Scuttle having subsequently lived up to his name 
and fled to New Zealand (781). 
* 
 I have given the Mr. Crawley thread above, as minimally as possible, and the rise and fall of 
Dobbs Broughton has had to be brought in along the way. We glimpsed Henry Grantly’s pursuit 
of Grace Crawley but not Henry’s discordance with his father over this matter; John Eames’ 
dalliance with Madalina Demolines has been alluded to, but not Conway Dalrymple’s wooing of 
Clara Van Siever. Adolphus Crosbie appears in a further plot—the victim of one of those 
between-novel spousal deaths so likely to befall a Trollope hero, free once more to pay court to 
Lily Dale (on now-limited means). Lastly, there are the more and less untimely demises of Mrs. 
Proudie and Mr. Harding, the former evidently killed off on a freak impulse of Trollope’s, and 
the latter’s slow shuffle into night the conclusion of the whole saga that began with The Warden 
and Mr. Harding’s conundrum in that novel.  
 For now, I want to return to the Mr. Crawley plot, which is undoubtedly central, leaving 
the proliferation of subplots to be discussed in the conclusion. There are several features of the 
Crawley plot that need to be drawn out prior to relating it to what I would like to call “economic 
formalism.” These features are as follows: 1) The mystery’s real solution is present from the 
opening pages; 2) that solution nevertheless has to be “activated” by outside material; 3) there is 
no movement on the side of the mystery itself, which is entirely static; and 4) the main plot is 
isolated and its consequences self-contained. 
 1. The real explanation is present from the beginning. After the initial error which Mr. 




explanation Mr. Crawley offers—and one he persists in—is that “he still believed that the money 
had come to him from the dean” (13). Later: “He had not seen the dean’s monies as they had 
been given, and he had thought that the cheque had been with them” (82).146 But as in the 
Sherlock Holmes story “The Speckled Band,” the real explanation here, while present, is in the 
form of a pun. The reader learns only later to emphasize phrases like “had come to him from the 
dean,” with the stressed element being on the indirect mediation of the money. The truth here is 
seen pushing from the other side of discourse. The solution, then, is there from the start—and not 
merely nominally, as in a mystery novel where “everyone is a suspect” and therefore the real 
culprit is indeed suspected only tautologically—but rather as a positive explanation, and one 
repeatedly insisted upon. 
 Besides Mr. Crawley’s statements, there are two other moments where the real solution 
can be glimpsed between the cracks of logic, as it were. However, these stop short of being able 
by themselves to solve the mystery, anymore than Mr. Crawley’s sticking-to-his-story could 
solve it—and in fact the partial nature of each cancels out the other. Mr. Harding writes to his 
daughter, Mrs. Arabin, about the case: “‘It has something to do with the money which was given 
to Mr. Crawley last year, and which if I remember right, was your present’” (432). Again, this is 
a true explanation, provided that two specifications are made—that “your” is read as “Mrs. 
Arabin” and not as the collective “your,” and that “money” means money in all its forms (checks 
inclusive) and not just bank notes. I owe the reference to this passage to Mary Poovey, but I 
disagree with her analysis, that “this detail has the potential to solve the mystery.”147 For, a few 
chapters later, Mr. Toogood tells John Eames that his belief is, “‘[T]hat the money was her [Mrs. 
Arabin’s] present altogether, and not his. It seems that they don’t mix their money’” (504). This 
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second moment, which can be synthesized with Mr. Harding’s comment in the final explanation, 
apparently neutralizes it, coming in this order. The attentive reading that picks up on the 
ambiguity of “your present” would, after Toogood’s remark, have to be satisfied that any 
monetary gift would have been Mrs. Arabin’s present anyways—check or no check. If the 
Arabins don’t mix their money, the specificity of the check’s being a present of Mrs. Arabin’s 
cannot obtain here.  
 2. The explanation nonetheless has to come from the outside. Although what Mr. Crawley 
has been insisting upon all along is “the truth,” it is not “the whole truth”—it cannot account for 
the question posed by an indignant Mr. Soames, “‘How should my pocket-book have got into 
Dean Arabin’s hands?’” (11). In order for the mystery to be solved by a canny reader (or by any 
of the characters), the solution would have to be immanent in the case as set out initially. 
However, everything rests upon the purely contingent piece of information that Mrs. Arabin 
owns the inn The Dragon of Wantly, and that she received the stolen check in payment of rent 
from Dan Stringer, of said inn (775, 778). The lack of this information is an insuperable barrier 
to any explanation which would mine the subtleties and gaps in logic of the narrative’s text itself. 
At the same time, Mrs. Arabin’s connection (through the inn and the theft) to Mr. Soames’ check 
can just as little be arrived at from any close examination of what has come before. 
 But here Trollope produces one of the greatest coups in all of literary mystery: this 
missing piece of the puzzle, Mrs. Arabin’s connection to the inn where Mr. Soames loses his 
check, can be found all the way back in the first book of the Barsetshire series, The Warden. 
When Trollope is introducing Mrs. Arabin’s soon-to-be first husband, John Bold, early in that 




shops in the High Street”148—and that is the last that is heard of the John Bold-Dragon of Wantly 
connection for several thousand pages. Of course the inn itself recurs throughout the series as a 
Barchester locale, but even the passing of its ownership into the hands of the widow Mrs. Bold is 
left to be understood though unmentioned—or more likely, forgotten about completely. Five 
chronicles of Barset later, this miniscule detail from the opening pages of the first novel in the 
series is dropped into LCB as the key to the entire protracted mystery of Mr. Crawley. The effect 
of this link being thrown out across so many books and years to the mere mention of a place-
name is potentially, almost paranoiacally, to illuminate every detail from the entire massive 
series as possibly signifying. If this fictional place name or this enumeration of someone’s 
property can become a vital clue, then it is as though the entire reality effect is suspended by the 
vertiginous possibility that every and any realist notation (and they are legion in Trollope) could 
be “rescued” in this way, thus transcending its immediate context as description. 
 At the same time, though, it is not as if any great light is being shed on The Warden or 
John Bold here. No avenue of meaning is being opened up to the past: we have only to recall, not 
to revise. The retrieval or preservation of this or that detail as a clue is merely supplemental, 
which is to say, playing this role lies outside of the “inner necessity” of the Dragon of Wantly. 
Contrast this with two instances from the history of recognition scenes in literature. In Marcel 
Proust’s À la récherche du temps perdu, the courtesan “lady in pink” whom the narrator meets 
on one of his childhood visits to his uncle, is later revealed to have been Odette de Crécy, the 
Mme. Swann of later date. It is a staggering identity, made across thousands of pages, collapsing 
into one person two discrete figures whom the reader has been holding apart for so long as 
having separate meanings and chronologies and spheres of relation. But this identity is not only a 
coincidence, i.e. a line drawn between two points but remaining external to them. To begin with, 
                                                




it lengthens and fills out the trajectory of this parvenue, connecting her triumph in Le Temps 
retrouvé with a period antecedent to her “first” appearance as Mlle. de Crécy in Du côté de chez 
Swann. Moreover, Proust thereby adds a scenic annotation to the entire drama of Swann’s 
jealousy in that novel: this scene, kept apart from the Swann plot as belonging to the narrator’s 
memories of his childhood, would in fact have been the key to all of that section’s tortured and 
anxious questions about Odette’s past, were it not that this recollection is only lying there inert, 
undiscovered. In much the same way, in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, the identity of Oedipus’ 
parents not only suggests a number of problems for the present moment, but this series of 
revelations also retroactively illuminates as inert a detail as the protagonist’s own name (in 
Greek, “swollen foot”). What was previously a mere biographical given, Oedipus’ lameness, is 
now integrated into an appalling explanation (his ankles were pierced by his parents before 
exposing him on a hillside), which in turn is granted all the power of tragic repetition (his being 
thus cast out to die as a child is repeated in his banishment from Thebes at the play’s 
conclusion). 
 These links with the past show how the “known” and given elements of life pursue their 
own course as the subterranean working-out of aspects which, on first appearance, are unstressed 
or deprived of their real connections, so that their development is manifest only in unrelated 
fragments, without their identity being visible. In short, the past’s existence for-itself is separated 
temporally from its being arrayed as what it finally is for-us. The character of the lady in pink or 
the fact of Oedipus’ lameness are not-yet-truths in their appearance; they are poorly situated, 
deprived of their native elements and require being renamed by later events that do not alter 
them, but rather fill out what they could not yet be in the narrative’s unfolding. LCB’s pointing to 




building up to this, its implementation: when Mark Robarts frequents the Dragon of Wantly in 
Framley Parsonage, nothing is being prepared for LCB. There is no “side” to the inn from which 
its development into its future role could be viewed. These relations are purely external to the 
elements themselves, just as the particular element here is arbitrary (i.e. it could as easily have 
been another of John Bold’s properties that played this part) and semi-external to the narrative 
whole we are dealing with. 
 3. There is no development on the side of the mystery. When Mrs. Arabin tells John 
Eames that she gave Mr. Crawley the contested check, this is in no way the culmination of an 
investigation which has been gradually assembling a puzzle, of which this is only the last piece. 
Instead, the mystery is pretty much where it was hundreds of pages earlier. There has been no 
continued accumulation of clues, or even a new set of questions. The only effort in this direction 
has been Mr. Toogood’s investigations, where he notices that there was “a queer lot about the 
house” at the Dragon of Wantly (410), but it’s entirely unclear how this could be relevant, and—
as just noted—is less a development of the mystery than a sort of tangential annex. Certainly the 
“real explanation” which emerges therefrom does not enter into the novel’s themes or 
profundities: any other explanation of how the Soames check got into Mrs. Arabin’s hands 
would have served as well to exculpate Mr. Crawley. 
 In truth, one of Trollope’s great accomplishments of tone is how he poses the mystery as 
itself being superseded within the very novel it dominates. Archdeacon Grantly, when he has 
reconciled himself to his son marrying Grace Crawley, asks himself, “Could he desire in his 
heart that Mr. Crawley should be found guilty? … If it might be possible he would have no wish 
on the subject whatsoever” (615). Mr. Crawley also ceases to defend himself, reckoning that “in 




true, “[h]e might be guilty before the law, but he was not guilty before God” (663)—and so he 
resolves to “submit to the bishop, let the bishop’s decision be what it might. Things were 
different since the day in which he had refused Mr. Thumble admission to his pulpit. At that time 
people believed him to be innocent, and he so believed of himself. Now, people believed him to 
be guilty... He would submit himself” (665). This submission and indifference to his fate—while 
maintaining the utmost principled dignity—is most poignantly expressed in the softening of Mr. 
Crawley’s tone towards his successor in the Hogglestock pulpit, Mr. Thumble. In fervidly 
defending himself in the first half of the novel, Mr. Crawley is viciously acute in criticizing his 
foes in the Proudie camp, but shortly before he is proved to be innocent, Mr. Crawley reprimands 
his daughter for disparaging Mr. Thumble’s sermon: “‘Be critical of Euripides, if you must be 
critical’” (753). It is a little moment, and Trollope doesn’t dwell on it, but it is really the climax 
of Mr. Crawley’s tragedy. He is not a broken man; he will accept whatever fate will befall him, 
uncomplainingly—though his humility is still haunted by this reference to his secret pride, his 
accomplishments in Greek. It is a move away from being persecuted, where the power of 
determination lies with the besieging forces, to ownership of his life. But it is also an 
abandonment or a devaluation of the plot we have been following since page one. To accept Mr. 
Thumble without mockery, Mr. Thumble whose humiliations and incompetencies I the reader so 
recently delighted in: it is not something I am ready to do. In other words, the emotional truth 
that Mr. Crawley arrives at is simultaneously the termination of his plot as a matter of interest. 
Even before it concludes, this plot has exhausted itself, has gone out with a whimper. What 
really happened is no longer an open question, and the parties involved have moved on—so, 
John Eames’ journey to Venice has more to do with proving himself, with escaping his 




solution arrives, then, it pertains to a mystery that is, if not actually resolved, at least outdated or 
superseded as a concern. 
 For this reason, 4) the outcome of the Crawley mystery is essentially self-contained. In a 
Dickens novel, the ramifications would take up the novel’s whole denouement and tie together 
every least plot strand; here, the consequences are remarkably minor. In the beginning of the 
book, of course, the question of the check “brings in” other strands to the story, e.g., the 
characters from Framley Parsonage return here strictly in connection to the Crawley family and 
their woes. But the solution of the mystery, to which everything so apparently was leading, ends 
up resolving only itself. Mr. Crawley has already resigned his parish, Grace is going to marry 
Henry Grantly in any case, John Eames still does not win Lily Dale’s heart, the Proudie faction 
in Barchester has been vanquished beforehand by an act of god, and so on. This main plot, then, 
is finally somewhat isolated. Very little hinges upon this unveiling of the real history of the 
check. 
* 
 Confusion is a persistent topic in LCB even from the incredulity expressed in the first 
sentence: “‘I can never bring myself to believe it’” (1), uttered about the apparently 
irreconcilable facts of Mr. Crawley being charged with theft and Mr. Crawley being a 
clergyman. But this gossippy consciousness hardly rests there, and the vague, unstable 
explanation that the Barsetshire community finally arrives at is marred by the inner confusion of 
its “kettle logic”—its being several partial, incompatible explanations at once. And then, Mr. 
Crawley himself hardly helps matters: “In all that he said he was terribly confused, contradictory, 
unintelligible” (13). This is understandable, given the circumstances of the case, which requires 




Lufton and a check drawn on Lord Lufton himself; between a check for twenty pounds and one 
for twenty pounds four shillings; and between two Barchester banks, the one where Mr. Crawley 
has the check cashed emphatically not being, “as will be understood, the bank on which the 
cheque was drawn” (9). This all amounts to much aggressive specification surrounding the check 
in the early going, and does not abate even after John Eames has broken open the case and 
cleared Mr. Crawley of all suspicion: 
As to the matter of the cheque, the dean acknowledged to his wife at last that he had 
some recollection of her having told him that she had made the sum of money up to 
seventy pounds. “I don’t feel certain of it now; but I think you may have done so.” “I am 
quite sure I could not have done it without telling you,” she replied. “At any rate you said 
nothing of the cheque,” pleaded the dean. “I don’t suppose I did,” said Mrs. Arabin. “I 




The entire perplexity of the novel, then—in the words of the first chapter-title, “How did he get 
it?”—is thus accounted for on the basis of this confusing half-recollection of a confusion 
between two monetary forms! 
 But this is not to say that the root of this dominant affect is to be lodged in the objective 
basis of the check-form. First, confusion is too diffuse in the novel to be traced back to this 
instance which is therefore just one among many, sitting at the same level. Indeed, leaving the 
check to one side, one can observe that hardly any character in LCB seems to understand how 
Victorian society and institutions work. The following examples of confusion could easily be 
multiplied. 
 -When Mark Robarts is discussing bail with Mrs. Crawley before her husband’s hearing 
at Silverbridge, he tells her, “‘[I]t may be just possible, Mrs. Crawley, that something may be 
said about bail. I don’t understand much about it, and I daresay you do not either’” (79). 




first asserts, “‘They have found him guilty; they have indeed. They have convicted him,—or 
whatever it is... I don’t understand it altogether; but he’s to be tried again at the assizes” (84). 
Trollope comments here, “Miss Anne Prettyman was supposed to be specially efficient in 
teaching Roman history to her pupils, although she was so manifestly ignorant of the course of 
law in the country in which she lived” (85). Then her sister steps in to further point out this 
mistake: “‘Committed him,’ said Miss Prettyman, correcting her sister with scorn. ’They have 
not convicted him. Had they convicted him, there could be no question of bail’” (85). 
 -This uncertainty about procedure and powers extends even to those who themselves 
wield institutional power. Discussing Bishop Proudie, Trollope remarks, “Now, episcopal 
authority admits of being stretched or contracted according to the bishop who uses it. It is not 
always easy for a bishop himself to know what he may do, and what he may not do” (106). 
 -But if Bishop Proudie is concerned to draw the appropriate limits to his authority—
indefinite and borderless as it may be—his wife’s interference yields an indeterminacy of a 
different character, as she makes no scruples about the strict limits of terminology or precedent. 
When, in the course of urging her husband to effectively disregard the bounds of his office and 
nearly to clap handcuffs on Mr. Crawley himself, she refers to Mr. Crawley as “a convicted 
thief,” and is corrected by her husband, she repeats, “‘A convicted thief,’ […] and she 
vociferated the words in such a tone that the bishop resolved he would for the future let the word 
convicted pass without notice. After all, she was only using the phrase in a peculiar sense given 
to it by herself” (105). 
 -One of the more prolonged comic misunderstandings in the novel is when Henry Grantly 
goes down to Allington to persevere in his declarations to Mr. Crawley’s daughter Grace, who is 




previous novel in the series, The Small House at Allington, will “know her way around” this 
locale quite intimately, while Henry Grantly gets quickly disoriented among the placid but 
monotonous country lanes and brooks. Considering that Trollope prides himself on exactly this 
“reality” of his imaginatively detailed but prosaic landscape—on the last page, he reminisces that 
“to me Barset has been a real county,” conceived and lived in over many years (891)—this scene 
of prolonged méconnaissance almost stands in for the novel as a whole: 
 He was careful not to go out of Allington by the road he had entered it, as he had 
no wish to encounter Grace and her friend on their return into the village; so he crossed a 
little brook which runs at the bottom of the hill on which the chief street of Allington is 
built, and turned into a field-path to the left as soon as he had got beyond the houses. Not 
knowing the geography of the place he did not understand that by taking that path he was 
making his way back to the squire’s house; but it was so; and after sauntering on for 
about a mile and crossing back again over the stream, of which he took no notice, he 
found himself leaning across a gate, and looking into a paddock on the other side of 
which was the high wall of a gentleman’s garden. To avoid this he went on a little further 
and found himself on a farm road, and before he could retrace his steps so as not to be 
seen, he met a gentleman whom he presumed to be the owner of the house. It was the 
squire surveying his home farm, as was his daily custom; but Major Grantly had not 
perceived that the house must of necessity be Allington House, having been aware that he 
had passed the entrance to the place, as he entered the village on the other side. “I’m 
afraid I’m intruding,” he said, lifting his hat. “I came up the path yonder, not knowing 
that it would lead me so close to a gentleman’s house.” […] 
 Then Major Grantly became aware that this must be the squire, and he was 
annoyed with himself for his own awkwardness in having thus come upon the house. He 
would have wished to keep himself altogether unseen if it had been possible,—and 
especially unseen by this old gentleman, to whom, now that he had met him, he was 
almost bound to introduce himself. But he was not absolutely bound to do so, and he 
determined that he would still keep his peace. Even if the squire should afterwards hear 
of his having been there, what would it matter? But to proclaim himself at the present 
moment would be disagreeable to him. He permitted the squire, however, to lead him to 
the front of the house, and in a few moments was standing on the terrace hearing an 
account of the architecture of the mansion. [...] 
 Then he followed the squire down to the churchyard, and was shown the church 
as well as the view of the house, and the vicarage, and a view over to Allington woods 
from the vicarage gate, of which the squire was very fond, and in this way he was taken 
back on to the Guestwick side of the village, and even down on the road by which he had 
entered it, without in the least knowing where he was. He looked at his watch, and saw 
that it was past two. “I’m very much obliged to you, sir,” he said again taking off his hat 
to the squire, “and if I shall not be intruding I’ll make my way back to the village.” 




 “To Allington,” said Grantly. 
 “This is Allington,” said the squire; and as he spoke, Lily Dale and Grace Crawley 
turned a corner from the Guestwick road and came close upon them. “Well, girls, I did 
not expect to see you,” said the squire; “your mamma told me you wouldn’t be back till it 
was nearly dark, Lily.” 
 “We have come back earlier than we intended,” said Lily. She of course had seen the 
stranger with her uncle, and knowing the ways of the squire in such matters had expected 
to be introduced to him. But the reader will be aware that no introduction was possible. It 
never occurred to Lily that this man could be the Major Grantly of whom she and Grace 
had been talking during the whole length of the walk home. But Grace and her lover had 
of course known each other at once, and Grantly, though he was abashed and almost 
dismayed by the meeting, of course came forward and gave his hand to his friend. Grace 
in taking it did not utter a word. 
 “Perhaps I ought to have introduced myself to you as Major Grantly?” said he, turning 
to the squire. 
 “Major Grantly! Dear me! I had no idea that you were expected in these parts.” (287-9) 
  
It is as though Henry Grantly, otherwise so poised, upon entering the terrain of The Small House 
at Allington, becomes infected by the clumsiness and want of tact which marked John Eames as 
a “hobbledehoy” in that novel. 
 -This whimsical bafflement even continues into the next chapter, where the Allington 
folks try to sort out the character relations well-known to us from earlier volumes Barchester 
Towers and The Warden: 
 “I remember when they talked of making the son a bishop also,” said Lady Julia. 
 “What;—this same man who is now a major?” said Johnny. 
 “No, you goose. He is not the son; he is the grandson. They were going to make 
the archdeacon a bishop [...]” 
 “He didn’t look like a bishop’s son,” said Johnny […] 
 “But then [he],” said Lily, “is only the son of an archdeacon.” (291) 
 
For the most part, the confusions just listed play upon common tropes surrounding the quaintly 
labyrinthine British legal/institutional order.149 But then, this is hardly a novel about those 
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institutions, as Bleak House or Barchester Towers so obviously are. On the contrary, this is a 
novel where the very modern institution of credit and currency dominates plots both major (Mr. 
Crawley) and minor (Dobbs Broughton, Mrs. Van Siever, Crosbie). The “financial” is where I 
want to locate the origin of the rural/legal/institutional confusions, as though what began in one 
zone (the City) had to appear in its “opposite” (Allington). But for reasons given below, interest 
(finance, credit) has to take precedence over currency (the disputed check, especially) here. Mr. 
Crawley and his check are much more integrated into the Barsetshire cast and geography than 
the group of new, urban characters who provide us with the disruptive credit-material from the 
margins of an obscure subplot. 
 As we see, the moral transparency valorized by Trollope can only be carried onto the 
terrain of finance, credit, and capital with much modification and some difficulty. And yet 
Trollope’s novels are unprecedentedly immersed in the minutiae of Victorian social existence, 
especially the period’s practical economics. Indeed, this is the author who included a balance 
sheet of his literary income in his Autobiography. So it is easy to find support for Jaffe’s claim 
that Trollope reduces financial categories to moral terms: the speculator Melmotte in The Way 
We Live Now is personally repulsive in the highest degree; Sowerby in Framley Parsonage is an 
object lesson in the reckless selfishness that attends the cultivation of personal indebtedness; The 
Last Chronicle of Barset’s Dobbs Broughton is an uncouth, drunken brute who is brought to 
suicide by his involvements in the City. In these novels, flirtation with new vehicles of financial 
risk and immaterial value-forms (the stock-share or the “paper” flying around with one’s name 
on it) is demonstrably fatal both to one’s immortal soul and one’s pocket-book. To oppose the 
                                                                                                                                                       
puzzled. He knew that Sir Felix was a baronet, and therefore presumed him to be the head of the family. He knew 
that Carbury Manor belonged to Roger Carbury, and he judged by the name it must be an old family property. And 
now the baronet declared that he was heir to the man who was simply an Esquire.” Anthony Trollope, The Way We 




City as an ideological topos, Trollope sets those economic virtues that emphasize aristocratic, 
landed wealth with its modest or flat growth and tangible, surveyable form. This contrast is 
perhaps most clearly set up in Orley Farm, where the magnanimous Sir Peregrine Orme warns 
the pretentious and sour Lucius Mason against the ruinous expenses of “experimental” 
farming—their opposing economic priorities doubling as characterization. 
 So, while these moral tales presuppose the mutual legibility of financial tools and of 
character, and the collapsibility of one into the other, this equation does not exclude legibility’s 
inverse: a thematics of unknowability, uncertainty, or unmarkedness, with the necessary correlate 
that what is illegible is in another sense always legible as—risky, subtle (in the sense of the Book 
of Genesis’ serpent), and deserving of caution. 
* 
 The ultimate affective referent of the finance material in LCB is not any real Victorian 
discourse about checks or the stock market—this discourse simply cannot step into a novel 
unaltered, “as itself.” We have to interpretively “reassign” the affect of confusion to the finance 
material (the stock market, finance instruments, interest rates)—but not to this material as it 
appears in the novel (specifically the Crawley theft case and the Dobbs Broughton/Van Siever 
subplot). Using Marx’s analysis of the fetishistic form of interest-bearing capital, we can restore 
this material to an original form which we never see as such in Trollope, the non-represented 
form to which the sundered affect belongs. Even though “finance” therefore appears on both 
sides of the equation, in Marx and in Trollope, it is not the same in each case. The literary image 
and the discourse-object have no intercourse here that could generate the novel’s confused, 
mysterious, befuddled tone and plot. Confusion in LCB is not alluding to or referencing the way 




which has dropped out of representation, so that confusion appears as largely displaced onto the 
most diverse bearers, e.g. the geography of Allington. 
 I am using “displacement” here in a technical sense borrowed from psychoanalysis. In 
The Interpretation of Dreams, in the section on “Affects in Dreams,” Freud remarks that in 
dreams, “[T]he ideational material has undergone displacement and substitutions, whereas the 
affects have remained unaltered,” so that “the ideational material, which has been changed by 
dream-distortion, [is] no longer compatible with the affect...”150 This incompatibility is on the 
side of the (substitute) dream-image rather than on the side of the (unaltered) affect. So, in 
Freud’s example, when a woman dreams that “She saw three lions in a desert, one of which was 
laughing; but she was not afraid of them,”151 analysis dissipates this fearful image—the lions are 
only substitutions for some non-threatening acquaintances, and it is this affect of not being 
threatened which has been preserved in the dream, putting it at odds with the threatening 
manifest content. As Freud puts it, “So this lion was like the lion in A Midsummer Night’s 
Dream that concealed the figure of Snug the joiner; and the same is true of all dream-lions of 
which the dreamer is not afraid.”152 
 In the same way, the confusion that reigns over LCB in all of the isolated, small moments 
cited above, has really been displaced from the monetary and financial spheres (qua “latent”). 
For instance, Allington, the quaintest place in existence, where everybody knows everybody, 
suddenly becomes a maze crowded with strangers—but only because this affect has been 
unlinked from the primary material and displaced onto a scene with which it is felt to be 
incompatible. Of course, taking the novel’s affects all together, seemingly nothing could be 
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further from the hasty, distraught suicide of Dobbs Broughton than a good, English, comic 
misunderstanding of the sort that occurs between Major Grantly and Squire Dale on the paths of 
Allington, but this wide separation of feeling is no contradiction: “[E]very element in a dream 
can, for purposes of interpretation, stand for its opposite just as easily as for itself”—the so-
called “reversal of affect.”153 
 To be sure, there is a fair amount of out-and-out confusion in the strictly financial sub-
plot.154 When Crosbie goes into the City to renew his bill at Broughton and Musselboro’s offices, 
he feels sitting there that he does “not quite understand the manner in which the affairs of the 
establishment were worked” (441). Or here: “Though he knew a good deal of affairs in general, 
he did not quite know what would happen to him if his bill should be dishonoured... [H]e did not 
know what his creditors would immediately have the power of doing” (447). Mrs. Dobbs 
Broughton is just as mystified as to her husband’s affairs: “She had never understood much 
about the City, being satisfied with an assurance that had come to her in early days from her 
friends, that there was a mine of wealth in Hook Court” (534). 
 However, this specific confusion cannot be said to belong to the workings of stock and 
credit as represented in LCB. Crucially, the confusion evinced by Crosbie and Mrs. Broughton 
stops at the door of the inner office, so to speak. From that point on, the motif of confusion is 
entirely transposed, into a precise language of interest rates, currency squeezes, scheduled 
payments and fallings-due, and profit—in short, shifted into a different register, one with 
pretenses of clear determination (higher risk=higher profit). For example, when Mrs. Van Siever 
comes to Broughton and Musselboro’s offices, she is in no doubt as to how things work there, 
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business partner in a stockbroking firm, Augustus Musselboro, is meanwhile competing with Dalrymple for the hand 




however much Crosbie may be. When Musselboro, in the process of declining to remit the 
payment due her, condescendingly informs Mrs. Van Siever of the workings of credit, she is not 
at all cowed or put off. “‘You must remember, Mrs. Van Siever, that ten per cent. won’t come in 
quite as regularly as four or five. When you go for high interest, there must be hitches here and 
there [...]’ ’I know all about it,’ said Mrs. Van Siever” (381). 
 Now, readers of the novel may recall that there is a definite and recurrent discussion of 
“risk,” “uncertainty,” “speculation,” “chancy” money, and a “smash” in LCB—pertaining to 
Dobbs Broughton’s impending ruin at the hand of the market. Taken over approximately 900 
pages, it is easy to neglect that all of this talk comes from only one (far from trustworthy) 
character, Madalina Demolines. In fact, these themes have no root except in Miss Demoline’s 
personal vendetta against her erstwhile friend, Mrs. Dobbs Broughton (née Maria Clutterbuck) 
and do not emanate from what one might call a reliable source. Risk, chance, or a smash are not 
otherwise put forward as causes of Dobbs Broughton’s precipitous fall. When Miss Demolines 
says, “City money is always very chancy” (259) and that “risk is every thing to” “City people,” 
who are “always living in the crater of a volcano” (399), however aphoristic, general, and indeed 
persuasive her conflation of the City with explosive risk might be, it is in fact part of the 
delineation of this one character. Recall that John Eames, by far the more level-headed character, 
is apt to answer Miss Demoline’s gossip with anodyne remarks such as, “‘Life is always 
uncertain, Miss Demolines,’” or, “‘I think that’s the same with all money’” (259). 
 I stress this point because the stock-market suicide in this novel, unlike in The Way We 
Live Now or Little Dorrit, cannot be traced to any thematization of risk, speculation, volatility, 
etc.155 actually found within LCB. Trollope rather attributes Dobbs Broughton’s taking of his 
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own life to his drinking (647) and to his being “‘sold up’” by Mrs. Van Siever to make room for 
his partner Musselboro, whom she intends to take over the business and marry her daughter 
(646). 
[…] Broughton’s property had never been great, and … his personal liabilities at the time 
of his death were supposed to be small. But he had fallen lately altogether into the hands 
of Musselboro, who, though penniless himself in the way of capital, was backed by the 
money of Mrs. Van Siever. There was no doubt that Broughton had destroyed himself in 
the the manner told by Musselboro, but the opinion in the City was that he had done so 
rather through the effects of drink than because of his losses. (714) 
 
Here, then, “risk” disappears, and extra-financial explanations hold the day: alcoholism, marital 
machinations, betrayal, a certain vulgarity.  
 If, as I claim, all the vast confusion of the novel is rooted in this “other scene,” interest-
bearing capital, confusion is itself remarkably absent from that scene. Finance in LCB is 
eminently calculable and rational for the characters in that sphere. “‘I know all about it’” is as 
though written above the entryway to the City as a Dantean inscription. The confusion cited just 
now—stemming from ignorance—is the immediate reflection of this scene in the minds of 
characters (Miss Demolines, Crosbie, Mrs. Arabin) who are excluded from the professional 
knowledge of Mrs. Van Siever, Musselboro, et al. 
 Confusion thus belongs, as an affect, to the “latent” original finance material, yet when 
this material appears in the novel it has become a rational and orderly element. So where does 
one locate this confusion, if the original is apparently nowhere to be found?—and always bearing 
in mind that it cannot be imported ready-made from some exterior historical discourse or corpus 
of cultural affects. Let’s have a look at least at how finance is conceived in LCB, especially in its 
                                                                                                                                                       
(Crosbie, Mark Robarts in Framley Parsonage) than the abstract “risk” in the form M-M', where money is to be 
directly realized on one’s private capital. (See Chapter One, on Little Dorrit.) In LCB, the financial activities in the 
City are employing and loaning money as capital: these loans are taken out and bought-up (by Broughton and 
Musselboro) with the intention of realizing a profit, of securing a rate of return for their partner. When Musselboro 
buys up Broughton, this is not systematic risk, but rather a direct personal double-dealing: an entirely intentional act. 




determining form of interest.156 
 Lecturing his son about the importance of owning land, and thus casually threatening that 
Henry will lose his landed inheritance if he goes ahead and marries Grace Crawley, Archdeacon 
Grantly remarks, “‘It is astonishing how land has risen in value... and yet rents are not so very 
much higher. They who buy land now can’t have above two-and-a-half for their money.’” (623) 
This he opposes to “a scratch income,—an income made up of a few odds and ends, a share or 
two in this company and a share or two in that, a slight venture in foreign stocks, a small 
mortgage and such like convenient but uninfluential driblets” (624). Or, there is Dobbs 
Broughton’s line of business, “raising money on his own credit at four or five per cent., and 
lending it on his own judgment at eight or nine” (439). Broughton’s line is partially in the service 
of Mrs. Van Siever, who has “drawn close upon two thousand a year for less than eighteen 
thousand pounds” of principal: more than an eleven percent return (377). Most concise of all is 
Butterwell’s way of stating the interest rate to Crosbie: “‘Money’s about seven now’” (453). 
 Disregarding the ideological values Trollope attaches to landed wealth, rent (profit on 
land) is manifestly a worse application of capital than interest (profit on money), by several 
percentage points. But whereas rent has an obvious source in agricultural labor, interest appears 
to return its seven or eight percent like clockwork on its own, money having this rate built into it 
as the commodity, capital. This tallies exactly with what Marx has to say about interest-bearing 
capital in Volume 3 of Capital: 
 In interest-bearing capital, the capital relationship reaches its most superficial and 
fetishized form. Here we have M-M' [the process of a quantity of money M yielding a 
greater quantity of money M': BP], money that produces more money, self-valorizing 
value, without the process that mediates the two extremes. In commercial capital, M-C-
M' [capital M purchases commodities C—the means of production and labor-power—the 
latter of which produces surplus-value, realized as the enlarged revenue M': BP] at least 
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the general form of the capitalist movement is present, even though this takes place only 
in the circulation sphere, so that profit appears as merely profit upon alienation; but for 
all that, it presents itself as the product of a social relation, not the product of a mere 
thing. The form of commercial capital still exhibits a process, the unity of opposing 
phases, a movement that breaks down into two opposite procedures, the purchase and 
sale of commodities. This is obliterated in M-M', the form of interest-bearing capital... In 
other words, [in interest-bearing capital] capital is not a simple quantity. It is a relation of 
quantities, a ratio between the principal as a given value, and itself as self-valorizing 
value, as a principal that has produced a surplus-value. And as we have seen, capital 
presents itself in this way, as this directly self-valorizing value, for all active capitalists, 
whether they function with their own capital or with borrowed capital... 
 This is the original and general formula for capital reduced to a meaningless 
abbreviation. It is capital in its finished form, the unity of the production and circulation 
processes, and hence capital yielding a definite surplus-value in a specific period of 
time... Capital appears as a mysterious and self-creating source of interest, of its own 
increase. The thing (money, commodity, value) is now already capital simply as a thing; 
the result of the overall reproduction process appears as a property devolving on a thing 
in itself... [T]his automatic fetish is elaborated into its pure form, self-valorizing value, 
money breeding money, and in this form it no longer bears any mark of its origin. The 
social relation is consummated in the relationship of a thing, money, to itself. Instead of 
the actual transformation of money into capital, we have here only the form of this 
devoid of content... the capital mystification in the most flagrant form.157 
 
Here Marx is describing the appearance of interest in the capitalist mode of production, not its 
actual determinations within the labor theory of value (e.g., the average rate of profit’s relation to 
the composition of capital). These would of course have been unknown to Trollope, while the 
appearance would have been everywhere operative, giving rise to ideas that are “merely the 
expression in consciousness of the apparent movement.”158 It forms no part of this study to 
present again Marx’s findings, as the real movement of interest and money-capital does not touch 
upon the logic of LCB. Suffice it to say that in Marx’s analysis, capitalist production, 
reproduction, circulation, and accumulation all form a process of many stages, in which unpaid 
quantities of the commodity labor-power are valorized as value in the production process, a 
surplus (unpaid-for) portion of this value then being realized by its sale as a commodity on the 
market, thus returning to the capitalist as profit. Capital only realizes a surplus-value through 
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production, labor being the site of capital’s valorization. In the case of money loaned out at 
interest, nothing changes: the interest repaid has always been thus applied as productive capital, 
but invisibly, by other parties, and at a temporal remove from the bank-ledger, from whose 
perspective interest is a function belonging to money as its “price,” as mere markup, and hence 
worlds apart from the complex material process of the realization of surplus-value. Thus, the 
commodity components of this productive capital (wages + means of production) no longer 
appear for interest-bearing capital: the entire mediating process of production is cut off here, so 
that interest-bearing capital “is not given out as money or as a commodity, i.e. neither exchanged 
for a commodity when it is advanced as money nor sold for money when it is advanced as a 
commodity. It is rather given out as capital.”159 So, while interest-bearing capital is the highest, 
most-developed form of the capitalist process, involving the most stages and the longest actual 
journey from outlay to return, its appearance is the exact opposite: it shows up as the most 
abridged, the least relational, and the most abstract form of capital. Hence, the “reflexive 
relationship in which capital presents itself when we view the capitalist production process as a 
whole” disappears, and as interest, capital “is here simply embodied in it as its character, its 
capacity, without the intervening mediating movement.”160 
 So, when someone in LCB says, “Money’s about seven now,” what we are hearing is not 
just the quote of the going interest rate, but also the phenomenology of capital in its most 
abstracted form. However, this abstraction is not, for all that, removed out of daily life and into 
the sphere of politico-economic treatises. On the contrary, this logic—an abstract, unmediated 
interest rate—is a predicate of that everyday instrument, money. Money is its seven per cent rate 
of return. With money, then, we are back in the heart of Trollope’s realist procedure: has any 
                                                





other author even been as scrupulous as Trollope in detailing each and every character’s source 
of income? The movement of money, or the space of money’s appearance, is of course 
everywhere, invisibly carrying with it the logic of its suppressed determinants. 
 Whence confusion, then? The mystified form of interest as reflected in consciousness is 
M-M', money begets money, which is simple enough and not particularly confusing. Even 
children understand the savings accounts that are opened in their names. As I indicated above, 
this fetishized form of capital takes on a rational and calculable shape in the professional 
financial sector, for example in the strictly chartable correlations of risk and rates of return. 
However, M-M', the automatic self-valorization of a “thing,” to use Marx’s expression, is 
irrationality itself: “a form devoid of content.” It is against the law of physics of the conservation 
of matter, money’s auto-genesis here being much more aligned with fairy-tale thought. To be 
clear: interest-bearing capital is not only irrational and mystified in relation to the real workings 
of capitalist reproduction or to the formation of the rate of profit; irrationality pertains to the form 
itself,161 in which a quantitative relation (the difference between M and M') is posited as the 
content of the self-relation of a thing, money-capital. 
 This is not a case of homology, such that the novel’s affect would be identical to an affect 
ready-to-hand in the economy. Confusion is rather the excess of appearance over its name, over 
this formal tautology M-M'. Just as, on one hand, the real process or essential laws of production 
of surplus-value are in excess of this mystified relation, so on the other hand, the appearance 
itself is irreducible to this name or formula. For the manifest, quantitative aspect of interest, the 
interest-rate, is here an objective determination entirely exclusive of the relation itself. As Marx 
demonstrates in his extensive quotations from Parliamentary reports, the simplicity of the interest 
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relation is contrasted at every turn with the complexity of its expression as a rate. So he quotes 
Lord Overstone: "3653. The fluctuations in the rate of interest arise from one of two causes: an 
alteration in the value of capital or an alteration in the amount of money in the country."162 Here 
the fetishized form: the determinations are completely within the relation M-M', i.e. this ratio of 
quantities. But the appearance, or the expression of this form, which also shows up for 
consciousness, as Marx lists these phenomena, is one of a nearly infinite regress of causation: 
Dearer corn, rising cotton prices, the unsaleability of sugar on account of overproduction, 
railway speculation and crash, the flooding of foreign markets with cotton goods, the 
forcible export and import trade with India... for the purpose of speculation in bills of 
exchange. All these things, overproduction in industry as well as underproduction in 
agriculture, i.e. quite different reasons, led to a rise in the demand for money capital, i.e. 
for credit and money. The increased demand for money capital had its origins in the 
course of the production process itself. But whatever the cause, it was the demand for 
money capital that made the rate of interest, the value of money capital, rise. If Overstone 
is trying to say that the value of money capital rose because it rose, this is a tautology.163 
 
In the case of interest, the very simplicity of the formula is outflanked instantly by the 
phenomenon of the interest rate and all of the multiplying intricacies of the world supply and 
demand of currency. The tautological abstraction, residing in its own simple self-sufficiency, is 
thus immediately abandoned as a name, in favor of what is implicitly only a description: the 
ideologeme of the market’s "complexity," its ramifying interactions, its unending relatedness, its 
atomic and quasi-magical regulation by invisible forces, etc. The form M-M' as a name is always 
therefore just a place-holder, insufficient in every case to settle into categories (other than sheer 
identity) the "complexity" of the appearance of the interest-rate. 
 Confusion is thus the formal effect of the gap within reification between the interest’s 
apparent contentlessness (its magical self-relation and tautological form) and the real content 
(interest rate, crises, capital accumulation, e.g. the worldwide project of Victorian imperialism) 
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which is reduced to nothing by this form—this unincorporated real content of course having its 
“revenge” in periodic global economic crises. This gap in interest’s form of appearance, its being 
a form “devoid of content” while at the same time functioning as the abstract reduction of real 
social-historical content (the mode of production’s other manifestations, to begin with)—
necessarily passes over into the shape and content of a work, such as LCB, which takes this gap 
over wholesale into its form as part of its appropriation of the reality to be depicted. What is 
reduced in the form M-M' cannot however be reduced to nothing by the realist novel, whose task 
is to render the very breadth and bulk of this social-historical content. Confusion here is the mark 
of the irony that Trollope, whom no one has ever thought of as abridging or reducing, has taken 
as the inner structure of his fictional world’s movements these very formal tendencies. This 
internalized, fetishized form is restrictive where Trollope is expansive, formulaic where 
Trollope’s art is the multiplication of empirical variety. What is confusing is just this inadequacy 
of the form to the content whose logic it is, but not as the logic of its real movements (i.e. 
capital’s expanded reproduction) but the logic of its appearance for appropriation by 
consciousness. 
 But how does this process of appropriation work? How does literature assimilate and 
transform reality? This is a question that has been with us a long time, since Aristotle. Even 
there, plot is not something laid on top of raw experience. Rather, emplotment doubles or 
reproduces the conditions of immediate experience, of reality’s “appearing” at all. This is almost 
especially true for Trollope, whose novels verge on an expansive virtual reality, so deeply 
imagined that it is one form of escapism to take up a Trollope novel, but another kind of 
escapism to then put it down. 




as such, and therefore cannot be dispensed with either in experience nor in the second-order 
mimesis of plotted narrative. Interest-bearing capital is an object for representation that cannot be 
taken into the novel without bringing along the necessary conditions of its appearance in 
developed capitalist society, namely its fetishized appearance as the automatic self-increase of 
money. We see here the contrast between this object and the check-form: interest-bearing capital 
has a definite and inviolable logic built into its objective structure as a datum for consciousness, 
whereas the check-form, as Mary Poovey demonstrates, is a matter of psychological "attitudes," 
which can be directly brought forward and addressed by a rhetoric whose aim to naturalize 
certain behaviors—all as a matter of conscious persuasion.  
 I say that interest-bearing capital is an "object for representation," rather than a real object 
or a discursive object, because at no point is it a matter for Trollope of examining the real 
workings of interest-bearing capital, of making a study that would reveal the "moments" thereof, 
nor is interest-bearing capital a concern merely imported from the political economy, journalism, 
or conversation of the day. Interest-bearing capital is a real process, but what shows up to be 
represented is not the processual genesis of interest as a form of surplus-value, but rather its 
fetishized appearance as self-generation. At the same time, this appearance (M-M') is not merely 
subjective—“capital presents itself in this way”—and therefore takes precedence over attitudes, 
whether in academic economy or in idle chatter, about this form. We see this clearly when a 
conversation in LCB reproduces this chatter about interest and capital—the understanding in 
these scenes hardly accounts for the way that the fetish-form diffuses itself throughout the work, 
e.g. its translation into a set of formal effects. The basis of the finance content, therefore, does 
not appear alongside this content itself, but has already been transposed along other lines. 




and structured by cognitive modalities that are also the prerequisites for usual, social, ideological 
life (going to work, buying food, retiring, etc.) The way in which quotidian experience is pre-
structured, therefore, is duplicated in the creative appropriation of this same contemporary 
reality. Put ahistorically, a cognitive modality is just the Kantian set of “necessary 
representations” a priori for the arranging of the manifold content of the phenomenal world for 
our experience. But in the specific social formation in question—advanced capitalism at 
precisely the moment Marx is writing Capital—how are social phenomena structured for 
consciousness? In his famous essay on proletarian consciousness, Georg Lukács gives this 
answer: reification, the logic of capitalist society where the commodity has become its “the 
universal structuring principle”164 or “universal category.”165 “Just as the capitalist system 
continuously produces and reproduces itself economically on higher and higher levels, the 
structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully and more definitively into 
the consciousness of man.”166 
 Now, reification is precisely descriptive of what is happening in interest capital’s 
appearance as M-M'. However, this form has its logical antecedents in the fetishism of the 
commodity, which is a much earlier moment in Marx’s exposition. Still, it is instructive to revisit 
this famous concept under the heading of its being a “cognitive modality.” Recall that in 
commodity fetishism, what is originally subjective and social, namely the expenditure of 
socially-necessary labor in creating use-values, becomes in the commodity-form as though 
objective and external to these producers. Their value (the amount of necessary human labor 
expended thereupon) appears as a characteristic magnitude belonging to commodities 
themselves, and then as a relation or ratio of values these products have automatically and on 
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their own with other commodities in exchange.167 The point here is that the rationality of 
“objectivity” itself (i.e. commodities having value) is for consciousness only insofar as 
objectivity is preceded in perception by the structure of reification, a structure inscribed into 
being’s appearance as objective, rational social life. In other words, reification is not a subjective 
error; it is the reflex in consciousness of objective contradictions. Hence, “it arises from the 
[commodity] form itself,” not from perception.168 Or, arising from perception only as from the 
category of perception itself: 
[T]he products of labour become commodities, sensuous things which are at the same 
time suprasensible or social. In the same way, the impression made by a thing on the 
optic nerve is perceived not as a subjective excitation of that nerve but as the objective 
form of a thing outside the eye. In the act of seeing, of course, light is really transmitted 
from one thing, the external object, to another thing, the eye. It is a physical relation 
between physical things.169 
  
In other words, reification is not “objective”—commodities don’t really, materially have 
exchange-value—but neither is it “subjective”—a mistake which could be corrected by a new 
perspective or dispelled by theory. Reification is in fact like perception, almost identical with it; 
hence, a “necessary representation” of the contradictions in class society. Our social cognition is 
not possible except on the condition of reification, anymore than sight is possible except on the 
“illusion” that vision is our subjective impression of objective things. The cognitive modality of 
reification, therefore, names the experience of social life in capitalism. This modality would then 
belong to any appropriation of this reality as the prior condition of its appearance for cognition. 
Strictly speaking, reification is not a predicate that would attach to the inclusion of this or that 
content (financial, commercial, etc.) in the novel. Rather, it is a form that precedes such content. 
Nor does it cling to “economic” subject matter when such does appear. We have seen above how 
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the affect pertaining to this form, its abbreviated and contentless self-relation, in fact fails to 
account for or be adequate to any content whatsoever, thereby producing confusion everywhere. 
* 
 We can now return to the viccissitudes of recognition in LCB. Here things are much more 
direct than with affect. Plot, tasked with structuring and objectifying the represented social 
reality, relates and orders not only events and characters, but also knowledge. A novel’s plot is 
just as much a shape of knowledge as any Foucauldian episteme or Bachelardian epistemological 
region. The plot not only performs its known narrative functions (suspense, exposition, closure, 
etc.) but also duplicates and consolidates the spontaneous experience and texture of social 
existence, bearing within it the traces of the pre-mimetic “cognitive modality.” In the instance of 
reification, the structural features of Marx’s formula for the ideological appearance of interest-
bearing capital carry over into LCB’s structure of recognition. The plot of the novel is in this way 
subject to the form of realisM’s pre-experiential content: even though interest and finance capital 
appear in this latent, form-determining content and in the manifest, structured content, this is 
only a case of over-determination. Plot as a shape of knowledge follows the formalization of 
content of the reified cognitive modality; this content itself, credit and finance, can then appear 
in the novel as in a sense “innocent.” 
 The key point to emphasize about the reification of interest is its structure as being the 
“mere form” of capital, its “irrational form,” its “form devoid of content,” and so on. This is the 
very essence of reification, precisely what Lukács is criticizing as the contradictions of bourgeois 
thought when, addressing the idealism of Fichte and Kant, he stresses “the irrational nature of the 
contents of their concepts.”170 But the irrational nature of the contents of the bourgeois concept 
of interest are what we have just seen under the heading of Trollope’s recognition plot in LCB: 
                                                




arbitrariness, unrelatedness, lack of development, and a static or fixed quality. Of course, I am 
not calling this 900-page novel “devoid of content,” nor is it “irrational” in the sense of 
Surrealism or a William Burroughs word-collage. Rather, what is irrational or arbitrary is: the 
lack of connection of the main plot (or its consequences) to the surrounding material, or the 
purely external role that the Dragon of Wantly plays. What is lacking in content is the main plot, 
which stays in the same place, pacing about within its main dilemma—if Mr. Crawley did pick 
up the check in his house, was he responsible or not responsible for then cashing it, thinking it 
belonged to him?—for hundreds of pages. 
 To draw parallels, then. If 1) the mystery’s real solution is present from the opening 
pages, then the activation of this truth which discovers itself lurking in this initial and inert form, 
ought to have made a quasi-Hegelian leap of externalization, so as to “return into itself” after 
having emptied itself out into uncomprehending otherness. We see this in the other examples of 
recognition (Proust, Sophocles), where the truth returns to the earlier moments with all the 
weight and force of a long separation, of a gap impossibly bridged by insight. But, in LCB, as in 
the case of interest, this return is only “the superficial form of the return, separated off from the 
mediating circuit.”171 Interest-bearing captial does not appear as having gone on a long journey 
through many divested forms, but rather finds itself only quantitatively altered. The surplus-
value here returns to find itself already present in the bank account, never having left home, as it 
were. 
 Nevertheless, 2) that solution has to be “activated” by outside material. But this outside 
material is not, in interest, the salto mortale where the capitalist throws out his capital in order to 
win it back in even greater quantity. For in that case, examined in Capital, volume I, this leap is 
within the very nature of the movement M-C-M: the commodity purchased, labor-power, 
                                                




contains this transformation in itself, while the relations that enable capital to thus purchase 
labor-power are the essence of this mode of production. But in interest, the interest rate is just 
such an outside, external factor that stands in no internal relation to the given formula. The 
interest rate is a kind of magical incantation which is completely abstract and arbitrary from the 
perspective of money’s self-relation, while objectively determining the latter from an “outside.” 
 3) There is no movement on the side of the mystery itself, which is entirely static. Of 
course, there is “movement” in interest: the movement from M to M'. But this is “money 
breeding money,” “a property devolving on a thing in itself,” self-valorization “without the 
process that mediates the two extremes.” 
As interest-bearing capital, ... capital obtains its pure fetish form... [as] a thing for sale. 
Firstly, by way of its continuing existence as money, a form in which all capital’s 
determinations are dissolved and its real elements are invisible... In the reproduction 
process of capital, the money form is an evanescent moment, a moment of mere 
transition... Secondly, the surplus-value it creates, here again in the form of money, 
appears to accrue to it as such. Like the growth of trees, so the generation of money 
(!"#"$) seems a property of capital in this form of money capital... As soon as it is lent, or 
else applied in the reproduction process, … interest accrues to it no matter whether it is 
asleep or awake, at home or abroad, by day and by night.172 
 
Crucially, in interest, what is loaned out as money “appears as [a] commodity”173—hence the 
misunderstanding of interest as the price of the commodity, money. But the functioning of the 
process which allows for the return of interest—the production of surplus-value—necessitates 
that this quantity M function not just as money for circulation, but as capital, hence that M 
(capital) turn into its opposite C (wage-labor) in the real process that allows interest to be repaid. 
But this movement and changing-of-shapes is precisely what is occluded by the form we are 
dealing with. In the static tautology of M-M' no such transition or movement takes place. 
 4) The main plot is isolated and its consequences self-contained. “For vulgar economics, 
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which seeks to present capital as an independent source of wealth... this form is of course a 
godsend, a form in which the source of profit is no longer recognizable, and in which the result 
of the capitalist production process—separate from the process itself—obtains an autonomous 
existence.”174  
* 
 In one sense, to point out the arbitrariness, lack of integration, or isolation in Trollope’s 
series fiction is not to say anything new: the Barsetshire series has never been conceived as other 
than “loosely organized.” The expansion that occurs over the series is uneven and haphazard at 
best, with the penultimate novel The Small House at Allington being the most free-standing: it is 
really only brought into the fold subsequently, by LCB. And it is difficult not to feel that the 
marriage plots of Doctor Thorne, Framley Parsonage, and LCB are repetitions of the same static 
form: a young man whose family is of the landed gentry (Frank Gresham, Lord Lufton, Henry 
Grantly) has trouble persuading his family to accept the girl (Mary Thorne, Lucy Robarts, Grace 
Crawley) he has chosen to marry, a girl who is in every case of humbler origins but emphatically 
not a vulgar commoner: she is always a lady, a fitting match culturally if not socially. In a sense, 
it is Trollope’s being so firmly stuck on this one plot form that gives the Barchester series its 
tenuous unity. (Again, The Small House at Allington is the work that doesn’t fit, just as it is the 
novel geographically the farthest away from Barchester, and also the furthest from the clerical 
material that occupies the other novels.) 
 However, this more abstract charge of the loose and static character of the Barchester 
series is not to be explained away with the same explanation as for the working-out of the form 
of LCB’s recognition plot, just given—where the aspects of the recognition and the shape of 
reified interest are point for point the same. When thinking about the series as a whole, it is less a 
                                                




matter of objectification than of selection. To take the example of that other great series, Zola’s 
Rougon-Macquart cycle, mimesis is here subordinated to a pre-existing framework of social 
spheres—isolatable test-tubes for novelistic experiments in sociology—and the capacious but 
capricious branchings of a family tree whose logic (how many cousins, etc.) is subject to the 
needs of the given novel, but which (in a vicious circle) is at the same time the supposed basis of 
the whole project. Just so, in Trollope, the very connections between novels, though usually in 
good taste and not objectionable, are in a sense the weakest part of the series. Anyone who picks 
up the next volume to learn of the further adventures of Archdeacon Grantly or Lady Lufton will 
be utterly disappointed—until the last volume, which knits all the books into the series which 
until then they only were in potentia. But at the same time, selection and geography—and not 
mimesis, as I have been defining it—dominate the process of enlarging his world, thus 
introducing randomness and a number of awkwardly-related spaces into his series. So Trollope is 
always alighting upon the same marriage plot, or marrying Dr. Thorne to Miss Dunstable in a 
thoroughly undermotivated connection (although its motivation is obvious from the perspective 
of the novelist’s convenience). But this is all quite another matter than the mimetic 
objectifications that rule the Crawley plot in LCB. The chance encounters on a fictional map, the 
recycling of a marriage plot, the clumsy (but quite natural!) reconciling of new social spaces, 
really speak more to economic problems of the novel form and to the handiness of certain 
conventions, than to the cognitive modality which produced such similar “micro” effects in the 
form of the individual work.  
 Once again, homology and identity have to be avoided. What looks the same, formally, 
may really be at the more abstract level (of the entire series) a matter of entirely different 




read seamlessly back and forth into each other. To be sure, Trollope insists on precisely this in 
his Autobiography: his very manner of writing memos in the Post-Office seems to be oblique 
advice about novel-writing.175 But it seems very doubtful critical practice to thus link up every 
level across one principle. In the same way, while the separation of society into “spheres” that 
can be treated as distinct and from one another is very much an instance of reification, of the 
detached observation of rational and isolated processes, it is not “the same” all down the line. If I 
have said nothing else in this chapter, I should think I have shown that we have always in 
literature to start anew with form. It is just here, in the least evidently historical space, that 
history shows up in its particularity, as distinct from the hovering perfume of a work’s “context” 
or Zeitgeist. But this is only true so long as form is never reduced (say, reduced to Trollope’s 
working method, or to a class-ideology, or to an objective correlative)—only so long as the 
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Locked Rooms: Empiricism and Form in Sherlock Holmes 
 
“The naked result is the corpse of the system which has left its guiding tendency behind it.” 
–G.W.F. Hegel 
 
 At the end of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s story “The Final Problem,” Sherlock Holmes and the 
arch-criminal Professor Moriarty have evidently tumbled to their deaths over the Reichenbach 
Falls, locked together in a hateful struggle. So, when Holmes returns from that undiscovered 
country in “The Adventure of the Empty House,” he has some explaining to do. “In your 
picturesque account of the matter,” Holmes tells an astonished Dr. Watson, “you assert that the 
wall was sheer. That was not literally true. A few small footholds presented themselves, and 
there was some indication of a ledge,” by which means he made his miraculous escape.176  
 The resurrection of Holmes is not one of Conan Doyle’s most elegant devices, but even 
though Holmes is not solving a crime here, the sudden appearance of ledges and footholds in his 
account is quite typical of the detective’s procedure in reconstructing his solutions. Such last-
minute emendations will be familiar to any reader who has tried to work through the cases to re-
trace Holmes’s thinking. I will limit myself to mentioning the “old manservant at Merripit 
House” who is parachuted into the last pages of The Hound of the Baskervilles to account for the 
glaring gap in the story’s logic raised by the question, “But what became of the hound when its 
master was in London?” (764). 
 The abrupt introduction of such heretofore unobserved qualifiers is in marked disaccord with 
Holmes’s own account of his method. In his self-characterizations, Holmes insists that he arrives 
at the solution from the same set of information that is set before Watson (and by extension, the 
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reader), i.e. the solution is always immanent in the given facts. 
“In solving a problem of this sort, the grand thing is to be able to reason backward… 
There are few people… who, if you told them a result, would be able to evolve from their 
own consciousness what the steps were which led up to that result. This power is what I 
mean when I talk of reasoning backward, or analytically.” (A Study in Scarlet 83-4, my 
emphasis) 
 
“‘The ideal reasoner,’ [Holmes] remarked, ‘would, when he had once been shown a 
single fact in all its bearings, deduce from it not only all the chain of events which led up 
to it but also all the results which would follow from it.” (“The Five Orange Pips” 224-5, 
my emphasis) 
 
Watson, the stories’ narrator, is perpetually astounded by this particularity of Holmes’s method, 
that from a small set of confused data he can reconstruct an extraordinarily complex and 
improbable solution—without introducing any new material: 
“‘But do you mean to say,’ [Watson asks] ‘that without leaving your room you can 
unravel some knot which other men can make nothing of, although they have seen every 
detail for themselves?’” (A Study in Scarlet 24, my emphasis) 
 
“I trust that I am not more dense than my neighbors, but I was always oppressed with a 
sense of my own stupidity in my dealings with Sherlock Holmes. Here I had heard what 
he had heard, I had seen what he had seen, and yet from his words it was evident that he 
saw clearly not only what had happened but what was about to happen, while to me the 
whole business was still confused and grotesque.” (“The Red-headed League” 185-6, my 
emphasis) 
 
Following Roland Barthes’ idea of a “reality effect,” we might even speak of a “method effect” 
produced by the texts: the aura of a consistent standard operating procedure adhered to by the 
detective. (And by the writer. The genre’s strict guidelines have often been codified as various 
“ten commandments” of detective fiction.) It is only if these oft-propounded statements are first 
taken to form a forensic and generic canon that the all-too-convenient materialization of 
footholds and old manservants can be felt as an exception or a departure from an articulated 
method. That is to say, a procedure adhered to and then not adhered to. Thus, the critics who 




effect of there being a protocol from which to deviate.177 
 In this study, I argue that the dissonance seen in narrative deviations from the logical method 
of the Sherlock Holmes stories is a dissonance internal to the logical method itself. It is not that 
Conan Doyle fails to execute the rigor of the rational, scientific logic enunciated in the stories. 
Rather, this logic (which I will ultimately locate in philosophical empiricism) is itself the hitch in 
the narrative, owing to a constitutive atemporality and idealism in British empiricist thought. The 
empirical method is not what the Sherlock Holmes stories are demonstrating or representing; 
empiricism is rather an anti-narrative tear in the very fabric of the stories.  
 What I am calling the method effect accounts for much historicist criticism of the Sherlock 
Holmes stories that has been concerned with attesting the contemporary scientific references 
found in the stories. Holmes explicitly names Winwood Reade in The Sign of Four (137), 
Georges Cuvier in “The Five Orange Pips” (225), and Alphonse Bertillon in “The Naval Treaty” 
(460). The effect lies precisely in suggesting that these citations are only the tip of the iceberg. 
Underneath Holmes’s discourse, Lawrence Frank discovers allusions to Charles Lyell, Charles 
Darwin, John Tyndall, E.B. Taylor, Thomas Huxley, Francis Galton, William Whewell, et al.178 
Other critics have seen Holmes as participating in the discourse surrounding the biopolitics of the 
British colonial apparatus, extending into identification, fingerprinting, ethnicity, and 
epidemiology—whether as complicit in reproducing these discursive regimes or as anxiously 
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problematizing their queasy, now-discredited suppositions, which are doubtless bound up with 
the triumphalism of the Victorian natural sciences.179 
 In such studies, the translation of the discourse of the scientific disciplines into the method of 
the fictional detective is taken to be a no-loss exchange—in other words, is taken not to be a 
translation at all, but only a shuttling between different sites sharing the “same” discursive 
object. We see this clearly in the entirely de-historicized semiotics of the Umberto Eco-edited 
collection The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce, which explicitly studies “the ‘method’ of 
Sherlock Holmes in the light of Peirce’s logic.”180 It is only a very slight exaggeration to say that 
these researches would not differ in any way had Holmes been a real person. There is even a 
palpable regret in these essays that Holmes never published his planned monograph on the whole 
science of detecting. What is absent is any consideration of the plotting of the Holmes stories, or 
the temporal structure of the solutions.  
 But if we are to look for the epistemology or structure of knowledge of the Holmes stories, it 
will not be found outside of the stories themselves, neither in the contemporary references (to 
Cuvier, Reade, or Bertillon), nor in reconstructions of analogous procedures (along the lines of 
Peirce or Huxley). Instead of starting from what the texts say (or don’t say) about method, I am 
asking after what they do as narratives. To this end, I consider the concluding reconstructions 
that Holmes offers in each story, as well as the numerous flashbacks or interpolated narratives 
that shadow these conclusions, with particular attention paid to A Study in Scarlet’s chapters set 
in Mormon Utah. 
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 As we will see, these reconstructions do not follow Holmes’s own characterizations. In 
contrast to what Holmes and Watson emphasize in the quotations above, none of the stories’ 
conclusions shed light upon a closed set of data, nor analytically draw out an immanent 
significance from the données immédiates of the case. 181 Holmes invariably relies upon some 
information hitherto unavailable to the reader and outside of the initial situation. In other words, 
one has never “seen the same things” as Holmes, one has not “seen every detail for oneself,” 
although the miraculous effect of Holmes’s solutions depends on this ostensible parity.  
 Since there is no specificity to the “real” of the method effect, we cannot speak of a particular 
referent that is being invoked in the stories. The method in question is not drawn from Bacon, 
Peirce, etc., but is produced by the Conan Doyle texts. The method effect imports a consistent 
doctrine into the fictional background—we see method in the stories. Against this, I consider the 
method as story—how empiricism is narrativized. Setting aside the philosophical or forensic 
value of Holmes’s aphorisms, I propose to locate the structure of knowledge of these fictions in 
their narrative form, or better, in the gap between the two—that is, the stories’ epistemology is to 
be found in the divergence between their scientific rhetoric and empirico-logical aura on one 
hand, and the narratological structure of the retrospections which conclude each case, on the 
other. Far from being a direct instantiation or mirroring of Victorian ideology, the Sherlock 
Holmes stories run up against a formal limit in the empiricism they invoke—an ahistorical 
idealism at its core—a limit which reappears in the stories’ temporal organization. The task, 
then, is neither to reiterate, qua “scientific thought”, excerpts that are ready-to-hand for 
historicism, nor to produce an underlying, coherent message intact “beneath” the text. Instead, 
the question is how narrative time intersects and interrupts this external logic of empirical 
inquiry. In the last part of the chapter, I look at how narrative time in novel theory is rooted in 
                                                




structures of reification—in other words, I propose to historicize the temporality of the stories as 
an ontological mode.  
* 
 Sherlock Holmes never solves the case using only the information which has been presented 
to the reader.182 “A few small footholds,” so to speak, always appear. The reader cannot 
therefore “play along” in solving the crime. The hapless efforts of Dr. Watson are a running joke, 
and serve as a warning by proxy against readerly ingenuity. One can’t help anticipating the 
answer, darting at false solutions, etc.—but this is never a principle of the stories’ construction. 
Only a later development of the genre will require that the reader be (technically) capable of 
solving the case at the same time as the detective, so that all of the same clues and observations 
are at his or her disposal. This principle is wonderfully summed up by Agatha Christie’s Hercule 
Poirot: “Of facts, I keep nothing to myself. But to everyone his own interpretation of them.”183 
The pleasure of reading the Holmes stories is not in being shown the answer to a brain-teaser 
which one has wracked one’s brain to solve; it is the pleasure of viewing an impressive and non-
duplicable feat. This doesn’t stop Conan Doyle and his characters from voicing, as a principle, 
that Holmes is reasoning from limited data to an explanation, or solving a puzzle using the same 
evidence that Watson has presented to us. It is just that this does not ever happen. Not a single 
time. 
 Consider the short story “The Adventure of the Cardboard Box.” In this story an elderly 
woman receives two severed human ears through the mail, inside the titular packaging. Holmes 
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is called in on the case, goes down to the country, looks at the ears, looks at the box, looks at the 
elderly woman, asks a few questions about her family life (she has two sisters, one of whom has 
unhappily married a sailor with a drinking problem), and sends a telegram. He then drives 
around to visit her sister, finds the house closed on account of illness, and finally, upon receiving 
the answer to his telegram, pronounces the case solved. Holmes tells the Scotland Yard 
investigator where and when he may pick up his man. 
 How did he do it? What we didn’t know (weren’t shown) was that the knot used to tie the box 
was “one which is popular with sailors” (896), nor that the elderly lady’s ear “corresponded 
exactly with the female ear in the box” (loc. cit.), nor that the answer to Holmes’s telegram (a 
frequent device) showed that the brother-in-law had been in port in Belfast the day the package 
was sent—from Belfast (897). This is all new information to the reader who was astonished at 
the case being solved on the basis of the earlier, more limited set of clues. Nonetheless, Holmes 
tells Watson that this was a case where he has “been compelled to reason backward from effects 
to causes” (895). Undoubtedly, Holmes himself, as a fictional personage, has reasoned back from 
effects (visible, immediate, senseless facticity) to causes (a chain of meanings). But this is 
completely outside of the literary construction. The story tells about reasoning backward from 
effects to causes, but these are “effects” known only to Holmes. 
It would be welcome but exhausting to debate this in every case. One more, and one that 
initially gave my thesis some trouble, “Silver Blaze” from the Memoirs of Sherlock Holmes. The 
question before us is: can a logically-complete explanation of the crime be given using only 
material available to the reader prior to Holmes’s solution, and dependent upon that material?  
In this story, a racehorse goes missing, its trainer is found dead, and the murderer turns 




what was immanent in the presented facts. First, the famous “curious incident of the dog in the 
night-time” (347). Holmes points out to Watson that the watchdog at the stable did not bark 
when the horse was stolen. Later on, Holmes shows that this indicated that the criminal was 
someone known to the dog and thus belonging to the stables. From this he concludes that it was 
an “inside job.” This is indeed “reasoning backward.” So far so good. Second, Holmes asks a 
question about the lame sheep near the stables. Holmes explains subsequently how this pointed 
to the culprit being the trainer himself, because if someone wanted to lame the stolen racehorse, 
he would have first practiced by cutting the tendons of such animals as sheep. Both these facts 
are available in the lead-up to the solution, and Holmes’s explanations show how decisive these 
seemingly-minor observations were in reaching the solution. Indeed, it looks like Holmes’s 
proclaimed method of rational deduction is at work here. 
However, a crucial part of Holmes’s solution is the motive, namely, that the suspect is 
supporting a mistress in a separate establishment under an assumed name. He needs the money to 
keep up this lavish double life. But this information is withheld from us until the very end. Until 
the last pages, the reader is led to believe that a bill discovered for an expensive gown belongs to 
a certain Mr. Derbyshire. Unbeknownst to us, offstage, Holmes has taken a photo of the trainer to 
the milliner and has ascertained that the trainer and Mr. Derbyshire are one and the same person. 
Holmes is therefore in possession of a motive dependent upon data which simply does not exist 
for the reader or Watson. We don’t know that any of this has happened—the milliner’s is an 
entirely separate excursion not belonging to the “given facts” of the case. 
In constructing his evolutionary “tree” of Victorian detective fiction, Franco Moretti 
notes this odd characteristic, that the characteristic device setting Conan Doyle apart from his 




and necessary to the solution—is also not a property of Conan Doyle’s work. In half of the 
Sherlock Holmes stories in The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes, “clues are present, they have a 
function, but are not visible: the detective mentions them in his explanation, but we have never 
really ‘seen’ them in the course of the story.”184 And at the next evolutionary branching, Moretti 
notes, “[E]ven being generous, there are decodable clues in no more than four of the Adventures 
(and being strict, in none).”185 In other words, Conan Doyle’s stories suggest this next branching, 
but do not reach the promised land of that form. So, why this distance between what the texts 
point to (reasoning backward) and what they do (suddenly introduce new data)?  
Moretti sees the inconclusive, hesitating, and imperfect development of the clue-device 
as demonstrative of an evolutionary truth: such “oscillations” underscore “an important 
Darwinian feature of literary history: in times of morphological change, like the 1890s for 
detective fiction, the individual writer behaves exactly like the genre as a whole: tentatively.”186 
In other words, this hesitancy is not to be interpreted after all: it is itself the confirmation of the 
evolutionary model’s refusal of teleology. However, if we are “being strict,” in Moretti’s words, 
there are no oscillations or tentativeness. Let us look closer at the four cases that Moretti, in his 
“generosity,” categorizes as decodable. 
1) “A Case of Identity,” to be solved in this waym would require the reader to detect that 
the same typewriter was used in two different letters—letters we do not have before us to 
compare. 2) In order to solve the case of “The Red-Headed League,” we would need to see (as 
Holmes does) the knees of Jabez Wilson’s assistant, as well as to recognize in his description all 
the traits of one John Clay—whom Holmes has been tracking for years but who is of course 
unknown to us. To recognize a known criminal mastermind by his physical appearance is 
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certainly a great advantage in “decoding” the other facts of the case! Holmes has this advantage 
and we do not. 3) It is impossible to decode “The Adventure of the Speckled Band”—as Moretti 
notes, “usually seen as a splendid cluster of clues”—because this story in fact relies on very 
doubtful deductions, i.e. “snakes do not drink milk, cannot hear whistles, cannot crawl up and 
down bell cords, and so on.”187 And the reader would have to “know” all of this bogus 
information to decode the clues rightly. 4) “The Adventure of the Blue Carbuncle” is solved by 
Holmes following the repeated sale of a goose back to its origin; the real criminal is caught 
because he is retracing the same tracks. This one seems to me not even close. It is really a case of 
legwork and not clues. 
 In Sherlock Holmes’s methodological aphorisms cited above, Arthur Conan Doyle is clearly 
advertising how well-versed his character is in the scholarship of forensics and contemporary 
scientific philosophy, and how doggedly empiricist. But then none of the stories are solved by 
the method or principles advertised. But is this a departure from empiricism—or the utmost 
consistency? In the following, I argue that the abandonment of any reconstruction-from-given-
facts coincides with certain epistemic conditions of subjectivity embedded in empiricism, 
specifically in an atemporality which empiricism shares with philosophical idealism. The inner 
limitations of the empiricist ideology that is asserted require its being compromised by a 
procedure in which Holmes arrives at the solution “behind our backs.” But the identity of 
empiricist and idealist presuppositions (see below) is a dialectical one, meaning that one cannot 
merely sort out these elements into two piles, nor locate an idealist “core” as opposed to an 
empiricist “surface.” Their identity is rather in their mutual limitation. This self-dividing identity 
reveals itself in the stutters of retrospection, in how the temporality of reified thinking vitiates 
narrative. 
                                                





 The last Sherlock Holmes stories were published in 1927, the same year as Virginia Woolf’s 
To the Lighthouse. Henri Bergson’s researches into duration and subjectivity first appeared in 
1889, the first volume of Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu in 1913, and another massive 
novelistic treatment of temporality, Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain, in 1924. But if time 
was a persistent concern of Conan Doyle’s contemporaries, it is almost nowhere to be found in 
the Sherlock Holmes universe. (One could argue that Conan Doyle’s lesser-known works include 
such treatments of temporality, albeit not in any modernist sense: the historical novel The White 
Company, set during the Hundred Years’ War, and the science fiction novel The Lost World, 
about prehistoric life forms still surviving.) 
 As an entry point into the temporality of the Holmes stories, consider the thematic of revenge. 
No one in this universe ever forgives and forgets. Once the wheels of vengeance have been set in 
motion, no number of disguises, no amount of globetrotting, and no passage of time can ever 
diminish the revenge motive. A Study in Scarlet, The Sign of Four, and The Valley of Fear all 
depict the prosecution of an ineradicable—though long past—grievance. Contrast this with the 
extremely complicated temporal logic of forgiveness in Thomas Hardy’s novels of the same 
period, The Mayor of Casterbridge, Tess of the D’Urbervilles, and Jude the Obscure. The latter 
novels revolve around reconciliations that had better not have taken place, after a long passage of 
time and the wearing-away of painful memories—and the disastrous forgiving of things that had 
better not have been forgiven (wife-selling, rape, bigamy). But in the Sherlock Holmes stories, 
there can be no forgiveness, nor wearing-away. Revenge brooks every delay: the true meaning of 
Satan’s “immortal hate” in Paradise Lost. For example, at the end of part one of A Study in 




when there is no risk of any further murders—he has succeeded in murdering everyone he had 
intended to—and too late for justice to be served, as Ferrier dies of a heart attack before he can 
even stand trial.  
 To account for the intrusion of long past revenge motives into the present of the stories, 
Conan Doyle has frequent recourse to a device first seen in A Study in Scarlet: a long flashback, 
bracketed off from the Watson narration, and set in some far-flung exotic locale. Often, these 
supervening flashbacks import into the stories a distinctive generic content as well. In A Study in 
Scarlet, the flashback is a historical romance; in The Sign of Four, it is a Moonstone-esque tale 
of the 1857 Indian Rebellion; in “The Adventure of the Cardboard Box,” a domestic melodrama 
of adultery; in “The Gloria Scott,” a tale of mutiny on the high seas; in The Valley of Fear, 
something like the industrial novel. It is as though Conan Doyle were conducting, in the margins 
of the detective genre, a revue of the literary variety of which he was capable and from which the 
public’s demand for more Sherlock Holmes was keeping his talents. At the same time, the stories 
include the past only as discrete miniatures—far from being “dialogic,” such inclusions are 
strictly partitioned off from Holmes himself. Contrast this gesture of distance with Agatha 
Christie’s oriental novels, Murder in Mesopotamia, Murder on the Orient Express, and Death on 
the Nile. These are so exactly like Christie’s novels set on English country estates that it is 
almost only a matter of changing a few place-names. A “locked-door” is the same everywhere. 
Whereas Conan Doyle is at great pains to import the generically exotic into 221B Baker Street, 
Christie ingenuously flaunts her ability to set an identically English mystery virtually 
anywhere—as long as it is a place frequented by the English bourgeoisie. Further along the 
generic timeline, consider the generically distinctive flashback which is proper to film noir: it is 




in the main storyline or in the flashback, since the genre never presents a non-noir past. All noir 
flashbacks are generically continuous with the main story. 
 Viktor Shklovsky defines the Holmesian style of mystery by its use of retrospection or 
“temporal transposition,” i.e. “the omission of a particular incident and its appearance after the 
consequences of this incident have already been revealed.”188 But in practice, the Holmesian 
flashback is marked by its externality to the detective’s solution of the case, both generically and 
temporally.  
 Take for instance A Study in Scarlet, padded out to full-length by a retrospective narration by 
an American murderer who is seen only briefly before he launches into his tale. A summary of 
the plot is probably in order. A Study in Scarlet is probably most memorable to its readers for 
introducing Holmes and Watson. A mutual acquaintance suggests that they room together, 
although he also warns Watson about Holmes’s eccentricities and aloof nature. The two men 
move into 221B Baker Street, and thereafter Watson sets about to discover what all of Holmes’s 
peculiar interests add up to. Naturally, this first mystery—what is Sherlock Holmes’s 
profession?—is too deep for Watson, but no sooner has Holmes told Watson that he is the 
world’s only “consulting detective” than the two friends are off upon their first case together. An 
American has been found dead, but with no marks of violence, in an unfurnished room in 
Brixton, and the Scotland Yard investigator Gregson has called Holmes in for assistance. Despite 
the word “Rache” being written in blood on the wall, the murder has in fact nothing to do with a 
“Rachel” nor with German socialists (the two official theories). Holmes gives an astonishingly 
precise description of the murderer, although he fails to prevent a second murder, that of the first 
victim’s secretary, also an American. Holmes’s method of investigating is in fact entirely opaque 
to Watson (and to the reader): on one hand, he asks seemingly irrelevant questions and makes 
                                                




pronouncements with no apparent basis; on the other hand, the first part of the novel ends 
abruptly with Holmes clapping handcuffs upon a complete stranger who comes up to their rooms 
of his own will, and declaring this unknown cabdriver, Jefferson Hope, to be the murderer. 
 Immediately following this, Conan Doyle drops the “reminiscences” of Dr. Watson, and 
begins a long third-person narrative entitled “The Country of the Saints,” set in Mormon Utah. 
The main character of this section is neither Holmes, nor Watson, nor even the murder victim, 
not even our recent acquaintance Jefferson Hope, but someone we have never heard of, one John 
Ferrier. The historical setting is 1847, and then 1860, while the murder under investigation by 
Holmes takes place in London in the early 1880s. This John Ferrier and an adoptive daughter are 
saved from starvation by Mormons while migrating westward, but on the condition that they join 
the faith. When they arrive in Salt Lake City, Ferrier prospers and the girl Lucy grows up to be a 
beauty, fought over by the sons of the Mormon Elders. Ferrier, disgusted by the practice of 
bigamy, refuses to let Lucy marry into the bigamous Mormon elite, and together they escape 
from Salt Lake City with the help of Lucy’s non-Mormon fiancé Jefferson Hope. The Mormons, 
not to be put off so easily, murder John Ferrier and take Lucy back to Salt Lake City, where she 
is forced into a bigamous marriage but dies soon after. Jefferson Hope vows revenge for this 
double murder, and follows Lucy’s two Mormon suitors across America and then across Europe. 
He finally catches up with them in England, with the murderous results already seen. The finale 
occurs in two parts: the third-person narrative, and then Holmes’s reconstruction of the case. 
 Taken together, the flashback (set in Mormon Utah), the murderer’s confession to the police, 
and Holmes’s own reconstruction of the case overwhelm the novel with retrospection. The 
second half of the novel takes on the inverse characteristics of that psychological type 




confessing to heinous crimes out of all proportion to his real culpability. It is as if in A Study in 
Scarlet no crime can be quite solved enough, with the result that the initial crime scene becomes 
just such a minor appendage to a litany of “explanations.” But the material in the flashback 
(taking up roughly one-third of the novel) does not correspond exactly with what was to have 
been explained—namely, how the murder was committed. Notwithstanding this positive flood of 
material from the past, the flashback does not advance the case’s solution proper, but instead 
shelters a vast horde of irrelevancies. The third-person narration ceases upon the arrival of the 
murderer, Jefferson Hope, in London, i.e. stops before the murder—and the most important 
elements (such as the motive) are recounted once more when the story resumes in Watson’s 
hand. Conspicuously, Sherlock Holmes makes not a single reference to the strange life of John 
Ferrier which we have just had at great length. 
 But then, after we have been transported to 1850’s Utah, and having then heard Jefferson 
Hope’s confession at the police-station—where he explains how he had planted false clues at the 
crime scene, the chemical makeup of the poison he used, the connection to the second murder, 
etc.—what is there left for Holmes to add? In fact, a great deal—all pertaining to his own process 
of reasoning (as we will see in more detail below). It is as though everything has to be observed 
twice: once for the mystery of the crime itself, and again for the equally mysterious method of 
Holmes’s solution. In its insufficiency to either task, Watson’s account, that famous device of 
focalized narration—which becomes a standard feature of detective novels, e.g. Hastings in the 
Poirot novels—turns out to be only holding at bay the unadulterated stream of the detective’s 
logical consciousness. 
 The endings of detective stories seem to call less for a formalist interrogation, hence 




prescribed, repetitious, an achieved mechanism.189 What, for instance, are the minimal pieces of 
information necessary to arrive at the identity of the murderer and to arrest him? This can only 
be done by going in reverse. I will say right away that the name of the murderer, the solution, 
appears out of the blue—is not a datum for the reader prior to the arrest, and the most important 
clue (the wandering cab-tracks) are first mentioned only a few pages from the end, long after the 
arrest and the Mormon flashback. There is no iron rule for this, but it is very often the case in the 
Holmes stories that the murderer’s name is first mentioned while the handcuffs are being put 
upon him, and that the decisive clue is safely tucked away in Holmes’ own pocket, unseen by the 
reader or Watson, and brought out only in the conclusion.  
 In order to arrest Jefferson Hope, only three clues are required. These clues can be 
arranged in various ways—the order in which they appear in the commission of the crime, the 
order in which Sherlock Holmes acts upon them, their logical priority in the solution, their order 
of appearance to the investigation, and their order in Holmes’ narration in the dénouement.  
• Crime. Cab-tracks, murder, wedding ring.  
• Arrest. Murder, wedding ring, cab-tracks.  
• Logic. Murder, cab-tracks, wedding ring.  
• Visibility. Wedding ring, murder, cab-tracks.  
• Dénouement. Murder, wedding ring, cab-tracks. 
We might also speak of the order of these orders—that is, the crime obviously comes before the 
arrest, Holmes’s thought-process comes before its reconstruction. The arrest order is what is 
most visible to the reader, but without coinciding in its arrangement of clues.  
 Crime. The three clues left in the committing of the crime itself are: the wheel-tracks of a 
                                                




cab in front of the house where the murder is committed; the fact of a murder at all, as opposed 
to suicide; finally, the wedding ring found at the scene of the crime, which is dropped in the 
exultation over the dead body. It is only these three pieces of evidence that play any role in 
solving the mystery. The murder weapon (poison capsules) is intuited by Holmes from the dead 
body having no injuries and from a whiff of poison about the lips, but he does not find Jefferson 
Hope by tracking down these pills—in fact, they merely turn up at the scene of the second 
murder. The same can be said for Holmes’ impressive foreknowledge of the murderer’s height, 
his florid face, the fact that the horse driving the cab has three new shoes and one old one, the 
particularities of the cigar ash at the scene, the length of his fingernails, etc. All of this is 
window-dressing, and irrelevant to the solution. 
 Arrest. Sherlock Holmes tracks down the criminal first by knowing the name and place of 
origin of the victim (Enoch Drebber of Cleveland: which the police discover in his wallet), then 
ascertaining that the victim has been poisoned rather than committed suicide (murder), then 
suspecting that a woman is involved (wedding ring), then sending a telegram to Cleveland 
pertaining to Enoch Drebber’s marriage. At this point Cleveland telegrams Sherlock Holmes the 
name of the murderer, Jefferson Hope. It is at this point only a matter of sending out his 
auxiliaries to ask for a cab driver working under this name (cab-tracks).  
 Logic. Holmes asserts that “the whole thing is a chain of logical sequences without a 
break or flaw” (85). The “single real clue which was presented” (49) is the presence of the cab-
tracks. However, in Holmes’ description, the revenge-character of the crime is truly delimiting 
(murder), whereas the clue of the cab-tracks only make senses sense when subordinated to this 
first determination: “Supposing one man wished to dog another through London, what better 




ring, which only “settled the question” of motive which Holmes had already surmised (loc. cit.).  
 Visibility. This is a tricky category. As readers, we have only Watson’s reports to go by, 
but Watson sees but does not observe, while Holmes has “both seen and observed” (162-3). 
What I count as the first appearance of something has to be its first mention in all of its pertinent 
aspects. So, if Watson mentions, e.g., a footprint, this clue does not yet become “visible” until 
Holmes shows that this footprint exactly matches a pair of the victim’s slippers. A great many 
clues in Sherlock Holmes remain in this limbo, however—we see a sheer cliff, but no ledges. 
Now, although Holmes describes the cab markings at length early on (32), the crucial result—
that the murderer was himself the cab driver—can only be deduced when one learns much later 
that “the marks on the road showed [Holmes] that the horse had wandered on in a way which 
would have been impossible had there been anyone in charge of it” (85). The first visible fact is 
the wedding ring which falls away from the body when it is being carried to the morgue; the 
second is the fact of murder by poison, which Holmes asserts as a conclusion in Chapter 3, but 
which is only “visible” in Chapter 7 when he tells Watson that he smelled poison on the victim’s 
lips; and lastly the true nature of the cab-tracks.  
 Reconstruction. Holmes begins explaining the case to Watson in the last chapter by 
lecturing him upon analytical reasoning. “Now this was a case in which you were given the 
result and had to find everything for yourself. Now let me endeavor to show you the different 
steps in my reasoning. To begin at the beginning” (83-4). Holmes then goes over everything, not 
“backward” at all, but in the very order in which he observed and acted. Instead of the order of 
analytic thought, we get merely a “behind the scenes” look into what Holmes was thinking at 
moments when his behavior or pronouncements were obscure to Watson. This order, then, is the 




face,” et al) brought back into the presentation.190  
 Epistemologically speaking, what is interesting here is that the reasoning subject treats his 
own behavior as much as a matter for explanation and recognition as the ostensible mystery of 
“whodunit”: the logical procedure not only fills in gaps in reality (the murder weapon, the 
criminal’s identity), but itself produces these lacunae, through Holmes’s inexplicable leaps and 
characteristic whimsical inclinations. In a narratological study of detective fiction, Tzvetan 
Todorov identifies the crime with the fabula (the raw occurrence), and the investigation with the 
sju!et (its narrated order)—not “two parts of the story or two different stories, but two aspects of 
the same story... two points of view on the same thing.”191 On Todorov’s reading, the 
reconstruction is inessential, a kind of ladder to be pulled up after reaching the “real” of the 
crime.192 But as we have just seen, the Sherlock Holmes stories effect a curious reversal: the 
“real” (the crime order and the flashback) turns out to be the inessential, while the detective’s 
own process of reasoning becomes the locus of mystery. On top of this, the flashback remains a 
kind of leftover, an overcompensating superfluous illumination that “has another try” at folding 
the fabula into the sju!et, but never intersecting the detective’s explanation.  
 Aesthetically, the extreme digression of Conan Doyle’s flashbacks can be somewhat jarring. 
However, this reliance upon external material in the fictional conclusions (e.g., long stretches of 
omniscient third person narration) is entirely consistent with Holmes’s practice in his 
investigative conclusions. That the flashbacks are outside the course of the Watson narration—
intruding rudely upon the self-contained “given facts” of the case, drawn fully-formed from the 
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generic worlds of romance or adventure—only confirms their importance to and inextricability 
from the Holmes paradigm. In the flashbacks, the stories abandon what Ernst Bloch identifies as 
the “most decisive criterion” of the detective novel, namely, “the un-narrated factor and its 
reconstruction…the discovery of something that happened ante rem.”193 Instead, the flashbacks 
merely attach additional material to the investigation, not so much reconstructing the past as 
annexing an adjacent narrative. But if the insertion of flashbacks abdicates any purely immanent 
relationship to the preceding material, this is not a departure from Holmes’s own narrated 
reconstructions—it only recapitulates their formal structure. 
* 
 By empiricism, I do not mean a discursive field which would provide a context for Holmes’s 
supposed “method,” but a structure of temporality, mediation, and representation (e.g. the 
construction of objectivity). If I now turn to more philosophical accounts of empiricism, it is not 
in order to shift said “context” further down the line, onto philosophical terrain. The buck does 
not stop at canonical philosophical elaboration. The point rather is to isolate a statement of the 
ontology and temporality of a reified cognitive mode, and to work out its implicit contradictions, 
conditions, and slippages for narrative form. No part of the following depends on a filiation 
between, say, Berkeley and Conan Doyle. Indeed, empiricist philosophy might be taken as 
grounded in a repression of temporality that returns as the vicissitudes of narrative form 
discussed above. Time is not excluded by philosophical empiricism once and for all, but, 
suppressed there, reappears in the very temporal fabric of its ideological bearer, detective fiction: 
the solipsism of Holmesian retrospection, the chronological monads of the flashbacks, and 
problems of periodization and internal continuity.  
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 Whether we are discussing Berkeley, Locke, Hume, or Mill, empiricism posits an observing 
subject who is the site of experience, concepts, and representations. This subject is set in 
opposition to an objectivity sundered from any structure of rationality. Concepts have an only 
subjective existence, and truth is the correspondence or adequacy of a mental representation to a 
perceived object. Logic is not a property of the external world, but of the reasoning subject, for 
the purpose of bringing the world under categories and causality. 
 This rough sketch will at least have differentiated empiricism from the ancient Greeks (Forms 
were real for Plato, substance for Aristotle), and from European rationalism (Kant does not deny 
rationality to things-in-themselves, only our knowing anything about it; for Spinoza and 
Descartes, the order of ideas pertains outside of the cogito). 
 Defining empiricism this way makes it identical with idealism. As Hegel writes in the 
Phenomenology of Spirit, reason, in its first appearance as “the abstract empty idealism” of 
Fichte and Berkeley, “is bound, therefore, to be at the same time absolute Empiricism.”194 This 
means: the withdrawal of the subject’s certainty into itself as the only reality, so that all sensible 
being is being-for-this-consciousness (idealism), is also what founds empiricism, “because, for 
the filling of this empty ‘mine,’ i.e. for the element of distinction and all the further development 
and embodiment of it”—the impressions that fill up the mind’s blank slate—“its reason needs an 
impact operating from without, in which lies the fons et origo of the multiplicity of sensations or 
ideas.”195 
 In empiricism and idealism, therefore, the rational subject only finds itself over and over 
again, without seeing its activity or researches as being implicated on the side of the object. This 
relation to the world is also an “immediate” one, meaning that what comes between us and the 
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object is only what we put there—for instance, Baconian idols or Gestalt perception are on our 
side of the divide. This stands in contrast to dialectical thinking, in which objectivity always 
already involves a minimal conceptual organization in order to even “occur” as appearance or 
exteriority. 
 In empiricism/idealism, time—continuity and duration—is on the side of the subject, as the 
succession of our impressions (Hume). Objectivity is only a “bad” infinity of perpetually-arising 
sensations, without permanence in-itself; it is never conceived as a historical or immanent 
process. In short, empiricism’s identity with idealism consists in the immediate relation of a 
reasoning, contemplative subject towards an objectivity that is inessential, atemporal, and void of 
concept. 
 This structure of subjectivity and its temporality is rooted in and repeats the reification of 
consciousness in capitalist society.196 “Narrative time” does not simply carry over from the 
ideological elaborations of a Berkeley; rather, the articulations of time in philosophy, narration, 
scientific practice, and even raw “lived experience” derive from and are conditioned by the 
historical organization of objectivity and consciousness. 
 Reification is the process whereby social domination in capitalism (the exploitation of 
workers by the capitalist class) is concealed by the commodity-form, i.e. by the exchange of 
equivalent abstract values objectified in things. Whereas earlier modes of production engaged in 
directly social exploitation (e.g., slavery, feudal serfdom), the capitalist wrings surplus labor 
from the worker only through the form of a wage paid in money. But there is another difference 
as well. Pre-capitalist modes of production are only ever engaged in the amassing of absolute 
surplus-value, the forced extension of the working day to an ever-greater length. The 
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transparency, so to speak, of this exploitation, contrasts with the reified and particularly capitalist 
form of relative surplus-value—which no longer manifests as an observable length of time. The 
concept of time pertaining to absolute surplus-value is pure duration: the accumulation of hours 
in the work week, or (as in the corvée) the allocation of a fixed period every season to surplus 
labor for the feudal aristocracy. Relative surplus-value is also determined by time, but no longer 
the raw extension of clock-time or calendar days; the surplus is found rather in decreasing the 
amount of labor time (and hence, decrease the value paid out as wages) necessary to “reproduce” 
(i.e. feed, clothe, house) the worker, relative to the portion of labor time that the capitalist is free 
to appropriate as his profit. That is to say, what the capitalist is appropriating as surplus-value in 
its relative form is only time in the abstract, an inner relation of necessary and surplus labor-
time, rather than a piling-up of an “absolute” time-quantity. 
 In empiricism, time has an ideal existence, as when Hume writes that, “Wherever we have no 
successive perceptions, we have no notion of time, even tho’ there be a real succession of 
objects.”197 Just so, the production of relative surplus-value yields a conception of time with only 
an ideal existence—what the social theorist Moishe Postone calls the “abstract time” of the 
capitalist mode of production.198According to Postone’s reading of Marx, value in capitalism is 
determined by abstract labor, a purely social category; capitalist value is a “nonmanifest abstract 
quality” measured by time.199  
 Just as empiricism denies time to objectivity, reserving it for subjective understanding or a 
feature of consciousness, Postone notes that abstract time makes up no part of the (thingly) 
objectification of value during the labor process: “As a social form, the commodity is completely 
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independent of its material content.”200 The proportions of necessary and surplus labor time in 
relative surplus-value, i.e. the structure and degree of class exploitation, which inhere abstractly 
in the commodity as bearer of value, make up no part of its objective composition, a disjunction 
expressed by Marx in his quip that, “So far no chemist has ever discovered exchange-value either 
in a pearl or a diamond.”201 Instead, this socially determinate time-relation is concealed by the 
muteness of the given commodity and its expression of a single magnitude of value. On this 
reading, reification as the concealment of social relations of domination is identical with the 
abstract non-objectivity of time in relative surplus-value. 
 It is this division between a temporalized subject and an abstract object that reoccurs at every 
instance of the Holmes stories’ literary form. The Sherlock Holmes stories are stories rather than 
philosophical treatises—and so it is as narratives, unfolding in time, that these ontological 
contradictions “stick”: the externality of the flashbacks to the main story, the solution of each 
case by clues outside of the given data, the arbitrariness of the retrospections (the repetitions 
across flashback, confession, Watson’s account, or Holmes’s conclusion), and the relocation of 
mystery from the crime to Holmes’s solving of it—all instances of the partition erected by 
contemplative reason against an increasingly reified objectivity. 
* 
 It is one thing, however, to root the ideality of time and the empiricist construction of 
objectivity in the concrete form of reification, and quite another to sketch out a properly literary 
mode of this subjective organization. The Sherlock Holmes stories are not an “instantiation” of 
these determinations, a freestanding expression of an existential-material structure. I have tried to 
undo the causal or contextual “outside” that founds the method effect in Holmes criticism. If the 
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above ontological premise of reification is granted, this does not however mean that Sherlock 
Holmes springs up directly from the constitution of a scientific “world picture,” as from 
Cadmus’s teeth. Literary recognition contests reification, under conditions that have their own 
history and determinations. The literary mode of idealism, then, is not a mere repetition of 
philosophy and economy, as we see in moving backwards from History and Class 
Consciousness, in order to locate the Sherlock Holmes stories within The Theory of the Novel’s 
discussion of “Abstract Idealism.” 
 What is “idealist” about The Theory of the Novel’s abstract idealism? To begin, the entire 
problematic of the book—the “unbridgeable chasm between cognition and action, between soul 
and created structure, between self and world”202—is derived from Kant’s transcendental 
idealism, which is historicized as the condition of a fallen modernity. Lukács thus transforms 
Kant’s critical separation of subjective experience from an ungraspable external world into an 
historical “dissonance special to the novel, the refusal of the immanence of being to enter into 
empirical life.”203 Because the unity of world and self found in the Homeric epics is no longer 
possible, the novel can only oppose its hero in various ways to an indifferent, heterogenous 
objectivity. Abstract idealism is therefore a kind of travesty of Kant’s ethical philosophy, 
wherein “the idea, because it should be, necessarily must be,” even though “reality does not 
satisfy this a priori demand.”204 The narrative result is the hero’s one-sided and monomaniacal, 
but ever-defeated attempt to realize this idea in the world. As examples, Lukács adduces Don 
Quixote, Tristram Shandy, Dead Souls, and Balzac’s Human Comedy.  
 But how can the Sherlock Holmes stories fit into the same category as Don Quixote?205 Even 
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granting some form of literary “idealism,” the character of these works, and even their external 
heft and degree of literariness, seem irreconcilable. Here is the core of Lukács’s definition: 
In neither of the two spheres [the soul or the sphere of action] is there an element of 
immanent progress or development, either within itself or arising from relationships with 
the other... Nothing can shake its inner certitude, because it is imprisoned in its safe 
world—because it is incapable of experiencing anything. The complete absence of an 
inwardly experienced problematic transforms such a soul into pure activity. Because it is 
at rest within its essential existence, every one of its impulses becomes an action aimed at 
the outside. The life of a person with such a soul becomes an uninterrupted series of 
adventures which he himself has chosen. He throws himself into them because life means 
nothing more to him than the successful passing of tests.206 
 
Outside reality remains quite untouched by [the soul], and reveals itself “as it really is” 
only as an opposition to every one of the hero’s actions... The hero in his demonic search 
for adventure arbitrarily and disconnectedly selects those moments of this “reality” which 
he thinks most suitable for “proving himself.”207 
 
There are five separate points here I would like to draw out and apply to the character of 
Sherlock Holmes, the objective world he interacts with, and the temporality of that relation. 1) 
The hero’s “complete absence of an inwardly experienced problematic” requires a ceaseless 
external activity, a “demonic search” taking the form of a series of (ultimately futile) minor 
“tests.” 2) “Outside reality remains… untouched” by the hero’s actions, without “an element of 
immanent progress or development.” 3) The world “reveals itself… only as an opposition” to the 
hero’s actions. 4) These adventures take the narrative form of being “arbitrary and 
disconnected,” a bad infinity of isolated incidents.  
 1) Because Holmes’ soul is “at rest within its essential existence, every one of its impulses 
becomes an action aimed at the outside”; thus, the stories take the form of a “demonic search.” 
This can almost be taken literally—the search for clues, the relentless hunting down of the 
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an event in the fictional universe—in Part Two of Don Quixote, Cid Hamet Benengeli’s history appears in print, 
while Holmes continually chides Watson for the popular quality and lurid titles of his published accounts (i.e. the 
very stories we are reading).  
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criminal. To be sure. But what is important here is that Holmes’ character is leveled-down by his 
constant pursuit of the same thing, to something less than human (Holmes the asocial drug 
addict) and also more than human (his incredible feats of memory, the ability to forego sleep 
when on a case). Man’s character is developed by his productivity (Marx), and Holmes’ one-
sided activities, however intellectually stimulating, leave him a stunted and partial person. In A 
Study in Scarlet, Watson writes of Holmes: 
His ignorance was as remarkable as his knowledge. Of contemporary literature, 
philosophy and politics he appeared to know next to nothing. Upon my quoting Thomas 
Carlyle, he inquired in the naïvest way who he might be and what he had done. My 
surprise reached a climax, however, when I found incidentally that he was ignorant of the 
Copernican Theory and of the composition of the Solar System. (21). 
 
Holmes is a monomaniac, a Macbeth or an Ahab, who sees in the world only the distorted image 
of his own idée fixe. He has forcibly, purposefully reduced himself to the machine that he is: “He 
said that he would acquire no knowledge which did not bear upon his object” (21). Holmes has 
instrumentalized every relation and activity; he has no acquaintance whom he cannot call upon to 
play some part in a case, no hobby that he does not turn to some surprising use. He is therefore 
“sealed off” as a human being. Lukács’s insight is to show the dialectical reversal wherein this 
inner completeness requires that Quixote/Holmes frenetically throw himself upon the world: 
“His unquestioning, concentrated interiority forces him to translate that interiority... into 
actions... [H]e is incapable of any contemplation; he lacks any inclination or possibility of 
inward-turned activity.”208 From the moment we first meet Holmes in A Study in Scarlet, he is 
complete: the thousand pages that follow only “fill in” superficial qualities (e.g. the name of his 
brother). This completeness means of course, that he is violently incomplete as a person or 
“realistic” character. 
2) “Outside reality remains… untouched” by Holmes’ actions. No matter how many 
                                                




Sherlock Holmes stories there are, no number could ever be enough for the detective to succeed 
in imposing his ideal (of law, of rationality) upon the world, of rendering his own activity 
superfluous. The detective is not exactly tilting at windmills—his career is a nearly unbroken 
string of incredible successes—but his constant activity, being only reactive, leaves the world 
untouched rather than shaping it in the image of his will. Not being able to end all crime, his 
“negating of it, therefore, cannot go the length of being altogether done with it to the point of 
annihilation.”209 The fantasy of retirement that he outlines in “The Final Problem”—“‘[T]hat if I 
could beat [Professor Moriarty], if I could free society of him, I should feel that my own career 
had reached its summit, and I should be prepared to turn to some more placid line in life… I 
could continue to live in the quiet fashion which is most congenial to me, and to concentrate my 
attention upon my chemical researches’” (470)—is of course unrealizable. Even though, as we 
have seen, Holmes defeats this “Napoleon of crime” (471) in “The Final Problem,” neither the 
death of this arch-villain nor Holmes’ own apparent death are sufficient to put an end to his 
crime-solving activities. In a novel like George Eliot’s Mill on the Floss, when characters meet 
their death clasped in each other’s arms, this represents a symbolic and emotional finality, an 
artificial but appropriate conclusion. When Sherlock Holmes (apparently) and Moriarty 
(actually) plunge to their deaths, it is felt as an abrupt and arbitrary termination, not as a 
resolution and culmination of forces long at work. The Holmes saga can only come to a halting 
and abortive stop (as in “The Final Problem”) or be cut off mid-reel, as it were—such that the 
last stories, in The Case Book of Sherlock Holmes, give no indication of being the last stories. 
One of the great ironies in the history of Tables of Contents is the staggering number of Holmes 
stories after this “final” one.210  
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3) Outside reality only reveals itself as an opposition to the hero. Just as the world shows 
up in Don Quixote only in order to be misunderstood as a hostile challenge, so in Sherlock 
Holmes all of Victorian England appears only as a string of crimes and infamies. The quotidian 
is in both cases banished. At most, we can see Watson reading a newspaper or coming back from 
a patient before the story’s client sends up his card at 221B Baker Street or (in the later stories) 
Watson is called away from his wife by Holmes’ summons. The little “down time” that is visible 
in the stories is anathema to Holmes: 
[Watson:] “May I ask whether you have any professional inquiry on foot at 
present?” 
 [Holmes:] “None. Hence the cocaine. I cannot live without brainwork. What else is 
there to live for? Stand at the window here. Was ever such a dreary, dismal, unprofitable 
world? See how the yellow fog swirls down the street and drifts across the dun-colored 
houses. What could be more hopelessly prosaic and material? What is the use of having 
powers, Doctor, when one has no field upon which to exert them? Crime is 
commonplace, existence is commonplace, and no qualities save those which are 
commonplace have any function upon earth.” (93). 
 
The “dismal, unprofitable world” is however, rarely seen. Holmes’s world is as suffocating as 
Hamlet’s Elsinore. Holmes prefers the blinds to be drawn.211 Watson only takes up his pen to 
describe the brief periods of crime-solving which dot an otherwise commonplace existence. 
Whereas a novel such as Madame Bovary, The Warden, or Middlemarch takes its entire action 
from the minor pettiness of bourgeois existence, the everyday event cannot enter at all into a 
Holmes story. So, on one hand, the world reveals itself only in opposition to Holmes, as a “field” 
for him to exercise his talents—but on the other hand, it is the very ruptures in the prosaic world 
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which call Holmes forth, as it were.  
 The fundamental problem of the detective story is to provide an explanation of a social fact 
(crime) in terms of both logic and probability. To this end, Holmes frequently insists on knowing 
the whole history of crime in order to assemble the current case: “There is a strong family 
resemblance about misdeeds, and if you have all the details of a thousand at your finger ends, it 
is odd if you can’t unravel the thousand and first” (A Study in Scarlet 24). But in these stories, 
the social (what might otherwise be thought to be the ground or origin of crime) is what can 
never appear—we know that Holmes has no interest in history per se, but only in the 
newspaper’s agony column (“The Adventure of the Noble Bachelor” 288). Watson tells us, “I 
was aware that by anything of interest, Holmes meant anything of criminal interest. There was 
the news of a revolution, of a possible war, and of an impending change of government, but these 
did not come within the horizon of my companion” (“The Adventure of the Bruce-Partington 
Plans” 913).  
4) The narrative form is marked by arbitrariness and disconnection. Very few Holmes 
stories rely upon the existence of any of the others. Holmes is given to repeating the choice 
maxims concerning his method, in case the reader has missed them elsewhere. Even the 
characterization of Professor Moriarty in The Valley of Fear presumes no readerly acquaintance 
with his earlier presentation in “The Final Problem.” The stories are chronologically “out of 
order,” but even this is a kind of pointless quirk—there is no good reason why a given story 
could not as well have taken place in 1887 as in 1903.  
Such arbitrariness at the formal level contrasts with the most apparent thematic of the 
detective genre. The entire skill in detection is to avoid arbitrariness, to assign the correct 




Boscombe Valley Mystery”: “ It may seem to point very straight to one thing, but if you shift 
your own point of view a little, you may find it pointing in an equally uncompromising manner 
to something entirely different” (204). But as a form, as narrative, the order in which one reads 
the stories, the year in which they are set, whether Holmes is thought to be alive or the story has 
been drawn from a posthumous archive—all of this is utterly contingent, incapable of intruding 
on the character or the literary formula.  
 
 The idealist conception of objectivity outlined above therefore remains in force in abstract 
idealism: the outside world is inessential, atemporal, and void of concept. Inessential, because 
“outside reality is no more than a sluggish, formless, meaningless mass”;212 atemporal, since 
“events... are almost timeless, a motley series of isolated adventures complete in themselves”;213 
void of concept, because “a world forsaken by providence and lacking transcendental 
orientation.”214 
 Contrast, then, the treatment of time in abstract idealism with the famous passage in The 
Theory of the Novel on the novel of passive, bourgeois subjectivity, Flaubert’s L’Éducation 
sentimentale.215 Lukács writes, “the greatest discrepancy between idea and reality is time”—
meaning, we get old, things decay, opportunity grows stale, we set aside our dreams, etc. 
However, against this receding present, the power of memory allows the subject to “glimps[e] 
the organic unity of his whole life through the process by which his living present has grown 
from the stream of his past life dammed up within his memory,”216 as in Proust’s Le Temps 
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retrouvé.217 In this sense, it is time as duration which endows experience with (subjective) 
meaning, thereby synthesizing a rich, memorious interiority and the nihilating objective passage 
of time. In abstract idealism, however, the passing of time neither accrues meaning nor wears it 
away. In Tristram Shandy, time can come to an absolute standstill without impeding the narrative 
progress; the posthumous and/or archival Holmes stories that Watson “publishes” long 
afterward—the next-to-last published tale, 1927’s “The Adventure of the Veiled Lodger,” is set 
back in 1896—lack any consciousness of the time lapse. Hence the “eternal” quality of the 
evergreen Victorian setting of the stories. This has the peculiar result, analyzed above, that 
history is both 1) arbitrary in presentation, such that the stories are outside of any chronological 
order, and 2) so foreign to the detective’s world that it can only occur in flashbacks set apart 
from the primary focalization (Watson). 
* 
 By way of concluding, I would like to return to one of the loftier themes of The Theory of the 
Novel, what might be called its underlying ontological statement: “the refusal of the immanence 
of being to enter into empirical life”218—in other words, that “there is no longer any spontaneous 
totality of being.”219 What for The Theory of the Novel is the historico-philosophical problematic 
(the “dissonance”220) particular to the novel, is for us as much an epistemological statement as an 
ontological one. The Hegelian problem of the possibility of immanent meaning, and the set of 
necessary mediations necessary to produce a whole within knowledge—is this not precisely the 
thematic we are dealing with in mystery fiction and in the vocabulary of recognition? Is the 
“clue,” for example, not the most concrete manifestation of The Theory of the Novel’s affirming 
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that “the immediate meaning of objects has disappeared”?221  
 One way to approach this is through the topic of “disenchantment.” At a first pass, the 
detective’s aim is the restoration of meaning and order to a confused heap of events, 
descriptions, agonies, personalities, etc. The avowed logic of Holmes’ world is “Omne ignotum 
pro magnifico [est]” (177). In other words, his task is to demonstrate that what is real, however 
strange, is ultimately rational. Everything has to be given meaning. So, for Moretti, the structural 
principle of the detective genre is “disenchantment” in a Weberian sense,222 hence its 
“totalitarian aspirations towards a transparent society.”223  
 But there is a double aspect here. To give a well-known example from the Holmes canon: in 
“The Adventure of the Dancing Men,” the childlike and apparently random drawings of dancing 
men turn out not to be mere whimsical sketches but rather an intricate code for secret messages. 
On one hand, explanatory order is made here to penetrate and colonize (what looks like) some 
harmless, thoughtless doodling. But on the other hand, there is a kind of re-enchantment at work: 
behind every banality now might lurk a secret message. Nothing remains entirely innocent, for 
what is most obviously overlooked might be the crux of apprehending a criminal conspiracy. 
This tension is also replayed at the formal level: as Moretti notes, “In detective fiction, 
everything that is repeatable and obvious ceases to be criminal and is, therefore, unworthy of 
!investigation,’”224 in contrast to the formulaic narrative sequence which unfolds according to a 
“perennial fixity of the syntax.”225 In shorthand, we do not know if Holmes is translating the 
world into signs (explanations, reductions) or into wonders (the copying-out of the Encyclopedia 
Brittanica is resolved into an underground tunnel burrowing into a bank vault).  
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 But this epistemological problematic brings us once more to Don Quixote, surely the novel of 
“disenchantment.” Like Holmes, Don Quixote is perpetually deciphering the world, bringing to it 
an explanatory ordering it no longer spontaneously has. We might say that the perpetual 
misrecognition of the world by Don Quixote occupies the same narrative place as Sherlock 
Holmes’s solutions: a point-by-point reordering of the world, the kind of notation or mapping of 
extensive reality that so interested Jorge Luis Borges. There is a magic name awaiting every 
empirical given; nothing fails to find a place in his ravings.  
  Michael McKeon notes, “One of the prescient implications of Don Quixote is that the modern 
disenchantment of the world entailed not the eradication of enchantment but its transformation, 
its secularization.”226 In Part I of the novel, mundane phenomena are metamorphosed into the 
fantasies of romance by a subjective delusion:  
 As our hero’s imagination converted whatsoever he saw, heard or considered, into 
something of which he had read in books of chivalry; he no sooner perceived the inn, 
than his fancy represented it, as a stately castle with its four towers and pinnacles of 
shining silver, accommodated with a draw-bridge, deep moat, and all other 
conveniencies, that are described as belonging to buildings of that kind.227 
 
Don Quixote’s vision enchants the quotidian world, “nor would [he] use the intelligence of his 
own eyes.”228 But in Part II, this delusion has invaded reality itself. Don Quixote’s madness is no 
longer confined to himself and Sancho, but begins to be taken up by others (Sampson Carrasco, 
Don Antonio Moreno, the Duke and Duchess, his steward, and her damsel Altisidora). No longer 
is the illusion or fantasy of romance a misrecognition of the empirical real, a failure to attend to 
one’s senses—now, the distorted, upside-down world is become objective, social, and in the 
form of the printed book of Part I, even material. That is, the site of “enchantment” shifts. 
 This, however, is a precise paraphrase of what Marx intends by his idea of the fetishism of the 
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commodity. Not coincidentally, it is in a discussion of commodity fetishism that Marx makes the 
following remark about Don Quixote: 
One thing is clear: the Middle Ages could not live on Catholicism, nor could the ancient 
world on politics. On the contrary, it is the manner in which they gained their livelihood 
which explains why in one case politics, in the other case Catholicism, played the chief 
part. For the rest, one needs no more than a slight acquaintance with, for example, the 
history of the Roman Republic, to be aware that its secret history is the history of landed 
property. And then there is Don Quixote, who long ago paid the penalty for wrongly 
imagining that knight errantry was compatible with all economic forms of society.229  
 
Etienne Balibar glosses this passage: 
Marx’s thesis does not signify that in these modes of production different from capitalism 
the structure of social relations is transparent to the agents. “Fetishism” is not absent, 
but displaced (onto Catholicism, politics, etc.) … In effect, it appears that “mystification” 
bears precisely, not on the economy (the mode of material production) as such, but on 
that instance of the social structure which, according to the nature of the mode of 
production, is determined to occupy the place of the determination, the place of the last 
instance.230  
 
To put this all in one sentence—the “secularization of enchantment” is the movement from a 
displaced mystification of feudal economic structures to the fetishism of commodities. 
Ideological misrecognition is no longer a secondary (superstructural) position taken up external 
to a positive economic reality, as religion might stand towards the brutality of medieval 
exploitation.  
 It is henceforth the quotidian world of exchange and production which is magical, “abounding 
in metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties.”231 Indeed, reification appears to be 
inextricable from a language of mystification and enchantment: not only the famous dancing 
tables, but also the “bewitched, distorted and upside-down world haunted by Monsieur le Capital 
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and Madame la Terre, who are at the same time social characters and mere things.”232 Nor is this 
enchanted world a kind of subjective, erroneous image separable from dry, secular reality: 
“These impersonal and abstract social forms do not simply veil what traditionally has been 
deemed the !real’ social relations of capitalism, that is, class relations; they are the real relations 
of capitalist society, structuring its dynamic trajectory and its form of production.”233 Contra 
Weber, illusion and enchantment are not at all done away with or receding in capitalism, even in 
reification.234 
 Thus, in Part II of the novel, Don Quixote might be taken to be engaged in a kind of 
rudimentary “ideology critique” along these lines. No longer does he insist that the world around 
him is directly the chivalric romance world, e.g. that these windmills are giants. Rather, it is the 
very ordinariness of appearances (the shared space of social encounters) that now calls for a 
fantastic explanation, for the undoing of the work of “that malicious inchanter, my inveterate 
enemy, [who] hath spread clouds and cataracts before mine eyes, to them and them only 
changing and transforming [Dulcinea’s] unequalled beauty into the appearance of a poor 
country-wench.”235 
 The comparison to Don Quixote allows a belated answer to the question, why call Holmes’s 
reconstructions instances of “recognition” at all? For if the knight errant at last has the scales fall 
from his eyes and mourns the loss of the knightly world, the constitutionally infallible Holmes 
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will never find himself alienated amongst the illusions and red herrings of his adventures. 
(Although this does happen in mystery fiction—recall the solution to the mystery of The 
Moonstone, where the investigating protagonist Franklin Blake learns that he himself committed 
the crime, in an opium-induced unconscious state.) It can only be ironic that recognition belongs 
at last to the perpetually mistaken Don Quixote, but never to Holmes, who never fails to catch 
his man. And surely Don Quixote’s recognition of plain reality in the last pages of the novel 
could be read as a sentimental, ennobling gesture by Cervantes. 
 However, Don Quixote offers another moment of recognition, one that is structurally 
impossible for Sherlock Holmes. In Part Two, when Don Quixote encounters the knight of the 
mirrors, he finds that his foe has already read and absorbed the entire printed tale of Don 
Quixote, Part One, and claims not only to have defeated Don Quixote in battle but essentially 
now to stand in for his prowess and history—i.e. to mirror back (like his armor itself) to Don 
Quixote his own identity from within the upside-down, enchanted world of his adventures: 
“I value and applaud myself chiefly, for having conquered, in single combat, that so 
renowned knight Don Quixote de la Mancha, and made him confess, that my Casildea is 
more beautiful than his Dulcinea. Now, in that single conquest, I deem myself superior to 
all the knights in the universe; for, that same Don Quixote hath vanquished all his 
contemporaries; and I, in conquering him, have transferred and conveyed to my own 
person, all his honour, glory, and reputation; the victor being always honoured in 
proportion to the fame of his vanquished foe; wherefore, the innumerable achievements 
of the said Don Quixote are placed to my credit, as if they were the effects of my own 
personal prowess.”236  
 
For all that the Sherlock Holmes stories consist only in a ceaseless retrospective construction of 
meaning from a fragmented, discontinuous world, never will Holmes encounter himself in this 
way, as an uncanny doubling, within that foggy, criminal world lying beyond Baker Street. At 
the dawn of the novel, reification meant the enchantment of the quotidian and social, and called 
forth recognition as the reflection of an undaunted monomania to unconcealment. In the Sherlock 
                                                




Holmes stories, recognition is only ever the inverse of Don Quixote’s procedure of 
“misrecognition,” i.e. an exhaustive, timeless decoding, which leaves the facing, external world 











































“With disgust I find only myself, over and over,  
in every thing that I create.” – Wotan, Die Walküre 
 
The golden bowl in Henry James’s The Golden Bowl is there instead of a recognition 
scene. About two-thirds of the way through the novel, when the heiress Maggie Verver confronts 
her friend Fanny Assingham with evidence of her husband’s infidelity, the scene of Maggie’s 
fortuitous discovery and disillusionment is dropped out of the narrative order, and recounted only 
in retrospect. In place of any scene, there is only the golden bowl, “inscrutable in its rather stupid 
elegance, and yet, from the moment one had thus appraised it, vidid and definite in its 
domination of the scene.”237 The reader (who has seen the bowl before) has no idea how it came 
into Maggie’s possession, and although Maggie insists to Fanny, “That cup there has turned 
witness”238 against Prince Amerigo, no testimony is forthcoming. Fanny urges Maggie, “I don’t 
know, you see, what you now consider that you’ve ascertained; nor anything of the connexion 
with it of that object that you declare so damning.”239 But, seeing that the bowl is meant to 
function in a recognition scene of Maggie’s own staging, as what Aristotle calls “recognition by 
token,” a visible reminder of Amerigo’s covert trespasses—Fanny smashes the bowl into pieces 
on the ground. 
On a first reading, then, the bowl is exponentially anti-climactic. In its first appearance, 
the Amerigo and Charlotte Stant pass up buying it as a wedding gift. Then, Fanny Assingham 
shatters it before it can be employed in Maggie’s planned encounter with her husband. What is 
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more, Maggie shrugs off this wild destruction, telling Amerigo, “Its having come apart makes an 
unfortunate difference for its beauty, its artistic value, but none for anything else. Its other value 
is just the same—I meant that of its having given me so much of the truth about you. I don’t 
therefore care so much what becomes of it now.”240 
However, the bowl is not just (and not even) an incriminating exhibit entered into the 
record against Amerigo. The bowl does not figure in a chain of explanations or deductions that 
clarifies Maggie’s understanding, nor does it function as a “token” for her own recognition. 
Instead, Maggie points to it as a self-interpreting, complete synopsis of her epistemological 
crisis. When Fanny asks her, “But what has that to do—?”, Maggie answers, “It has 
everything.”241 “!It was on the whole thing that Amerigo married me.’ With which her eyes had 
their turn again at her damnatory piece. !And it was on that—it was on that!’”242 The bowl is a 
condensation of all “her accumulations of the unanswered”;243 Maggie’s understanding of her 
marital relations are in this thing, the bowl. This is why Fanny acts upon these ideas there, by 
smashing it—as though to dispel the recognition Maggie has had, into so many crystal pieces. (In 
a fairy tale, this might have worked.)  
When Fanny hears that the bowl has an inner flaw, she tells Maggie, “Then your whole 
idea has a crack.”244 Pages later, Maggie feels, “within her, the sudden split between conviction 
and action.”245 The bowl has a crack, the idea has a crack, the bowl is broken into pieces, 
Maggie’s ideas are suddenly split. In short, consciousness is figured is a thing. Instead of a 
sequence of Maggie’s perceptions, emotions, where she might “get the facts of appearance 
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straight, only jam them down into their place, [show] the reasons lurking behind them”246—
Maggie only points to this mute object above the fire-place, which in turn takes on “a conscious 
perversity.”247 The relations of consciousness, the determinations of the past, and the location of 
the self are no longer figured as “a roomful of confused objects, never as yet !sorted,’” “the mass 
of vain things, congruous, incongruous,”248 but are transposed onto a single, as it were speaking, 
intensely symbolic lump of thinghood. 
This reading is at odds with the usual picture of consciousness in Henry James as 
determining consciousness. So, for Peter Brooks, James’s fiction presents “the melodrama of 
intepretive consciousness.”249 Consciousness deciphers, even if what ultimately confronts 
thinking is an “abyss of meaning,” a “moral occult” impenetrable to interpretation and in excess 
of it.250 In an entirely other register, Ross Posnock sees consciousness in James as confronting—
not an abyss, but a churning, dynamic urban world in inexorable flux. Instead of interpretation, 
Posnock’s words are immersion,251 improvisation,252 curiosity,253 and exposure.254 
Consciousness is supposed to get outside of itself, and not just puzzle over the figure in the 
drawing room carpet. In Sharon Cameron’s book Thinking in Henry James, consciousness is 
something projected, sometimes with results that sound almost like ESP.255 Consciousness 
dominates others,256 and James’s novelistic world is one of interpenetrating, contesting, and 
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constituting consciousnesses.257 Cameron even states a “Jamesian first principle: that there be 
nothing !outside’ consciousness, at least nothing determining of consciousness, that has a 
constituting hold over it.”258 
The scene from The Golden Bowl, above, has already suggested how what is “outside” 
consciousness may precisely be... consciousness. This is also the great paradox of reification: 
how the medium of thought, of abstraction, is not the mind (not the theater of subjectivity) but 
rather the universal equivalent of the commodity-form, money. As Alfred Sohn-Rethel puts it, 
“[R]eflection itself is not a mental process... the reflecting medium of the real abstraction is 
coinage.”259 
On my reading, James’s The Portrait of a Lady is a systematic presentation of the 
reification of consciousness: the determination of consciousness by outside objects and its 
condensation within them; and the possibilities for recognition that follow.  
Most critics have agreed in seeing The Portrait of a Lady as being about a 
misrecognition—although, as I will show, they have not put their finger on the same place. To 
quickly recap the plot: A young American, Isabel Archer, is brought to England by her aunt, a 
Mrs. Touchett. Once there, she quickly captures the affection of an English lord, whose proposal 
of marriage she rejects, and of her invalid cousin Ralph. Upon her uncle’s death, Ralph secretly 
bequeaths her half of his own inheritance, because he wants to watch what she does with her 
beauty, intelligence, and a fortune that everyone in the book equates with independence. Of 
course this money and these expectations turn out to mean not freedom but intrigue and disaster. 
Isabel falls in with two dissolute, cosmopolitan, aesthete Americans, Madame Merle and her 
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friend Gilbert Osmond. Isabel marries Osmond, but their life together is one of suffocating 
cynicism and enclosed superiority. Isabel finally breaks with Osmond when her sister-in-law 
reveals that Osmond and Madame Merle were once lovers, and that Osmond’s daughter Pansy is 
really his child with Madame Merle. Isabel returns to England, to Ralph’s deathbed, but not 
before Madame Merle has told her the bitter secret of her inheritance (that it was Ralph’s doing). 
In the last scene, Isabel departs England to return to Rome, with full consciousness of the 
loveless pit of vipers that she is going back to.  
It is this conclusion that most critics and readers have had trouble with. It is as though we 
were watching a horror film, and the embattled heroine were to start going up the stairs of her 
house, where she will have no escape. Helpless to assist her by shouting at the screen, criticism 
has resorted to blame.  
The implication is that Isabel has not “learned her lesson” properly—but what lessons 
was that supposed to be? Here is where the theorization of consciousness becomes important. 
The usual way that the novel is read is that Isabel’s error consists in adopting Osmond’s hermetic 
doctrine of aesthetic egoism, namely that the best way to keep the self unsullied by the gross 
world, is to make the self into an aesthetic object. On this reading, Isabel exchanges an 
indeterminate, abstract freedom for the lacquered definiteness of being a rare object among her 
husband!s fine things.  
I call this the “fall” reading, one where Isabel descends from a position of autonomous 
subjectivity into an unfulfilling, restricted instrumentalization at the hands of Osmond. The move 
is from a naïve indeterminacy, soaring above particulars, to a crushing, definite placement—




These positions are dialectically linked: Osmond is seen to be the “truth” of Isabel’s earlier 
idealism and its insufficiencies. 
The “fall” reading follows automatically from the idea of a determining consciousness. In 
a first move, consciousness is constructed as heroic—in the interpretive model, as a kind of 
detective; in the pragmatist model, opposing praxis to the autonomous self, as the fairy tale hero 
who must leave the confines of home and learn what fear is; and in the intersubjective model, as 
plural consciousnesses, the mind is all that there is on stage, so that all relations are still between 
consciousnesses. In a second move, this heroic agency is either blamed or victimized. 
But Isabel Archer is her mistake. Her subjectivity does not lamentably become objectified 
and (badly) determined; her subjectivity is always-already determined, narcissistically caught up 
in an object. And self-consciousness is shown to be the moral equivalent of a hamster wheel. 
Indeed, the ground of the ethical subject in James is not self-consciousness, not an agency that is 
further “inside.” Rather, the ethical act begins from where the subject does not perceive herself 
externally, from a misrecognition in the world of phenomena. Indeed, never in Henry James is 
“our” ethical notion phenomenologically identical with that of a narrated self-consciousness.260 
 This sounds like a fairly “pragmatist” version of Henry James—the emphasis on perspective, 
the refusal of a priori truths, intervention in external reality, etc. The same case could be made 
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for James’s conception of recognition: he doesn’t produce a substantial, latent content from the 
given, but like a good pragmatist he shows the nullity of “immanence.” But I think not. Not, the 
pragmatist anti-metaphysical point that nothing is illuminated—but, what is illuminated (in 
recognition) is a nothingness. Not, that there is no transcendental position (the “absolute” or 
“thing-in-itself”)—but, this position is consubstantial with the subject’s negation in appearance, 
with the holes and oversights belonging to that perspective. Not the departure from an entrenched 
observational mode into an immersion in praxis—but, the way that that observation is already 
mirrored back from external reality. All this is what James is up to in The Portrait of a Lady, as 
the following analysis of that novel’s recognition plot will show. 
* 
This “perpetual recurrence of the same thing” causes us no astonishment when it relates 
to active behavior on the part of the person concerned and when we can discern in him an 
essential character-trait which always remains the same and which is compelled to find 
expression in a repetition of the same experiences. We are much more impressed by cases 
where the subject appears to have a passive experience, over which he has no influence, 
but in which he meets with a repetition of the same fatality... The most moving poetic 
picture of a fate such as this is given by Tasso in his romantic epic Gerusalemme 
Liberata. Its hero, Tancred, unwittingly kills his beloved Clorinda in a duel while she is 
disguised in the armor of an enemy knight. After her burial he makes his way into a 
strange magic forest which strikes the Crusaders’s army with terror. He slashes with his 
sword at a tall tree; but blood streams from the cut and the voice of Clorinda, whose soul 
is imprisoned in the tree, is heard complaining that he has wounded his beloved once 
again.261 
 
Why does Isabel go back to Rome at the end of the novel, presumably back to her 
tyrannical husband and failed marriage? It would be unreasonable, inaccurate, and pointless to 
argue that The Portrait of a Lady illustrates Freud’s theory of repetition-compulsion, and such is 
not my intention here. (To begin with, repetition plays a very different role.) But Freud’s 
emphasis on the passivity of Tancred’s sorrowful fate can only echo what is most troubling about 
                                                




Isabel Archer, who has an early premonition that she “can’t escape [her] fate” nor “escape 
unhappiness.”262 We are accustomed in novel-reading to seeing heroines (Emma Woodhouse, 
Gwendolen Harleth) morally rebuked for arrogant, heedless striving. Isabel, by contrast, suffers 
even though in marrying Gilbert Osmond she has evidently set aside the presumptions of 
ambition, declaring that life is no longer “such an inviting expanse” as it had once seemed to her. 
“One must choose a corner and cultivate that,” she tells Henrietta Stackpole (II, 65). 
Nonetheless, through this passive renunciation she only pours on herself treble confusion and 
woe. 
Any reading of the novel that is not to reduce it to an overlong lecture about the dangers 
of being taken in by supercilious charlatans, must start from Isabel’s responsibility for her fate. 
James takes every pain to emphasize Isabel’s freedom and circumspection: she marries Osmond 
“with her eyes open” (II, 160), “not deceav’d,” in Milton’s words.263 Of course there are dark 
facts of which she is kept unaware. (I will show later on how these same excluded elements 
belong to the way Isabel frames her world and her choice: what is brought out by subsequent 
recognition was already part of the falsifying, misleading structure of appearances from the 
outset.) Isabel’s much-vaunted freedom and determination to see for herself turn around and 
becomes their own opposite: the blindfolded passivity of stepping into “the house of darkness, 
the house of dumbness, the house of suffocation” that is her marriage (II, 196)—surely as 
nightmarish a scene as the terrifying magic forest in Tasso. 
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The question then is when Isabel “falls”—when Isabel first “gets in wrong,” in 
Hemingway!s phrase from “The Killers”—whether she first objectifies herself in marrying 
Osmond, or if this is only a repetition of an earlier, unhappy interpellation.  
James writes in the preface to the novel how his creative process began with Isabel 
conceived independently of any “set of relations.”264 Rather than beginning with a situation or a 
setting, James started from Isabel as a “stray figure, the unattached character, the image en 
disponibilité.”265 
Thus I had my vivid individual—vivid, so strangely, in spite of being still at large, not 
confined by the conditions, not engaged in all the tangle, to which we look for much of 
the impress that constitutes an identity. If the apparition was still all to be placed how 
came it to be vivid?266 
 
The question for James is how Isabel is “to be placed”—how he can begin “organizing an ado” 
about her.267 This is his writerly problem, but the novel’s narrative makes no attempt to cover the 
tracks of its creation. James sets Isabel before us in all her disponibilité: an Albany girl waiting 
quietly in a room for something to happen to her, unengaged, set apart from local life—before 
promptly embedding her in a marriage plot and in the international scene afoot at Gardencourt. 
The story quite literally follows the sequence of James’s “process”: first character, then 
placement. 
This necessity of finally being placed, of becoming a determinate someone instead of 
remaining a groundless “apparition,” is how Isabel justifies her marriage to Gilbert Osmond, 
undoubtedly the central “ado” of the novel. Not only is Isabel not placed at the start of the novel, 
her intellectual self-conception dictates that she “must be free, and freedom means first of all 
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independence, not being attached or committed anywhere, not being identified with a role or 
function, not, indeed, !being’ anything (at least, she seems to think, not yet, not for a while).” 268 
Coming down from this lofty, unattached attitude that led her to turn down both Caspar 
Goodwood and Lord Warburton, Isabel didactically concedes that, “[I]f one marries at all one 
touches the earth... [O]ne must marry a particular individual” (II, 74). But her marriage is, 
ultimately, a horrendous mistake. As a determination or placement, it is ruinous. 
 In marrying Osmond, Isabel not only is placed but is also objectified—she becomes “like 
some curious piece in an antiquary’s collection” (II, 42). It is this objectification which Posnock 
associates with the Jamesian critique of reification—her mistake is to “reify” herself.269 Posnock 
argues that this objectification is only the mirror image and corollary to Isabel’s belief in her 
“absolute subjectivity,”270 her “relentless drive to fortify the self and subdue experience”:271 a 
dialectic whereby her autonomous self-conception can only be realized in being treated as a 
thing, “as senseless and convenient as mere shaped wood and iron” (II, 379). 
But is her marriage the first moment that Isabel is “placed”? Is there an earlier 
determination in which she “touches the earth”? Everything depends on this. If Isabel’s mistake 
in marrying Osmond only sets in stone (sets in porcelain?) her naïve conception of the self—
whether a mistaken instrumental aestheticizing, or a valorization of contentless freedom—then 
the incredible spiritual ravages that Isabel suffers would be James’s didactic warning against 
such aesthetic idealism. Isabel, then, has to be “brought low from heights of self-idealization,” to 
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learn the virtues of “immersion”272 in contrast to the rigidities of the autonomous ego. A bad idea 
leads to a bad mistake: the point was not to have had that idea in the first place. I find this 
unhelpful and cruel. It is like telling Tancred that he repeatedly kills Clorinda because of his bad 
habit of waving swords around. But to argue, as I do, that Isabel is responsible for what happens, 
means that she has produced the very framework within which she errs. 
For Isabel is not first “placed” when she descends from an abstract freedom to the 
determinate confines of a particular marriage, rendering herself an acquired aesthetic object. 
Rather, the very appearance of this abstract subjective freedom itself is placed and determined, a 
produced effect and not a spontaneous immediate state. Certainly Isabel speaks in terms of a self-
positing subjectivity unmarked by and indifferent to material otherness: “[O]ne’s ideal could 
never become concrete” (I, 266); “Nothing that belongs to me is any measure of me; 
everything’s on the contrary a limit, a barrier, and a perfectly arbitrary one” (I, 288). But we are 
not obligated to accept Isabel’s image of her consciousness as self-constituted and 
transcendental. Here I depart from Sharon Cameron’s phenomenological account of Jamesian 
consciousness as autonomous and self-positing, where intersubjectivity is the supra-
psychological grounds of the domination and productivity of consciousness.273 Isabel’s self as an 
unbounded ideal freedom is, on the contrary, intensely framed and situated. 
This framing is doubled by the novel’s structure of recognition. There are two big 
moments of revelation in the novel that recast Isabel’s perception of what has befallen her. First, 
Isabel learns from the Countess Gemini that Gilbert Osmond and Madame Merle had been lovers 
before Osmond’s marriage, that Pansy is their illegitimate lovechild, and that Isabel’s courtship 
with Osmond was a stage-managed conspiracy to gain her fortune. Shortly thereafter, Madame 
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Merle, exposed at last, tells Isabel that Ralph Touchett, not his father, is really Isabel’s 
benefactor (something the reader already knows). Temporally, these recognitions are given in 
reverse of their order and scale, almost nested one inside the other like Russian dolls, since 
Isabel’s fortune precedes and looms over her marriage. The first recognition shows the 
devastating concealed determinations that Isabel’s freedom succumbs to, almost the hidden 
strings pulling her limbs. The isolated consciousness, we see, is not entitled to posit freely its 
own world of others, treating life cooly as a set of unencumbered aesthetic-critical judgments. 
Life is rather a matter of being tossed, without bearings, into a world already in motion and 
multiply entangled, even instrumentalized within other people’s projects. If things stopped here, 
the novel’s lesson would be something like, “Be on your guard!” But a second illumination 
quickly follows, to show that this consciousness of freedom is itself a product of further 
determinations. What had appeared to Isabel to be her duty to a transcendent principle of 
freedom, an obligation to suspend reality in a cosmopolitan accumulating of impressions, is 
unmasked as a show enacted for Ralph Touchett’s observation. She learns, in effect, that there is 
no symbolic guarantee of her liberty—the view for which she has performed her life is only that 
of a disappointed, terminally ill empirical person. 
For Isabel’s first placement is to be interpellated by Ralph’s gaze, which is also her first 
“objectification”—the gaze is her subjectivity as an object. At the same time, Isabel’s blindspots, 
where recognition will later emerge, are inscribed in this perspective. Her “fall” is not a set of 
errors made on top of this, but she is in a sense already these mistakes and oversights and 
misrecognitions. Instead of showing us a “fall” that might have been avoided by a more 
scrupulous or more pragmatic actor, the novel shows that we are at our most “framed” (placed, 




as I will argue about the ending of the novel, real freedom does not lie in being “sufficient to 
have stood,” but rather in retroactively affirming these choices, filling in the gaps of the past with 
the present self. Isabel at last decides not to “escape,” but to identify with what was negatively 
presented in that first distorted framing. 
Her recognitions are belated illuminations of alienated aspects of her desire and 
subjectivity. She must “put herself” back into the gaps of fate and misrecognition. We have seen 
something similar in Hegel!s Unhappy Consciousness who, searching ever for an external 
confirmation of its being, cannot see “the inner certainty of itself... [in] the process of canceling 
and enjoying reality,—existence in the form of independent things. The unhappy consciousness, 
however, finds itself merely desiring and toiling... [I]ts inner life really remains still a shattered 
certainty of itself; that confirmation of its own existence which it would received through work 
and enjoyment, is, therefore, just as tottering and insecure.”274 
With reference to Freud!s theory of repetition-compulsion mentioned earlier, the key 
element for my argument is to see Isabel as a “barred subject.” From the outset, the 
psychoanalytic cure consisted in leading the patient to recognize in her hysterical symptoms not 
an external affliction with a physiological aetiology, but the expression of her own repressed 
desires and the history of her personal symbolism. The “barred subject” of the unconscious 
describes the disavowal (by the ego) of the unconsciousness’s productions, wherein the dream, 
or the parapraxis, or the symptom is classed as accidental, unintentional, and unwanted, hence 
consigned to non-signifying objectivity. Lacan identifies this split or misrecognition as the 
essence of repetition-compulsion: the “insistence of the signifying-chain” is correlative with the 
“ex-sistence” of “the subject of the unconscious” (Écrits I, 11). In the parapraxis, the symptom, 
or the dream—alienated by language—the subject is really enjoying or pleasuring herself. “The 
                                                




symptoms constitute the sexual activity of the patient.”275As Hegel writes, the Unhappy 
Consciousness “in appearance renounces the satisfaction... but it gets the actual satisfaction of 
that feeling, for it has been desire, work, and enjoyment.”276  
What the subject is “barred” from, then, is the objective form of her own (condensed) 
meaning and (mutilated) desire.277 What shows up instead does not seem to belong to the self at 
all: a debilitating illness, or a tragic chance happening, e.g. in the example from Tasso, or in the 
dream, “Father, don’t you see I’m burning,” where a beloved child’s funeral wrappings catch 
fire.278 It is a hard saying to understand a misfortune like this as one’s own doing. This line of 
argument can seem like a show trial where one confesses to a whole slate of uncommitted 
crimes, thereby laying claim to an omnipotence (guilty of everything!) belied by one’s presence 
in the dock. But if there is something unhappily deterministic about placing oneself in a chain of 
unconscious causality,279 the point is not to recover somewhere an un-barred subject. Robert 
Pippin nicely captures the paradox here: for Isabel “to have achieved a self-determined life is to 
‘recover’ her past as her own,”280 i.e. this self-determination can only be accomplished 
retrospectively, by restoring intention to the discontinuity and fumbling of a botched life. When 
faced with the truth of her choices, the morbid ways that her desires have come to pass, Isabel 
does not retreat from them, does not plead that she didn’t mean it. Instead, she affirms her own 
meaning within what she can only regret, claiming a mangled outcome as something desired. 
“One must accept one’s deeds. I married him before all the world; I was perfectly free; it was 
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impossible to do anything more deliberate” (II, 284). In saying this, and in returning to Osmond, 
Isabel writes herself into her own history as free within the long wreck of her past.  
* 
Isabel Archer is first introduced to the reader almost as a pair of disembodied eyes, like 
those staring out of the dark forest in Disney’s Snow White: “She was looking at everything, with 
an eye that denoted clear perception” (I, 18); “she had an immense curiosity about life and was 
constantly staring and wondering” (I, 45). Her gaze even precedes her: on her arrival at 
Gardencourt, Ralph Touchett finds that he “had been an object of observation” for Isabel “for 
some moments before he perceived her” (I, 16). She is all vision, “seeing without judging” (I, 
42). This Ur-Isabel, this incorporeal vector of perception, is very much the “not confined” and 
“not entangled” “apparition” of James’s preface. A portrait on such a bare background is not yet 
a person—she lacks what “constitutes an identity.” She is more like a soul primed for 
metempsychosis. 
Isabel immediately becomes an object of observation and conjecture—even before her 
arrival, really, as Ralph Touchett and his father debate the wording of the telegram announcing 
her impending visit (I, 13). Once at Gardencourt, Isabel cannot remain a mere pair of eyes, or a 
question mark, for long. Her own spontaneous, irrepressible vision is soon met by her cousin’s 
gaze. Ralph is described as contemplating Isabel in architectural terms that recall the famous 
metaphor of “the house of fiction” in James’s preface: “He surveyed the edifice from the outside 
and admired it greatly; he looked in at the windows and received an impression of proportions 
equally fair. But he felt that he saw it only by glimpses and that he had not yet stood under the 
roof” (I, 87). It is this gaze which structures everything that comes after, framing and tilting 




pretend to advise you,” Ralph tells Isabel; “I content myself with watching you—with the 
deepest interest.” (I, 211) 
By contrast, look at Isabel’s response to Caspar Goodwood, when he meets her in 
London. She is trying on a cosmopolitan attitude that is new to her, as if to hear how it sounds in 
her voice: 
This attitude was part of a system, a theory, that she had lately embraced, and to be 
thorough she said after a moment: “Don’t think me unkind if I say it’s just that—being 
out of your sight—that I like. If you were in the same place I should feel you were 
watching me, and I don’t like that—I like my liberty too much. If there’s a thing in the 
world I’m fond of,” she went on with a slight recurrence of grandeur, “it’s my personal 
independence.” (I, 227-8). 
 
Here, Isabel opposes being-seen to her independence. But she is not being “thorough” at all, 
having made no similar objection to Ralph’s open professions of watching her every move. And 
if this is a new system for her, it is not one plucked at random from the intellectual ether. Rather, 
Isabel’s theoretical independence is (however counterintuitively) an expression of Ralph’s gaze. 
When she dresses her liberty up as a grandiose posture, it is under the confessed personal 
observation of her cousin, and when her accession to a fortune makes this liberty possible outside 
of the abstract, she exercises it under the (concealed) auspices of Ralph’s continued scrutiny. 
Unmoored free agency and autonomy=being seen by Ralph Touchett. 
The crucial development here is the passage from Ralph’s gaze to the gaze of the 
impersonal Other, the transcendental guarantor-observer of Isabel’s free ego—for, in the novel’s 
final recognition, when Madame Merle’s character lies naked before Isabel, her parting shot is to 
reverse this move. Defeated, Madame Merle’s only power is—like Toto in The Wizard of Oz—to 




everything in motion for the book’s conclusion, resolves the ideal spectator of Isabel’s life into 
this frail, dying, heartbroken man. 
Early on, Ralph tells Henrietta Stackpole that, when it comes to Isabel, “!I’m only 
Caliban; I’m not Prospero’” (I, 169): 
[Henrietta]: “You were Prospero enough to make her what she has become. 
You’ve acted on Isabel Archer since she came here, Mr. Touchett.” 
“I, my dear Miss Stackpole? Never in the world. Isabel Archer has acted on me—
yes; she acts on every one. But I’ve been absolutely passive.” 
“You’re too passive, then. You had better stir yourself and be careful. Isabel’s 
changing every day; she’s drifting away—right out to sea.” (I, 169-70) 
 
The irony here is that when Ralph does play the Prospero figure, in arranging for his father to 
divide the inheritance between himself and Isabel—weaving Isabel’s fate behind the scenes, 
incognito, through mediaries—he makes a dreadful mess of the life he wants to enchant. “The 
direful spectacle of the wrack” this time is all too real and not a mirage. Ralph, in being “too 
passive,” in observing Isabel, by a dialectical inversion is found to have “acted on” her. In 
“watching,” “surveying,” sneaking “glimpses” of Isabel, his own vision acts as a kind of lure to 
draw hers. Isabel, all perception, is caught in this narcissistic reflection of another set of eyes 
returning her look. What first captivates Isabel is thus not the allures of European sophistication 
(Lord Warburton) but the mirroring of her gaze of her cousin’s rapt fascination, which resembles 
a closed loop: a mutual interest in “the thrill of seeing what a young lady does who won’t marry 
Lord Warburton” (I, 212). 
Although Ralph’s transformation is yet to come, Henrietta Stackpole detects the secret 
identity between the ungainly creature and the Duke of Milan. For Caliban’s grotesque 
appearance is at once a disturbing rupture in excess of the magical arrangement of the island, a 




What have we here? a man or a fish? dead or alive? A fish: he smells like a fish; a very 
ancient and fish-like smell; a kind of, not of the newest, Poor-John. A strange fish! Were 
I in England now, as once I was, and had but this fish painted, not a holiday fool there but 
would give a piece of silver: there would this monster make a man; any strange beast 
there makes a man. When they will not give a doit to relieve a lame beggar, they will lay 
out ten to see a dead Indian. Legg’d like a man! and his fins like arms! (II.ii.21-3) 
 
—and at the same time a necessary node for Prospero’s Robinson Crusoe-like “economy.” This 
object of disgust, however repudiated and spurned by the island’s sovereign, in reality stands in 
for Prospero’s order, as the particular product of its logic. Behind the hideous creature glower the 
enchanter’s eyes. Thus, Caliban’s body makes a stain, blot, or mark—the “strange, suspended, 
oblique object”281 that indicates “the pre-existence of a gaze—I see only from one spot, but in 
my existence I am seen from all around.”282 Caliban’s obscene existence (indeed, his obscenity 
learned from Prospero) is a foul marker of Prospero’s omniscience—the inscrutable point of 
excess that signifies the magician’s stage-management. 
Isabel is first caught in the mirror of Ralph’s returned gaze, but what is decisive is the 
disappearance of this literal set of eyes belonging to a person, and the submersion of Ralph’s 
intent observation under a symbolic mandate: the move from “a gaze seen” to “a gaze imagined 
by me in the field of the Other.”283 In acting as Isabel’s Proppian benefactor, Ralph is adamant 
that this story-function not appear as his own. The new will must appear as Mr. Touchett’s own 
eccentricity in favor of Isabel. Even in obliging his son, the father remarks on the somewhat 
perverse implications of the wish: “When I cared for a girl—when I was young—I wanted to do 
more than look at her” (I, 262). But the consequence is really to erase Ralph’s looking-at-Isabel 
from her field of vision. His surveillance of her is all the more effective in becoming impersonal 
and disembodied. The seen figure of Caliban gives way to the all-seeing Prospero. 
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Ralph moves into the background, relishing the spectacle he has arranged for himself: 
“Ralph looked forward to a fourth, a fifth, a tenth besieger; he had no conviction she would stop 
at a third” (I, 395). No longer does he lock eyes with Isabel, or advertise his reconnaissance 
mission to her, opting to proceed clandestinely. “Ralph Touchett, when he appeared to be 
looking listlessly and awkwardly over her head, was really dropping on her an intensity of 
observation” (I, 413). Isabel refuses to see, in the logic of her “fate” that she has been voicing, 
anything to do with the quotidian personage of Ralph, whose advice she haughtily shrugs off. 
When this “little” other starts to claim the privileges of the “big” Other’s gaze, Isabel refuses any 
identity between the two, almost to the point of covering her ears: 
“I had treated myself to a charming vision of your future,” Ralph observed... “I had 
amused myself with planning out a high destiny for you. There was to be nothing of this 
sort in it. You were not to come down so easily or so soon...” 
“I don’t understand you in the least... You say you amused yourself with a project for my 
career—I don’t understand that. Don’t amuse yourself too much, or I shall think you’re 
doing it at my expense.” (II, 69-70) 
 
From Isabel’s perspective, then, her inheritance is in no way an extension or displacement of her 
cousin’s observation of her. Rather, she construes Ralph’s plan for his own “mere amusement” 
(I, 262) as an alien intrusion,284 to be “look[ed] at... in a dozen different lights” and “scrutinized” 
(I, 300-1). Above all, she doesn’t see any strings attached. So, her un-looked-for windfall is 
rationalized abstractly; the immediate consequence is “to be able to do” (I, 301), a responsibility 
she feels imposed on her from without: “I look at life too much as a doctor’s prescription” (I, 
319). The “prescription” that Isabel imposes on herself is essentially a categorical imperative, a 
single and indeterminate principle not derived from experience. To be able to do, so generally, is 
possible only as long as one does not so much as exercise this privilege: the very nature of doing 
                                                




is to close down other possibilities of doing. Nothing could be less pragmatist than such a 
spontaneous directive, uttered from within and really proscribing action. But this imperative is 
not really derived from an a priori regulative moral law, but on the contrary, from her specific 
position in being interpellated by Ralph’s benefactor-function. Moreover, it is based on Isabel’s 
illusion that nothing has happened, i.e. that she is still the same girl as when she was sitting in 
Albany. She still thinks that she has not been “placed,” and that this can be postponed 
indefinitely. But this exact illusion is itself her placement—a determinate perspective that 
dissembles itself as the very opposite: abstract, unbounded free consciousness. 
 Ralph!s gaze, then, is the first “placement” and objectification285 of Isabel, which is only 
repeated in the misrecognition of Osmond and Merle.  
To be sure, mine is a tendentious psychoanalytic reading, asserting the pre-existence of a 
symbolic order in the retrospective construction of an ego. But it is also just what Henry James 
says in the book’s preface, describing the innumberable windows looking out from the “house of 
fiction”: 
These apertures, of dissimilar shape and size, hang so, all together, over the human scene 
that we might have expected of them a greater sameness of report than we find. They are 
but windows at best, mere holes in a dead wall, disconnected, perched aloft; they are not 
hinged doors opening straight upon life. But they have this mark of their own that at each 
of them stands a figure with a pair of eyes, or at least with a field-glass, which forms, 
again and again, for observation, a unique instrument, insuring to the person making use 
of it an impression distinct from every other. He and his neighbors are watching the same 
show, but one seeing more where the other sees less, one seeing black where the other 
sees white, one seeing big where the other sees small, one seeing coarse where the other 
sees fine. And so on, and so on; there is fortunately no saying on what, for the particular 
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pair of eyes, the window may not open; "fortunately" by reason, precisely, of this 
incalculability of range.286  
 
Isabel’s mistake is just this: to imagine that she has a “hinged door opening straight upon life,” 
that she can exercise her consciousness in unlimited observation and unfixed praxis. There is not, 
as in Plato’s allegory of the cave, any escape out of the edifice, where one might frolic among 
things-in-themselves before reporting back to the other prisoners. We are stuck at our “mere hole 
in a dead wall,” faced with the situation of a theatergoer who buys the cheapest tickets. Every 
consciousness is marked “Obstructed View.” But this limitation is not, as in the philosophy of 
Kant, an a priori restriction built into “pure reason.” In James’s metaphor, each pair of eyes is 
decisively placed, particularized, and “distinct from every other.” And Isabel’s being situated at a 
“pierced aperture” (46) not only rules out her notion of gaining an unobstructed vision of the 
world—this notion of freedom itself belongs to this delimited perspective. 
The “house of fiction” metaphor might suggest the following reading, which is inimical 
to my line of argument: If our consciousness of the world is only ever from a partial perspective, 
and if Isabel’s mistakes stem from ignorance of what will later be illuminated, then what befalls 
her is actually built into her subjective position, once she is set at whatever “window.” If Isabel 
had seen “more” instead of “less,” fine instead of coarse, and so on, then she would not have 
been such an easy prey. So, she is doomed in advance from the sheer fact of her location and 
incomplete perspective—not unlike the man from the country in Kafka’s parable “Before the 
Law.” He is told, on the verge of death, after years of being refused admittance, “No one else 
could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now going to shut it." 
His failure and tragedy is just to occupy that position prepared for him—to be in his place is 
itself enough to seal his fate. 
                                                




Much as William James’s pragmatist philosophy, in its railings against idealism, often 
seems to imagine that Cartesian dualism can be “overcome” just by booting the subject out of his 
oak-paneled study and into the real world, this reading fails to include the limitations and 
structures of the subject as essential to appearance itself. But The Portrait of a Lady could not be 
clearer. The framing and restrictions of Isabel’s field of vision are not just overlaid upon an 
unchanging and static objectivity; she also posits a symbolic depth behind the framed image, a 
space “through the looking glass”—the logic of what she is “meant” for, a quasi-providential slot 
preordained for her. What appears through the window is not just raw appearance; the structure 
of appearance contains, from the outset, the returned gaze of an Other.287 
As this is something of an obscure proposition, take Freud’s case study on the Wolf Man 
as a demonstration, which revives the principle conceit (looking out a window) from the “house 
of fiction.” You will recall that Freud interprets the patient’s dream—of five wolves perched in a 
tree outside his window, staring intently—as reproducing a childhood experience of awakening 
and witnessing his parents having sex. 
He had woken up and had seen something. The attentive looking, which in the dream is 
ascribed to the wolves, should rather be shifted on to him. At a decisive point, therefore, a 
transposition has taken place... [I]nstead of immobility (the wolves sat there motionless; 
they looked at him, but did not move) the meaning would have to be: the most violent 
motion. That is to say, he suddenly woke up, and saw in front of him a scene of violent 
movement at which he looked with strained attention... [T]he distortion would consist in 
an interchange of subject and object, of activity and passivity: being looked at instead of 
looking.288  
 
In other words, the subject’s own gaze has to be written into the scene witnessed in the dream—
here, as the wolves’ stare. The viewer is not excluded from what it is seen outside the window; 
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rather, he is essentially reflected therein. The misperceived gaze is the representative of the 
subject, a narcissistic object alienated in the symbolic field. It is simultaneously the Other’s 
viewpoint (for whose desire fantasy is staged) and the trace of that too-much of enjoyment (the 
repressed infantile trauma of confused observation). Moreover, as I argued above concerning 
Ralph Touchett, this reflection is a narcissistic mirroring: if Isabel is originally captivated by 
Ralph’s gaze, this is because she is all staring and looking to begin the book. 
 In other words, what is being presented in The Portrait of a Lady is not so much the record of 
a consciousness, even of a “reflected” one, as the way that what appear as the inner workings of 
an autonomous self-consciousness are already articulated and “at work” outside of that 
interiority. The distortions and gaps in Isabel’s subjective position do not remain there—the very 
limitations of reflection are already included in objectivity, in things themselves.289 That is to 
say, illusion is not a passive category, but shows up as a hostile external force.  
* 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the case of Madame Merle. Since I want to argue 
that she is presented by Ralph as a model for Isabel, a point of identification, it will be best to 
start with how Ralph describes her: 
“She’s complete.” (I, 252) 
“Serena Merle hasn’t a fault.” (I, 277) 
 
“She’s too good, too kind, too clever, too learned, too accomplished, too everything.” (I, 
361) 
 
“On the character of every one else you may find some little black speck... But on 
Madame Merle’s nothing, nothing, nothing!” (I, 362) 
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“Worldly? No...she’s the great round world itself!” (I, 362). 
 
Madame Merle is the “complete” image of the precocious but disoriented Isabel, reflected back 
at her and misrecognized as her own image: without defect, uncertainty, a trace of a past, or 
fuzziness in self-presentation. Isabel’s identification with her is almost immediate—Madame 
Merle “presented herself as a model” from the first, engaging Isabel’s admiration and envy (I, 
270)—but is thoroughly reinforced by Ralph, as though her were casting a spotlight on this 
perfectly polished and powdered vision. This identification with a reflected, ideal image, 
governed by the gaze of the Other, corresponds to the psychoanalytic concept of the the 
“specular image” and its role in the mirror stage290—the mastery of the unbroken image assumed 
(anticipated) by the infant whose motions are still fragmented and halting. 
Isabel and Madame Merle’s friendship eventually sours. (Madame Merle is only a 
slightly better friend than Iago.) The ugliness of this disintegration—the resentment and 
suspicion that closeness and similarity give rise to—is perfectly expressed in Lacan’s description 
of the ideal-ego in the mirror stage identification: 
What the subject finds in this altered image... is the paradigm for all the forms of 
resemblance that will tint the world of objects with hostility, by projecting there the 
avatar of the narcissistic image, which, from the jubilant effect of its encounter in the 
mirror, becomes in this confrontation with its counterpart the release valve for the most 
intimate aggression.291  
 
But this poisonous intimacy is all to come. How does Isabel first respond to Madame Merle? 
“She’s a Frenchwoman,” Isabel said to herself; “she says that as if she were French.” And 
this supposition made the visitor more interesting to our speculative heroine. (I, 245) 
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Isabel found it difficult to think of her in any detachment or privacy, she existed only in 
her relations, direct or indirect, with her fellow mortals. One might wonder what 
commerce she could possibly hold with her own spirit. One always ended, however, by 
feeling that a charming surface doesn’t necessarily prove one superficial; this was an 
illusion in which, in one’s youth, one had but just escaped being nourished. Madame 
Merle was not superficial—not she. She was deep, and her nature spoke none the less in 
her behavior because it spoke a conventional tongue. (I, 274) 
 
There was something between them [Madame Merle and Ralph Touchett], Isabel said to 
herself, but she said nothing more than this. If it were something of importance it should 
inspire respect; if it were not it was not worth her curiosity. With all her love of 
knowledge she had a natural shrinking from raising curtains and looking into unlighted 
corners. The love of knowledge coexisted in her mind with the finest capacity for 
ignorance. (I, 284) 
 
In each instance, Isabel can be seen putting something “behind” the image of Madame Merle: the 
sophistication eternally associated with being French, being “deep” and undoubtedly holding 
unperceived “commerce... with her own spirit,” and as having “unlighted corners” and unraised 
curtains in her past relations. But this depth, the space behind the curtain, so to speak—is 
Isabel’s creation, a “speculative” dimension carved out in thought, not corresponding to anything 
in appearance—coinciding only with the “through the looking glass” space from where she is 
regarded by the Other. 
In short, Madame Merle—the architect of Isabel’s emotionally desiccated marriage, the 
systematic starvation of her soul—is not a foreign invader, an enemy discerned at the end of a 
spyglass, but rather is integral to Isabel’s structure of desire from the first. When Madame Merle 
brings Gilbert Osmond to impress and charm Isabel, their conversation is a kind of theatrical 
performance staged for an audience of one. 
Isabel took on this occasion little part in the talk; she scarcely even smiled when the 
others turned to her invitingly; she sat there as if she had been at the play and had paid 
even a large sum for her place. Mrs. Touchett was not present, and these two [Osmond 
and Merle] had it, for the effect of brilliancy, all their own way. They talked of the 




performers figuring for a charity. It all had the rich readiness that would have come from 
rehearsal. Madame Merle appealed to her as if she had been on the stage, but she [Isabel] 
could ignore any learnt cue without spoiling the scene—though of course she thus put 
dreadfully in the wrong the friend who had told Mr. Osmond she could be depended on. 
This was no matter for once; even if more had been involved she could have made no 
attempt to shine. There was something in the visitor that checked her and held her in 
suspense. (I, 355) 
 
All of this language of being “at the play,” watching “distinguished performers,” of being “on 
the stage,” naturally underscores Isabel’s passivity. She is a seated member of the ticket-holding 
public, observing from amidst the hushed dark, while Merle and Osmond are virtuosic actors 
delivering their lines rapid-fire before the footlights, with all the artificiality and stagecraft of 
expert direction. It would seem that Isabel is a mere spectator, rooted in her assigned seat, and at 
a remove from what is transpiring before her. But as in the Wolf Man’s dream, there can be no 
true division of spectator and spectacle. Madame Merle breaks the theatrical fourth wall—she 
“appealed to [Isabel] as if she had been on the stage”—including her in the performance. And so 
Isabel’s “perverse unwillingness to glitter by arrangement” (I, 356) becomes a refusal seamlessly 
incorporated into the duo’s routine: not a spectatorial response, but a negative acknowledgment 
of a “learnt cue” in (mute) dialogue with other professionals. The artificiality, the touch of 
rehearsal, are addressed to Isabel, yes, but just as much are they her additions—the show being 
put on before her is not an indifferent, closed-off objectivity: she is herself included “onstage” 
through her very passivity and silence, through her very posture of removing herself therefrom. 
 The second half of this finely-honed act, Gilbert Osmond, is defined almost completely 
negatively. To Ralph, Osmond is “a vague, unexplained American... I don’t know his 
antecedents, his family, his origin” (I, 358). When Lord Warburton asks, “What is he besides?” 
Ralph answers, “Nothing at all.” (I, 427). To Mrs. Touchett (who believes she has intervened 




middle-aged widower with an uncanny child and an ambiguous income” (I, 394). Osmond’s own 
account of himself is just as recalcitrant and void: “Not to worry—not to strive nor struggle. To 
resign myself. To be content with little”—to “do nothing” (I, 381-2). Osmond is a blank screen. 
If Ralph says that on Madame Merle there is “nothing, nothing, nothing!” (I, 362) of discredit, 
then of Gilbert Osmond can be said that his substance is “nothing, nothing, nothing” of note (I, 
391)—in his sister’s description of their family background. 
 Isabel of course converts this utter lack of quality as a tasteful covering. When Osmond has 
given a desiccated, audaciously bland capsule of his life: “This would have been rather a dry 
account of Mr. Osmond’s career if Isabel had fully believed it; but her imagination supplied the 
human element which she was sure had not been wanting” (I, 382-3). She brags to Caspar 
Goodwood, “I’m marrying a perfect nonentity” (II, 47). This is, of course, true. When Mrs. 
Touchett warns, “There’s nothing of him,” Isabel turns this into a virtue. “Then he can’t hurt me” 
(II, 54).  
 But Isabel never really conceives a grand passion for Osmond. Reflecting on her disposing of 
her inheritance, she rationalizes that “Unless she should have given it to a hospital there would 
have been nothing better she could do with it; and there was no charitable institution in which 
she had been as much interested as Gilbert Osmond” (II, 193). When I fall in love, I am never 
hoping to be compared to a hospital.  
 In turn, Osmond’s desire is characterized as that of being recognized—of returning, from 
within a frame, Isabel’s gaze, after lingering for years in the obscurity of the American colony in 
Rome. “If an anonymous drawing on a museum wall had been conscious and watchful it might 





 I have spent a great many pages discussing who and what is “framed” and “placed” in the 
novel, how the subject is “included in appearance,” about what depth or “beyond” is “posited” 
behind a mirror/screen—not with the sterile aim of describing a masterpiece of literature point by 
point in Hegelian and/or psychoanalytic terminology, but because this is what the novel seems to 
be about. The burning questions that confront any reading—how to account for Isabel’s almost 
obstinate blindness in marrying Osmond, and for her returning to Rome at the very end when she 
has discovered every unsightly truth—are really variations on this essential question of 
recognition: how does the truth looks a moment before and a moment after it is disclosed?  
The first part of this chapter has analyzed what I consider (in burning question number 
one) to be the priority of Ralph’s gaze over Isabel’s blindness. I now want to turn to the second 
question, the novel’s much-debated ending, which almost immediately follows the double 
revelation that Madame Merle married Isabel to her own ex-lover, for Isabel’s money, and that 
Ralph was responsible for his father’s will which made Isabel rich. 
Beginning with the narrative leap (of some four years) taken between chapters XXXV 
and XXXVI (during which Isabel marries Osmond and loses a child, along with a number of 
illusions) the plot centers upon Osmond’s attempt to marry his daughter to Lord Warburton (and 
so not to Ned Rosier, with whom Pansy is in love), and Isabel’s debate in her conscience 
between loyalty to her husband’s plan and her creeping suspicion that Madame Merle is too 
involved in these affairs. Acting on this suspicion, Isabel spoils Lord Warburton’s candidacy, 
which has the double result of Madame Merle dropping her mask, and of Osmond sending Pansy 
back to a convent in Rome. At this point, Isabel learns that Ralph is dying in England, 
whereupon Osmond’s sister, the Countess Gemini, with the hope of inspiring Isabel to a total 




at last, and backed into a moral corner, Madame Merle’s parting shot to Isabel is to tell her the 
secret of Mr. Touchett’s will. And this is how everything hidden from Isabel in the first part of 
the novel finally comes out. 
The truth is a matter of perspective, not of presence. Recognition is not just pointing at a 
self-explanatory objectivity. Trees in a magical forest don’t advertise themselves as containing 
the ghosts of slain lovers. Only the stupidest character in the entire book treats recognition as a 
matter of evidence and observation. Having laid bare the noxious underpinnings of Isabel’s 
misery, the Countess Gemini lectures her: 
“Ça me dépasse, if you don’t mind my saying so, the things, all round you, that you’ve 
appeared to succeed in not knowing... Had it never occurred to you that he was for six or 
seven years her lover?” 
“I don’t know. Things have occurred to me, and perhaps that was what they all meant.” 
(II, 365) 
 
Contrast this with Madame Merle’s response to Isabel’s incredulity. The truth is not a matter of 
different knowledge, of additional information, but of where one sees it from. 
“I don’t know why you say such things. I don’t know what you know.” 
“I know nothing but what I’ve guessed. But I’ve guessed that.” (II, 388) 
 
To return to the “house of fiction” metaphor, recognition is not a matter of getting a clearer view, 
switching windows, even of adjusting or wiping off one’s field glasses, but of the viewer’s 
implicit self-location within what she sees there. There is something to-be-illuminated because it 
is there already, in a state of disassembly. But everything is in disassembly: perception is not an 
ordering that comes upon a given scene, but is itself already mixed up with the being of things. 




The point is not to remove the framing to get an unobstructed view, but to see how reality 
itself includes the obstructions of perspective. This is why everything falls apart when Madame 
Merle reveals the identity of Isabel’s benefactor to be Ralph. The sustaining, ideal gaze for 
which Isabel performed her freedom, her destiny, and her loyalty to Osmond (keeping her own 
knowledge of her misery hidden from its view) is unmasked as belonging to her dying, 
disappointed relative. But this gaze is a perspective situated within appearance; it is not the same 
as Isabel’s perspective on appearance. The same is true for Isabel’s realization that her 
counterpart is not Madame Merle, her earlier model, but Pansy, the pawn of Merle and Osmond. 
Again, this is a shift of where Isabel finds her own image mirrored back to her, from “out there” 
where she is looking. 
Like Little Dorrit, where Arthur Clennam’s identity and personal history collapse (along 
with his childhood home) under the light of recognition, the revelations that close The Portrait of 
a Lady don’t so much produce a substantial truth as they illuminate an emptiness, a determinate 
nothingness, where the protagonist ought to have been. At the end, Isabel no longer finds herself 
mirrored in the ideal of Madame Merle, nor is she the addressee of the Other’s impersonal gaze. 
She is denuded of these supports, and can locate herself only in identifying with the unperceived 
“little black speck” (apparently) nowhere to be found in Madame Merle’s past: Pansy. The 
recognitions that close the novel expose Isabel as entirely negated: not as absent or canceled, but 
as a negation present from the start and essential to the structure of her deception and illusions. 
In this sense, James’s method in recognition is almost the opposite of Arthur Conan 
Doyle’s. In the Sherlock Holmes stories, we see a discontinuous and incomprehensible external 
investigation—oblique and seemingly irrelevant inquiries made, curious details ascertained—




Being stuck in Dr. Watson’s perspective, Holmes’s method is as much a mystery to us as the 
crime at hand. In The Portrait of a Lady, we have access to the “investigating” consciousness, 
but it is just this that makes for the blindness and gaps in knowledge. The truth does not come 
about from being approached head on, nor from some refinement in Isabel’s subjective 
outlook—indeed, it is this subjective position which is annihilated. Unlike Sherlock Holmes, or 
Arthur Clennam, or Reverend Crawley, Isabel doesn’t want to know. The recognition comes 
about indirectly—not by pressing on the truth between Madame Merle and Osmond, but by the 
series of maneuvers around marrying Pansy. In other words, the truth emerges only through a 
groping, unsure intervention—not through any epistemological revision, nor by the churning of 
objective inevitability (as in “murder will out”). Everything proceeds not from a question whose 
answer she looks for, but from an uncanny impression she receives and unsuccessfully tries to 
file away. 
Just beyond the threshold of the drawing-room she stopped short, the reason for her doing 
so being that she had received an impression. The impression had, in strictness, nothing 
unprecedented; but she felt it as something new, and the soundlessness of her step gave 
her time to take in the scene before she interrupted it. Madame Merle was there in her 
bonnet, and Gilbert Osmond was talking to her; for a minute they were unaware she had 
come in. Isabel had often seen that before, certainly; but what she had not seen, or at least 
not noticed, was that their colloquy had for the moment converted itself into a sort of 
familiar silence, from which she instantly perceived that her entrance would startle 
them... There was nothing to shock in this; they were old friends in fact. But the thing 
made an image, lasting only a moment, like a sudden flicker of light. Their relative 
positions, their absorbed mutual gaze, struck her as something detected. But it was all 
over by the time she had fairly seen it. (II, 164-5) 
 
 What makes this sight so disturbing? There is “nothing unprecedented,” “nothing to shock in 
this”—just two people talking in a room. Nonetheless, after seeing this, Isabel’s “soul was 
haunted with terrors which crowded to the foreground of thought as quickly as a place was made 
for them” (II, 188). In a word, the scene is uncanny. And, just as Freud’s autobiographical 




Isabel’s finding herself in this tableau vivant, which is so disgusting to her. What a moment 
before was an ideal reflection (Madame Merle as model)—Isabel has just been telling herself, 
“the best way to profit by her friend... was to imitate her, to be as firm and bright as she” (II, 
156)—suddenly becomes tense, startling, eerie.  
 And here Madame Merle is much too close, almost obscenely present. Although, it would 
seem there is no satisfactory distance at which to hold Madame Merle. Isabel, always resistant to 
Mrs. Touchett’s intimation that Madame Merle has made Isabel’s marriage, has becomes more 
so when that marriage has withered into a sarcastic stalemate. If earlier, “she couldn’t make a 
crime of Madame Merle’s having been the producing cause” of her knowing Osmond (II, 158), 
this soon degenerates into something less sure: 
The fact of Madame Merle’s having had a hand in Gilbert Osmond’s marriage ceased to 
be one of her titles to consideration; it might have been written, after all, that there was 
not much to thank her for. As time went on there was less and less, and Isabel said to 
herself that perhaps without her these things would not have been. That reflection was 
instantly stifled; she knew an immediate horror at having made it. “Whatever happens to 
me let me not be unjust,” she said; “let me bear my burdens myself and not shift them 
onto others!” (II, 159) 
 
To associate Madame Merle with [Isabel’s] disappointment would be a petty revenge... 
When a woman had made such a mistake, there was one way to repair it... to accept it. (II, 
160-1) 
 
So, does Isabel grant that Madame Merle made her marriage or not? She is not so much denying 
that this is the case (which she has on good information), as she is refusing herself the 
consolation of believing it, or dwelling on it. She is putting herself on guard, not against the fact, 
but against a certain angle of assault that it suggests. To give ground on this point risks slipping 
from “acceptance” into “unjustly” blaming her unhappiness on others—a trivial and unattractive 
consolation. 




seeing her husband communing with Madame Merle, Isabel could remark on her noticeable 
discretion and distance from Isabel’s affairs—“her old ally was different, was almost detached... 
[I]n this matter of not wishing to intrude upon the inner life of the Osmond family it at last 
occurred to our young woman that [Madame Merle] overdid a little...; she had a dread of 
seeming to meddle” (II, 156-7). Madame Merle’s absenting herself from the Osmonds, washing 
her hands somewhat, concurs entirely with Isabel’s impulse to take all the blame on herself. As 
long as Madame Merle stays away, she and Isabel are working towards the same aim, mirroring 
each other. It is only when Madame Merle is thrust in front of her that this collaboration, the 
reflection of Isabel’s own self-protective denial, becomes suddenly grotesque. 
 It is as though Isabel recognizes in this tête-à-tête a nearly-identical composition (that she 
could not have seen) from earlier in the book, where Osmond and Madame Merle are arranging 
his marriage, strategizing with the same silent communication, the same “absorbed mutual gaze”:  
[A]t a certain moment the element between them, whatever it was, always leveled itself 
and left them more closely face to face than either ever was with any one else. This was 
what had happened now. They stood there knowing each other well and each on the 
whole willing to accept the satisfaction of knowing as a compensation for the 
inconvenience—whatever it might be—of being known. (I, 346) 
 
In other words, it is as though Isabel were witnessing the Norns cutting the thread of her own 
fate. But then, she hasn’t seen this earlier colloquy, and she doesn’t draw this conclusion (“my 
marriage was also made in this way by these fiends”).  
 The whole chain of the recognition might be represented as follows, with Isabel’s 
unconnected, abrupt response to what she sees, and the immediately-following conversation she 
has with Madame Merle, broken up by connections she does not presently make, in parentheses: 
Here, where I thought Madame Merle was conspicuously absent from our family’s affairs 




Osmond discussing Pansy’s marriage (as they had strategized over my own), in which Madame 
Merle is “much too interested” (II, 168) (for anyone not Pansy’s mother). That Osmond should 
prefer to marry Pansy to Lord Warburton than to Edward Rosier is not surprising (since Osmond 
sees this marriage too as a vulgar acquisition of funds), while Mr. Rosier’s troubling Madame 
Merle about the matter is evidently not to the point. “I don’t know what mysterious connection 
he may have discovered between me and Pansy,” says Madame Merle (II, 167). (In fact it is 
directly to the point, Madame Merle having a direct line to Osmond and being intimately 
involved in her nuptial arrangements.) But, being unwilling to publicly break from Osmond, my 
disastrous marriage being my own act and my own shame (but really being a conspiracy hatched 
against me by vile adventurers and liars), I should comply with this indifferent (but actually 
brutally materialistic) choice of a husband (against a poor suitor whom she loves in return, and in 
favor of a rich one who is disconcertingly still in love with me) for Pansy. (Having their 
daughter’s affairs in hand in such a heartless, manipulative, and cynical way, caring only for 
money and in despite of all decency, so, at some past time, they must also have spoken in this 
same pose about me, deceiving me, marrying me and robbing me of my fortune and my self-
respect, while discourteously still keeping me in the dark, burdening me with the blame.) 
 Isabel’s reaction on the spot is, evidently, incomplete and fragmented. She plans to remain 
compliant with Osmond’s wishes, she draws no connection between this marriage and her own, 
and learns nothing definite. The scene in itself is nothing, but these gaps, what is unseen, and 
will only later be illuminated and filled in—this is what is horrible. And these parentheticals 
indicate, over and over, Isabel’s inscription in the scene, which is a repetition of how her own 





 However little she puts everything together, this scene keeps returning to her, as a nameless 
discontent whose origin she can only vaguely place, scraping away at the already-precarious 
sense of where she stands in the world: 
What set [these fears] in motion she hardly knew, unless it was the strange impression 
she had received in the afternoon of her husband’s being in more direct communication 
with Madame Merle than she suspected. That impression came back to her from time to 
time, and now she wondered it had never come before. (II, 188) 
 
But even then she stopped again in the middle of the room and stood there gazing at a 
remembered vision—that of her husband and Madame Merle unconsciously and 
familiarly associated. (II, 204-5) 
 
These returns play out against a shifting background. At first the dominant key is Isabel’s 
insistence, as we might say, that there is nothing to be illuminated in her situation. This outlook 
is bound up with an obstinate self-denial, a welling-up of unexercised energies, and certain 
dubious tenets of belief—elaborated at length in the famous “meditative vigil” before the 
fireplace in Chapter XLII. Glancing over the years since her marriage, Isabel heaps all the blame 
for its evident failure, not on Madame Merle or Osmond, but on herself. “[S]he had not read him 
right” (II, 192). “He was not changed; he had not disguised himself... he had been sincere” (II, 
191). But Isabel—she has disappointed him, misled him, even, during their courtship. “[I]f she 
had not deceived him in intention she understood how completely she must have done so in fact. 
She had effaced herself when he first knew her” (II, 191). Thus, “she had been hypocritical... 
[Her character] was what she had kept in reserve; this was what he had not known until he had 
found himself... face to face with it” (II, 195).  
 These are bitter self-recriminations, harsh and unfair on herself, and Isabel is not only 
surveying a parade of facts—much of what we see her describing, surely she is also hearing for 
the first time, as it were. But she is also running in place. All these thoughts are bookended by 




haunts her, prompting her introspection while refusing to yield its meaning. Her reflections begin 
and end at the same place, however crucial is her intervening penetration into Osmond’s 
malignancy and their “horrible life” (II, 202). She has discovered the falsity of the image of 
Osmond that was presented to her, in which her own ideals were mirrored and her place 
foreordained—nevertheless she is resolved to suffer being walled up, and to “conceal her 
misery” from Ralph; “She concealed it elaborately; she was perpetually, in [her talk with Ralph], 
hanging out curtains and arranging screens” (II, 203). But this deception is not only limited to 
Ralph, she is “playing a part” (II, 204) before the world. “[S]he believed she was not defiant, and 
what could be a better proof of it than that she should linger there half the night, trying to 
persuade herself that there was no reason why Pansy shouldn’t be married as you would put a 
letter in the post office?” (II, 205). In sum, she wants to hide the knowledge of her mistake from 
the Other, to go on as if she had perceived everything rightly and made no error. As yet this is 
only suppositional, but if she were to fix Pansy’s marriage to Lord Warburton, as Osmond had 
requested in the previous chapter, she would make this “as if” into an objective fact, proving—
not to Osmond, nor to herself, nor to the encouraged Lord Warburton, nor to Madame Merle, nor 
to Ralph, who had not been “for a single instant a dupe” (II, 204), but to the searching but easily-
fooled gaze of the Other—that she is a happy and compliant wife. 
 For all that Isabel re-experiences in this vigil, then, she is no closer to an epistemological 
breakthrough. (Many of her insights turn out to be wrong.) Nothing is illuminated here: nothing 
changes in her comprehension of the relationship between Osmond and Madame Merle, i.e. the 
startling impression that prompted her introspection. And for this reason, that all the language of 
discovery and epiphany here shows Isabel entering a scene, finally seeing how things really 




 But she had seen only half his nature then, as one saw the disk of the moon when it was 
partly masked by the shadow of the earth. She saw the full moon now—she saw the 
whole man. She had kept still, as it were, so that he should have a free field, and yet in 
spite of this she had mistake a part for the whole. (II, 191) 
 
 But when, as the months had elapsed, she had followed him further and he had led her 
into the mansion of his own habitation, then, then she had seen where she really was. 
 She could live it over again, the incredulous terror with which she had taken the 
measure of her dwelling. (II, 196) 
 
Isabel imagines that she is entering a new space, behind the image she first encountered—as one 
might discover a secret passageway behind a dusty painting in a Gothic novel. It is for this 
reason that I say there is “nothing to be illuminated” for her, because recognition doesn’t cast 
light on some heretofore-concealed annex, but upon just what is already there, obliterated by 
misprision. For Isabel at this moment, the truth-all-along was an elsewhere, literally the dark side 
of the moon.  
 No recognition, then, because she still does not see herself in the situation, she is still putting 
another “observer” there to look back out at her: the Other’s gaze for whom she is going to 
obligingly throw Pansy into the arms of Lord Warburton. Recognition only occurs when Isabel is 
no longer inserting this reflective “beyond” into her vision. As long as her desires are the desires 
of the Other—first, the idealized obligation to grandly and freely do, then the obligation to hide 
(and persist in) her failure and her entrapment—she overlooks her own role in the situation, 
thereby reproducing it. In plain language: to not know that Osmond married her for her money, 
to blame herself in all the erroneous ways we have just seen, is to blindly replay her own fate in 
Pansy’s.  
 It is only by a first, hesitant intercession that Isabel strikes upon the lever that will invert her 
perspective and bring about recognition. So, in the chapter following Isabel’s fireside reflections, 




Warburton (II, 188), putting the case clearly before Pansy’s suitor. Instead of working upon his 
lingering attachment to her, as Osmond had wished, Isabel jars Warburton out of his plans, by 
suggesting that Pansy’s affections lie elsewhere.  
  “You don’t mean that she cares for him [Rosier]?” 
 “Surely I’ve told you I thought she did.” 
 A quick blush sprang to his brow. “You told me she would have no wish apart from her 
father’s, and I’ve gathered that he would favor me—!” He paused a little and then 
suggested “Don’t you see?” through his blush... 
 [Pansy’s deference towards Osmond, Isabel concedes, is “a very proper feeling.”] Then 
at last she said: “But it hardly strikes me as the sort of feeling to which a man would wish 
to be indebted for a wife.” (II, 219-20) 
 
Then, leaving the party, she tells Ned Rosier, “I’ll do what I can for you. I’m afraid it won’t be 
much, but I’ll do what I can for you” (II, 222).  
 All of this would seem quite removed from recognition as an epistemological reversal. 
Everything hinges on Pansy, whose role in recognition is threefold. 1) Pansy is Isabel’s 
counterpart or analogue; 2) in Pansy’s situation, Isabel can read the falsity and negation of her 
own; 3) this identity is also the fundamental contradiction upon which Isabel’s misprision and 
error (thus her entire situation) rest.  
 1) Pansy as Isabel’s counterpart. Of course, Pansy enters the novel almost as Isabel’s 
negative image: shy and recessive where Isabel is outgoing and opinionated, a “passive spectator 
of the operation of her fate” (I, 337-8) where Isabel is bent upon self-determination, without a 
dowry where Isabel is newly endowed, a little girl where Isabel is a marriageable woman. But 
everything that follows is to undo this opposition. Pansy is, after all, the consummate product of 
Osmond’s system, a human being polished down into an aesthetic object. “She was admirably 
finished; she had the last touch; she was really a consummate piece” (II, 90). Isabel, on the other 
hand, will wish to have made her “self a firm surface, a sort of corselet of silver” (II, 155). Pansy 




edifying text” (I, 401), while Isabel in marrying Osmond imagines herself as “a polished, elegant 
surface” that will reflect his thoughts (II, 79). This is all implicit, however. In the novel’s second 
half, Osmond and Madame Merle’s arranging of Pansy’s marriage becomes for Isabel a déjà vu: 
the same manipulations, the same vulgar cupidity, the same aversion to love or pity, the same 
tendency to “make a convenience” out of persons.  
 2) Pansy as Isabel’s cancelation. But in seeing that her own marriage was “made” by 
Madame Merle in the same ugly way as Pansy’s is being made, Isabel sees her own image—not 
mirrored, but obliterated. The sinking realization is: I am that powerless, wretched creature.  
Pansy... could be felt as an easy victim of fate. She would have no will, no power to 
resist, no sense of her own importance; she would easily be mystified, easily crushed: her 
force would be all in knowing when and where to cling. (II, 26-7, my emphasis). 
 
Of course it is Isabel who, having told Caspar Goodwood, “I shouldn’t be an easy victim” (I, 
224), then becomes one just as much as Pansy. If when Isabel first meets Pansy she finds her 
rather pathetic and pitiable, her opposite in so many ways, Isabel’s tragedy is to recognize that 
she is all these things, that she too was “easily... mystified, easily crushed.”  
 3) Pansy as the fundamental contradiction in Isabel’s situation. When Osmond asks Isabel to 
“cultivate the advantage she possessed” with Lord Warburton, to marry Pansy, this “was not an 
agreeable task; it was in fact a repulsive one” (II, 187). Even as Osmond plays upon the 
interchangeability of his wife and daughter, Isabel experiences her enlistment as a revolting 
compulsion: “It was what she was doing for Osmond; it was what one had to do for Osmond!” 
(II, 257). That Pansy’s situation repeats Isabel’s is not experienced by the latter passively—she is 
drawn into the ploy, made to suffer indignities, scorned for her sense of honor, accused of lying.  
 Pansy is also the literal, biological evidence of the Osmond-Madame Merle tryst. But this is 




Madame Merle glibly disavows that she can help Mr. Rosier in getting Osmond’s ear: “I don’t 
know what mysterious connection he may have discovered between me and Pansy; but he came 
to me from the first” (II, 167). But it is this “mysterious connection,” and her real investment, 
that makes Pansy a sticking point and nexus around which all the flows of the novel coagulate.  
 How does Isabel sift out the truth from the confusions surrounding this action? She “seemed 
to wake from a long pernicious dream” (II, 323) only when Madame Merle finds Isabel directly 
blocking her plan to marry Pansy to Lord Warburton.  
[Madame Merle] had suffered a disappointment which excited Isabel’s surprise—our 
heroine having no knowledge of her zealous interest in Pansy’s marriage; and she 
betrayed it in a manner which quickened Mrs. Osmond’s alarm. More clearly than ever 
before Isabel heard a cold, mocking voice proceed from she knew not where, in the dim 
void that surrounded her, and declare that this bright, strong, definite, worldly woman, 
this incarnation of the practical, the personal, the immediate, was a powerful agent in her 
destiny. She was nearer to her than Isabel had yet discovered, and her nearness was not 
the charming accident she had so long supposed. The sense of accident indeed had died 
within her that day when she happened to be struck with the manner in which the 
wonderful lady and her own husband sat together in private. No definite suspicion had as 
yet taken its place; but it was enough to make her view this friend with a different eye, to 
have been led to reflect that there was more intention in her past behavior than she had 
allowed for at the time... She moved quickly indeed, and with reason, for a strange truth 
was filtering into her soul. Madame Merle’s interest was identical with Osmond’s. (II, 
322-3, my emphasis) 
 
I mentioned earlier that repetition plays in the novel than in Freud’s theory of repetition-
compulsion. Obviously, in the ending of the novel, when Isabel repeats her choice of Osmond, 
this is anything but a fatal, passive recurrence. But here, too, the uncanniness that Isabel is trying 
to label is that this has all happened before: “there was more intention in her past behavior,” too, 
than is comfortable. But what is so repugnant in this recurrence is Madame Merle’s “nearness”—
the sudden, queasy inversion of the perspective of what had been an unobstructed, ideal 
mirroring. The effect that James is conjuring is not unlike the child’s game “Bloody Mary”: 




within grasping distance. What Isabel experiences here is just this sickening anteriority and 
proximity.  
 Finally, the mask drops. Isabel sees, beneath her friend’s sophisticated and charming 
discourse and the enticing “verdant meads” of her appearance, the wall of “human bones that 
whiten all the ground,” where “human carnage taints the dreadful shore” of her Siren’s rock, 
visible to the uncharmed spectator.292  
 “Let him off—let us have him!” 
 Madame Merle had proceeded very deliberately, watching her companion and 
apparently thinking she could proceed safely. As she went on Isabel grew pale; she 
clasped her hands more tightly in her lap. It was not that her visitor had at last thought it 
the right time to be insolent; for this was not what was most apparent. It was a worse 
horror than that. “Who are you—what are you?” Isabel murmured. “What have you to do 
with my husband?”...  
 “What have you to do with me?” Isabel went on. 
 Madame Merle slowly got up, stroking her muff, but not removing her eyes from 
Isabel’s face. “Everything!” she answered. 
 Isabel sat there looking up at her, without rising; her face was almost a prayer to be 
enlightened. But the light of this woman’s eyes seemed only a darkness. “Oh misery!” 
she murmured at last; and she fell back, covering her face with her hands. It had come 
over her like a high-surging wave that Mrs. Touchett was right. Madame Merle had 
married her. (II, 326-7) 
 
Leaving aside the recognition for a moment, what stands out here is the the audacity of Madame 
Merle’s power over Isabel, her frank and unapologetic domination (with Osmond) of Isabel. If 
she drops her mask, she does so advisedly—it isn’t a slip-up. For me it is hard to read the first 
person plural, “let us have him!” without the overtones of Linda Blair in The Exorcist, which 
exactly complements the effect James is after: something unholy is being revealed here, 
moreover something insolent to all decency. 
 James has earlier prepared us for the form of this scene: Isabel is aware that about Madame 
Merle “there was a corner of the curtain that never was lifted; it was as if she remained after all 
something of a public performer, condemned to emerge only in character and in costume” (II, 
                                                




39). We know that Isabel has posited such a space behind the curtain, mask, what have you. 
There are early intimations of “an occasional flash of cruelty, an occasional lapse from candor” 
(II, 39). Isabel naively draws from these glimpses that Madame Merle “doesn’t understand” her, 
leaving Isabel “with a vague dismay in which there was even an element of foreboding” (II, 40). 
That is, Isabel assumes that if Madame Merle has an unseen side, other than the performative and 
narcissistically appealing (the song of the Sirens), that this unknown is totally other than Isabel 
and cannot comprehend her. But this truth, which Isabel has supposed to be held asunder, 
irreconcilable with her own truth, is in this scene disquietingly revealed to be a knowledge of 
Isabel that she herself lacks. As she reviews the past once more, it occurs to her now, with a 
certain detachment and flatness of tone, with an affectless weighing of options, what her 
marriage really is: 
She found herself confronted in this manner with the conviction that the man in the world 
whom she had supposed to be the least sordid had married her, like a vulgar adventurer, 
for her money. Strange to say, it had never before occurred to her; if she had thought a 
good deal of harm of Osmond she had not done him this particular injury. (II, 330) 
 
 
Recognition might be thought to clarify things. To know the truth of a situation ought to 
crystallize the possibilities for action, but Isabel is as mired in confusion as before. Defeated, left 
with the thin consolation of moral judgment, she retires to taste afresh her acid fate and handle 
these new facts. Osmond is still a formidable, deliberate obstruction, whose every action is “an 
elaborate mystification, addressed to herself and destined to act upon her imagination” (II, 348). 
She is left, one might say, confirmed in her hopelessness and lack of comfort. But further 
revelations await. Isabel has learned that Ralph Touchett, returned to England, is finally at 
death’s door, but under Osmond’s iron refusal, his “blasphemous sophistry,” “action had been 




she cannot bring herself to leave. Isabel would not go to England unless the Countess Gemini, 
mischievously forcing a break between her brother and his wife, asked her what she really knows 
about Osmond and Madame Merle: 
 “Had it never occurred to you that he was for six or seven years her lover?” 
 “I don’t know. Things have occurred to me, and perhaps that was what they all meant.” 
(II, 365).  
 
The whole thing takes about ten pages: that the first Mrs. Osmond had no children; how Pansy 
was born to Madame Merle but passed off as the dead wife’s child, somewhere in the Italian 
Alps; how the two lovers broke things off but remained in cahoots; how finally Osmond has tired 
of her after securing Isabel’s fortune; and that Pansy remains the one point where Madame Merle 
can be touched.  
 The swapping of Pansy’s live, illegitimate mother with a corpse really belongs to a more 
sensational book, something like The Count of Monte Cristo or The Woman in White. In that 
context, this secret would be the knot holding together all the strands of deception—the plot 
could not survive its revelation.293 In The Portrait of a Lady, though, this recognition is really a 
dead end. Isabel finds that she has been reified, made a commodity (“a convenience” [II, 410]), 
her agency and determination negated.  
 Isabel saw it all as distinctly as if it had been reflected in a large clear glass... She saw, 
in the crude light of that revelation which had already become a part of experience and to 
which the very frailty of the vessel in which it had been offered her only gave an intrinsic 
price, the dry staring fact that she had been an applied handled hung-up tool, as senseless 
and convenient as mere shaped wood and iron. All the bitterness of this knowledge 
surged into her soul again; it was as if she felt on her lips the taste of dishonor. (II, 378-9) 
 
In other words, this recognition does not bring enlightenment, or dispel the shadows lowering 
over Isabel Archer. The “large clear glass” shows to her only its “crude light” and bitter things: 
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her own non-being and her hopes laid waste. How far from Arthur Clennam learning that his real 
mother was a creature of art and light, or Reverend Crawley hearing of his innocence and 
weeping, or Sherlock Holmes getting his man! Isabel is only confirmed in “the ruin of her 
happiness” (II, 327). This recognition confronts Isabel with her desires in their most heinous 
realizations, before which she recoils. Aphanisis—not identification. 
 A second recognition is required for Isabel to see, in this obliteration, her own desires (as both 
mutilated and realized). In Hegelian terms, recognition only occurs as the negation of the 
negation: Isabel cannot find herself in this wreckage until the very framework of her observation 
is also annulled.   
 “I’m going to ask you a strange question,” said Madame Merle. “Are you very fond of 
your cousin?” And she gave a smile as strange as her utterance. 
 “Yes, I’m very fond of him. But I don’t understand you.”  
 She just hung fire. “It’s rather hard to explain. Something has occurred to me which 
may not have occurred to you, and I give you the benefit of my idea. Your cousin did you 
once a great service. Have you never guessed it?”  
 “He has done me many services.”  
 “Yes; but one was much above the rest. He made you a rich woman.”  
 “He made me—?”  
 Madame Merle appearing to see herself successful, she went on more triumphantly: “He 
imparted to you that extra lustre which was required to make you a brilliant match. At 
bottom it’s him you’ve to thank.” She stopped; there was something in Isabel’s eyes. 
 “I don’t understand you. It was my uncle’s money.”  
 “Yes; it was your uncle’s money, but it was your cousin’s idea. He brought his father 
over to it. Ah, my dear, the sum was large!” […] 
 Isabel went to the door and, when she had opened it, stood a moment with her hand on 
the latch. Then she said—it was her only revenge: “I believed it was you I had to thank!” 
(II, 388-9) 
 
At first this is only a dreadful irony—another twist of the knife. This is how Ralph has always 
felt it. In trying to give Isabel the key to a beautiful and free life, he really delivered her to a 
jailor. On learning of her marriage, “Ralph was shocked and humiliated; his calculations had 
been false and the person in the world in whom he was most interested was lost.” (II, 61) My 




his watching her through her long trial, as unconsciously already incorporated into her choices 
and failures. What Ralph sees of Isabel’s fate is fundamentally preceded by the fact of his seeing 
it, of her freedom being structured by his observation.  
 In discussing this reading with others, I have heard it said that I am “blaming” Ralph for 
everything that happens. Yes and no. Madame Merle is being sardonic when she tells Isabel that 
she has Ralph “to thank” for her marriage to Osmond—but she is not technically wrong. Isabel 
herself admits that, if not “for her money... she would never have done it,” i.e. never married 
Osmond (II, 192). But otherwise, no. For it is not Ralph himself, but Isabel’s interpretation of his 
(beautiful, generous) act—in fact, her elimination of her cousin from her horizon and substituting 
a transcendent notion of her grand destiny in the eyes of the world—that is to be blamed. 
Paradoxically, everything goes wrong in Ralph’s absence from his gift to Isabel. “Who” is 
responsible is really the Other that Isabel installs in the place of that absence—and what she 
learns from Madame Merle is that this Other simply does not exist. 
 Isabel is all alone in making her momentous decision, which she (like James!s Maisie, 
Catherine Sloper in Washington Square, or Tita in “The Aspern Papers”) cannot expect to be 
further comprehended or externally ratified. (This is essentially Robert Pippin’s point in his book 
on James—there is no stable set of norms in “modernity” to which one can appeal.) This solitude 
is not a secure presence-to-self; what she faces is her own reduction and defeat. Isabel’s position 
after learning that Madame Merle and Osmond were lovers, that she had been married for her 
money, and so on, is worlds apart from her position a few pages later when she learns that all of 
this followed from Ralph’s self-disinheritance. The first case is only the completion of the 
debacle, the filling-in of the parenthetical gaps of Madame Merle’s ghastly betrayal of her trust. 




being ensnared by unscrupulous fortune hunters, nor of aesthetically objectifying herself—her 
ensnarement is her subordination to the gaze and desire of the Other. All of this is “for” another 
who disappears at the pronunciation of Madame Merle’s words—the only thing left is for Isabel 
to claim these horrors as realizations of her own wishes.  
* 
 As Isabel journeys back to England, the landscape of her past flits before her: 
It was extraordinary the things she remembered. Now that she was in the secret, now that 
she knew something that so much concerned her and the eclipse of which had made life 
resemble an attempt to play whist with an imperfect pack of cards, the truth of things, 
their mutual relations, their meaning, and for the most part their horror, rose before her 
with a kind of architectural vastness. She remembered a thousand trifles; they started to 
life with the spontaneity of a shiver. She had thought them trifles at the time; now she 
saw that they had been weighted with lead. (II, 390-1) 
 
The revelations that have been almost inflicted upon her continue to stretch out, to fold into 
themselves new connections, to overturn and reorganize—but the past is here almost literally 
another country, and Isabel pushes it to one side. “Yet even now they were trifles after all, for of 
what use was it to her to understand them? Nothing seemed of use to her today. All purpose, all 
intention, was suspended.” (II, 390-1). “There was nothing to regret now” (II, 391)—even the 
events of the early part of the novel now “came before here as the deed of another person” (II, 
393).  
 But Isabel is not quite beginning with a fresh slate. She has promised Pansy to return, and 
even if she tells Henrietta Stackpole, “I’m not sure I myself see now” why she thus committed 
herself, still “my having promised will do” in the absence of a substantial reason (II, 398). But 
even this is not final: “she decided nothing; her coming itself had not been a decision” (II, 421). 
 Her last encounter with Caspar Goodwood decides her. This scene cannot be read too closely. 




of purpose; her hands, hanging at her sides, lost themselves in the folds of her black dress; her 
eyes gazed vaguely before her” (II, 429). Caspar, coming before her in his unflinching frankness, 
launches into another assertive tirade. “You must save what you can of your life,” he tells her (II, 
434).  
 Everything Isabel says is to contradict and resist his logic. Caspar asks, “Why should you go 
back—why should go through that ghastly form?” 
 “To get away from you!” she answered. But this expressed only a little of what she felt. 
The rest was that she had never been loved before. She had believed it, but this was 
different; this was the hot wind of the desert, at the approach of which the others dropped 
dead, like mere sweet aris of the garden. It wrapped her about; it lifted her off her feet, 
while the very taste of it, as of something potent, acrid and strange, forced open her set 
teeth. (II, 433-4) 
 
The narrator adds: “I know not whether she believed everything he said; but she believed just 
then that to let him take her in his arms would be the next best thing to her dying” (II, 435). Then 
he does take her in his arms, and it is rather like dying: “So she had heard of those wrecked and 
under water following a train of images before they sink” (II, 436). But when the kiss is over, she 
flees back to the house. “She had not known where to turn; but she knew now. There was a very 
straight path” (II, 436). On the next page, we learn that she has gone to Rome, and then the book 
ends.  
 To Caspar, Isabel’s options are clear: on one hand, he can tell her, “You’re the most unhappy 
of women, and your husband’s the deadliest of fiends” (II, 432), and on the other hand, “If you’ll 
only trust me, how little you will be disappointed!” (II, 435). And without his help, she is utterly 
hopeless: “You’re perfectly alone; you don’t know where to turn. You can’t turn anywhere; you 
know that perfectly” (II, 433). Add to this that Isabel is suddenly overwhelmed with a sexual 
passion for this man, which is then entered into physical evidence, and that she also learns at this 




in her renouncing what we have been decidedly convinced by.  
 Now, Isabel’s character is an avowed enemy of this logic. She turned down Lord Warburton 
on the grounds that, as she says, “I can’t escape unhappiness... In marrying you I shall be trying 
to... I can never be happy in any extraordinary way; not by turning, by separating myself” (I, 
186-7). She still holds to this deep into the stagnation of her marriage, telling “let me bear my 
burdens myself and not shift them upon others!” (II, 159). But I do not think this is the whole 
story (that Isabel has a principled stand of renunciation and causing herself to suffer alone). And 
we must take Isabel at her word when she says that her commitment to Pansy is vague and 
mutable. The final identification with Pansy is this, that in understanding at last what it is to be 
loved, she understands what Pansy has to lose. For Isabel, this is already lost—she is simply not 
going to be with Caspar, James never falters in telling us so—but Isabel, by not turning, not 
separating herself, can revive the future of her stepdaughter. Isabel’s going back to Rome is not 
owing to any binding promise to Pansy, no, but in doing so she will be standing in the way of a 
repetition of her own fate. Whereas, to take Caspar’s word at face value, to engage in flights of 
independence and unattached liberty, would be precisely to make the same error twice.  
 Remember: everything has already changed since Isabel started for England. That impulse 
was under the pressure of Ralph’s dying and Countess Gemini’s information. But before her 
departure (though still in Rome) Madame Merle related the secret of Isabel’s inheritance. The 
recognitions could not be more precisely staggered. So that (old) situation no longer exists. 
Madame Merle has gone to America; since Ralph is dead, she no longer has to hide her misery 
from him while he pretends to be believe her. Her choice is not, then, as Caspar would have it, 
between a new future with him, and a “return.” Paradoxically, this new situation exists only if 




“trying to.” It is just this possibility or attempt that she rejects—paying the price for clinging to 
her original desire (which she repeats in returning to Rome) by giving up what she knows is an 
impossibility (“It’s awful what she’ll have to pay for it,” Ralph had said [II, 433]): the sexual 
relationship she would have with Caspar. In doing so she refuses the illusion of some full, 
untainted domain of happiness (the very thing that first got her in trouble!) that exists in another 
dimension but can still be accessed—the illusion that motivates the ghost story “The Jolly 
Corner.” Isabel will instead persist in her original desire, repeating her choice of Osmond. 
Beyond the death of this desire at the hands of Madame Merle and Osmond, Isabel persists in the 
sense that she will now find herself in its chain of effects, in the parenthetical gaps that were 
enigmas before, and in identifying with Pansy as her counterpart. 
 In making his speech, Caspar tells Isabel, “The world’s all before us—and the world’s very 
big” (II, 435), recalling the last lines of Paradise Lost:  
Some natural tears they dropped, but wiped them soon: 
The world was all before them, where to choose 
Their place of rest, and providence their guide; 
They hand in hand, with wandering steps and slow, 
Through Eden took their solitary way.294 
 
Freedom, alas, is just this loneliness and loss and uncertainty. There is no avoiding of death and 
only increase of pain—this is what they have chosen in the Fall. But it is a new world. In going 
back to Rome, Isabel chooses certain hardship and an uncertain end. She also returns freedom to 
her early choice, insisting retroactively in her desires even where they were most fatal and most 




                                                






 In his book on Wagner, Adorno refuses the usual idea of the composer as presenting an 
archaic world of lost heroic values, by revealing at every turn the “taint of the commodity” in 
Wagner’s orchestral color,295 his use of the leitmotiv,296 and the theatrical gesture.297 Reification 
also turns up in the least likely of places, not only in the various arts that make up the 
Gesamtkunstwerk,298 but even in Wagner’s ratio of clarinets to flutes.299 To Adorno, Wagner’s 
art is deeply complicit in a passive, defeated affirmation of bourgeois dominion, such that for 
Wagner, “the task of music is to warm up the alienated and reified relations of men and make 
them sound as if they were still human.”300 
 Adorno also criticized Wagner’s handling of recognition scenes, especially those in The 
Nibelung!s Ring, which he figures as a succession of clunky, even tasteless dramatic botches. 
“Secrets that have long since become public are confided in gossipy detail; Sigmund declares 
with pathos that Volsa is his father even though he has previously addressed him as such. 
Hunding instantly detects the resemblance between Sigmund and Sieglinde, yet the subsequent 
revelation that the two are brother and sister is supposed to shock.”301 He could have further 
added: when the magical love potion is dispelled, Siegfried recognizes Brunhilde as the love he 
has betrayed under its spell; Hunding discovers that the stranger stopping in his house for the 
night is the very enemy he has been tracking down to kill; Siegfried is able to hear Mime's inner 
thoughts in his speech after he has tasted the dragon's blood. These recognitions are none of the 
most artful. In Aristotle’s hierarchy, they are plainly inferior since they rely on tokens and 
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potions. (The same unabashed contrivance can also be found in the recognition scenes of 
Shakespeare’s late romances, The Tempest, Pericles, Cymbeline, and A Winter's Tale.) 
 Adorno’s criticism of reification in Wagner, and Wagner’s use of recognition, raise all the 
most pressing questions about these two paradoxical and interpenetrating concepts. Why does 
recognition shade into identity and closure? Are reification and its form of subjectivity 
ontologically inevitable? And can recognition in art dispel reification in life?   
 Why does recognition shade into identity and closure? For Adorno’s “negative dialectics,” 
closure and identity are the worst of bad words. Recognition scenes could easily be read as a tool 
of conservatism, of preservation, of a difference that is no difference, an upheaval that leaves 
everything the same (as in Fielding!s eleventh-hour revelations). So, for Adorno, the conclusion 
of The Nibelung!s Ring is no conclusion at all, but an arbitrary cap or limit point imposed on the 
music from without. “The pretended infinity remains bad; it is no more than the husk of 
something finite.”302 Wagner!s sonority has renounced “the unattainable claim to give 
meaningful shape to the passage of time,” settling for an indefinite postponementof tension and 
dissonance.303  
 Closure and identity are for Adorno refusals of history, a ruse of a listless totality, ruled by 
complicit bad faith and postponement disguised as negation. “The fact that resistance is produced 
by the social totality has its corollary in the end, in the identification of resistance with 
domination: here is the outer limit of power of the Ring to interpret history, and from there it 
seeps away into the void... The totality itself... is the bad eternity of rebellion as anarchy and 
unrelenting self-destruction.”304 
 Are reification and its form of subjectivity ontologically inevitable? Reification, as Adorno 
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uses the concept, is at once central to his thinking and inconsistently (or not at all) defined.305 
Reification for Adorno is a severing. In his book on Wagner, the term most often appears in 
paradoxical aphorisms, paired with “alienation,” befitting Adorno!s criticism of bourgeois 
society in which “all categories are objectified and become independent... they are cut off from 
the living subject which constitute the substance of concepts.”306 But Adorno is also intent on 
preserving this separation, of not collapsing thought into an easy identity with reality; this is his 
criticism of Lukács and of recognition. History and Class Consciousness “presupposes the 
reconcilement of subject and object and thus relapses into idealism,”307 that is, recognition is 
smuggled into and inscribed in reification from the start. 
 Reification for Adorno is a kind of conceptual alienation: the subjectivity determined by 
reification is one where concepts appear in the “wrong” place, as the properties of things. 
Basically, reification for Adorno begins in exchange-value: the forced equivalences and 
misaligned properties arising in circulation, rather than from (as in Marx and Lukács) the 
abstraction of labor in constituting values. Objectification (of value in commodities) “alienates” 
what is conceptually appropriate to use-values, giving rise to “identity thinking.” Thus for 
Adorno, reification “should not be conceptualized as a "fact of consciousness,! a subjective or 
socio-psychological category,”308 because commodification is a kind of split or falsified 
immanence. However, this splitting of the concept extends back into subjectivity itself, which is 
in turn fragmented, as an extraterritorial “interiority.”  
 Thus, the best instance of Adorno!s sense of reification—as “the appearance of society, as if it 
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had the properties to which the concepts refer”309—would be the complicated dialectic between 
Wotan (as Will) and Siegfried (as ignorant resignation) in the demise of the world. Here “the 
opacity and omnipotence of the social process... is celebrated as a metaphysical mystery” 
whereby consciousness can only range itself “on the side of the dominant forces.”310 This is 
“reified” because the totality, consciousness, and negation all show up in the wrong places, 
separated from their conceptual immanence, “badly determined.”311 And subjectivity follows 
suit, not as representing something given to consciousness, but as itself alienated, isolated, 
dehistoricized and ambivalent (split over two characters).  
 Can recognition in art dispel reification in life? In the aesthetic realm, Adorno!s critique of 
reification as objectification leads to the criticism of the commodity-character of artworks. So, 
the “antinomy of aesthetic reification” takes this paradoxical form: “If it is essential to artworks 
that they be things, it is no less essential that they negate their own status as things.”312 As 
Timothy Bewes points out, reification (on this model) is therefore simultaneously always anxiety 
about reification.313 It is perhaps inevitable then that Kafka become for the Frankfurt School the 
exemplary artist of modernity, given his refusal of completeness and the “use-value” of 
comprehensibility—where even the non-publication of Kafka!s works becomes a heroic negation 
of the commodity status of mass-cultural artworks. Walter Benjamin observes, “No other writers 
has obeyed the commandment "Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image! so faithfully.”314 
This counts as “reification,” of course, not in any sense having to do with Marx!s categories of 
abstract and concrete labor in the value-form, but reification as “the thoroughly mystical concept 
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of !idolatry" by another name.”315 
 In the following reading of recognition in Wagner"s The Ring of the Nibelungs, the drama 
turns in all its massiveness upon Wotan's never-uttered recognition of the Valkyrie Brünnhilde as 
the free “Other” who is simultaneously opposed to Wotan and enacting his will, which 
Brünnhilde takes upon herself. This identity in otherness produces no scene of discovery and 
cognizance, but this recognition silently undergirds the entire downfall of the Gods.  
 The scene in question is Act Two, Scene Two of Die Walküre. The god Wotan has been 
forbidden by his wife Fricka from aiding the hero he father, Siegmund. Wotan orders his 
daughter, the Valkyrie Brünnhilde, to break Siegmund's sword in the fray of battle—Brünnhilde, 
who tells Wotan she is nothing but his own “will”: “Zu Wotans Willen sprichst du.” Wotan, 
bound by the pacts and treaties that render him his might, bemoans the contradiction in his power 
and his will, that his deepest purpose can only be accomplished by an Other who will oppose his 
decree.  
How can I create a free agent whom I have never protected, who by defying me will be 
most dear to me? How can I make that Other, no longer part of me, who of his own 
accord will do what I alone desire? What a predicament for a god, a grievous disgrace! 
With disgust I find only myself, every time, in everything I create. The Other man for 
whom I long, that Other I can never find: for the Free man has to create himself; I can 
only create subjects to myself. (II, ii) 
 
Wotan's own actions, then, are caught in a perverse loop whereby his volition and omnipotence, 
by their very logic, are reduced to a mechanistic, objectified unfreedom (the servitude of mere 
automata). What Wotan comes to desire, however, is his own end, the wiping-clean of the Aesir 
slate. That is—and here we are not far from Hegel's master-slave dialectic—someone who will 
be an independent self-consciousness willing to oppose Wotan and thereby satisfy him.  
But if recognition would consist in Wotan seeing this, finding his will fulfilled and 
                                                




simultaneously opposed by an Other, then we should be looking for a scene where Wotan 
acknowledges Siegfried, the accredited hero who brings about the longed-for catastrophe. 
However, the bold indifference and cross purposes of their meeting in the third opera hardly 
fulfill these expectations. I propose instead that Wotan sees in Brünnhilde the embodiment of a 
free agent who by opposing him and acting without his support, is also his own will. To look for 
a recognition scene, then, is stupid: the very terms laid out above stipulate that Wotan be 
separated from his agent, not support him or her. When he tells her, “I must shun you, no more 
may I share whispered counsels with you; parted, we may no more act in concert” (III, iii), this is 
not a continued misrecognition by Wotan. It is to the letter the separation he desired earlier. To 
be more explicit would be mere winking. In fact it would undo what is being precisely 
recognized: that Brünnhilde must henceforth act entirely free from Wotan. In his ostentatious 
disowning of the Valkyrie, he acknowledges by stages the congruence of every aspect of the free 
agent he was searching for. He only doesn't say this, since that would be a performative 
contradiction throwing them once more into collusion.  
 Wotan's severing of himself from Brünnhilde is therefore not a recognition scene in the “bad” 
Aristotelian sense of Sieglinde and Sigmund, who discover that they look so much alike; as with 
the Oedipus we have here the collapse of the recognizer!s “place” (the Götterdämmerung that 
abolishes Wotan's supremacy) and the retroactive illumination of the past!s significance. In 
confining Brünnhilde to the ice fortress, Wotan restores meaning to the course of events since 
Das Rheingold: Brünnhilde's disobedience is not the interruption of Wotan!s plan, i.e. one of a 
series of obstacles including Alberich!s theft of the Ring—this is the plan itself, the canceling of 
the restrictions and bonds that comprise Wotan:  
Against myself I had turned myself in agony; above stunning sorrows I had risen in a 




my own world I would end my endless sadness. (III, iii) 
 
Wotan!s recognition here inverts the interpretive valence of the main act of the entire cycle, 
Wotan!s rupture with the law in stealing the Ring from Alberich. Previously, we had to read this 
as a tragic aberration and overstepping, as throwing the law out of a primal balance. After this 
scene with Brünnhilde, the unbalance (to be eradicated) appears not as the theft but as the law 
itself. 
 The next two operas should be read as unfolding the destiny of this recognition, all the way 
down to Brünnhilde’s immolation. Plainly, it is she and not the vapid Siegfried who brings about 
the downfall of the Gods, sets fire to Valhalla, frustrates Alberich and Hagen, returns the Ring to 
the Rhinemaidens, and fulfills Wotan’s will to destruction. But she does all of this in the name of 
her original, free defiance of Wotan, from which she never turns.  
Your life I sheltered in Sieglinde’s womb; before she had borne you, I was your shield. 
So long have I loved you, Siegfried! ... I loved you always, for I divined the thought that 
Wotan had hidden, guessed the secret thought I dared not even whisper; I did not shape it, 
rather I felt it; and so I fought, urged by that deed, when I defied the god who conceived 
it; and then I suffered, slept on this rock, for that thought still secret, that thought I felt! 
Know what that thought was; ah, you can guess it! That thought was my love for you! 
(Siegfried, III, iii) 
 
In the terms of Adorno’s criticism, then: 
 Recognition is no closure at all—Brünnhilde’s trajectory starts from this tenuous identity 
which is nowhere stated aloud. Recognition is not a terminus but a task. The same cannot be said 
of “recognition scenes”—when Gutrune learns of Siegfried’s first winning of Brünnhilde, her 
character is thenceforth mute. 
GUTRUNE (breaking out in sudden despair): Accursed Hagen! By your advice I gave 
him the drink that made him forget! Ah, sorrow! My eyes are opened. Brünnhilde was his 
true love, whom through the drink he forgot. (Filled with shame, she turns away from 
Siegfried and, abandoning herself to grief, bends over Gunther’s body; so she remains, 





Just so, Siegfried lives only a couple of minutes after he regains his memory, promptly giving 
himself away to Gunther in another Aristotelian recognition scene. Brünnhilde’s recognition, 
however, is authentically tragic: first she is symbolically unmade, divested of Godhead, and two 
evenings later, hurls herself upon the flames, renouncing the renunciation Alberich made to gain 
the Ring in the first place.  
 Against Adorno’s reading,316 the Siegfried-Wotan identity is staged as a spurious one, a comic 
reprisal of Oedipus knocking Laertes upside the head on the way to Thebes. Far from a 
recognition, their meeting is an anti-climactic travesty of crossed signals, repeating (in reverse) 
the true violence of Wotan’s shattering of Notung in Die Walküre (his hand having been forced 
there by Brünnhilde’s disobedience). And when Siegfried arrives at the Gibichung hall, he is 
already an anachronism, such that he is immediately instrumentalized by Hagen and Gunther.  
Thus, reification is not ontologically inevitable (as it might seem to be in the terms of 
“objectification” or “dialectic of enlightenment”). Reification is rather a framework of 
objectification. Reification (as in the Christian perspective Unhappy Consciousness) means the 
organization of the world as the work of the Essence/unchangeable Subject, the grind of the 
“beyond” that must “become flesh.” Reification is the bad infinity of this objectification, the 
“trap” of value’s ontology, capital making the world over in its image, bodying forth only an 
impotent chain of sameness, whether in Marx’s formula M-C-M, or Wotan’s plaint that he can 
create only slaves, but not a free subject. As God bodies forth Christ and Wotan the Volsung 
line, value bodies forth the commodity.  
 Finally, art must go through reification—not as “objectification” or the making of graven 
images, but in reification as a structure of misrecognition. This whole time, I have been 
discussing recognition as an aspect of plot, where reification appears in the cracks. But with 
                                                




Wagner, we are no longer dealing only with literary-dramatic mimesis. I wonder if these things 
are possible in music. Can we think an aesthetics of non-mimetic “recognition,” i.e. an aesthetics 
that meant negating the place where we start from in any transcendental framework, an art that 
undoes the bad determination, the skewed perspective—while revealing that it is this 
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